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1

INTRODUCTION

Although the idea of unified Europe is not new, for centuries confrontation between
powerful European states and attempts to conquer the continent by force took precedence over a
union based on the free will of European governments and solidarity between the peoples of
Europe. Thus, for a long time the idea of European unification remained a utopian ideal
cherished primarily by the intellectual elite. After World War I, the prospect of peaceful
unification of Europe resurfaced. This idea was met with reservations by the European political
elite, so the vague projects for a European Union faded away again without tangible results. The
terror of the Second World War and its destruction reinvigorated the need to undertake pragmatic
actions to build a peaceful and unified Europe. However, the refusal of the Soviet Union and
Eastern European states to be a part of the Marshall Plan and the blockade of West Berlin in
1949 ended WWII victors’ military cooperation and led to almost half a century of political
division between Western and Eastern Europe. The Cold War began, which made the dream of
European unity a political impossibility. The two pieces of the divided continent parted ways in
separate unifications driven by two inherently different ideological doctrines. In this atmosphere
loaded with fear and tensions, the first organizations of cooperation were designed for military
defense from the politically-different. Therefore, where the Warsaw Pact (1955) was designed to
counter security threats to Eastern Europe from the West, the WEU (1948) and NATO (1949)
protected the military safety of Western Europe. The political cooperation amongst the countries
from the Soviet Blok was orchestrated by the Kremlin, which designated the states’ ruling
communist governments and directed cooperation within the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) that was created in 1949. However, in Western Europe political and
economic unification took various shapes, based on the states’ own specific needs and goals.

2

This evolving process of cooperation on various levels in Western Europe made the unthinkable
half-a-century ago unification of the entire continent a realistic possibility.
The development of European organizations in Western Europe progressed in two
directions: functionalist and neofunctionalist integration, since the EU itself is a construct of
neoliberal institutionalism. At different times, strong forces appeared to drive the EU in both
directions, although at present there is a strong current that appears to be driving the EU away
from neofunctionalist integration. The reason for this is because for both types of organizations,
their emergence and evolution were determined to a much greater extent by political context,
rather than from philosophical or economic goals. Ultimately, the philosophical and economic
goals were just a means to achieve broader political aims by powerful states. In order to illustrate
this, next I will trace the various trajectories of development of the EU from inception through
today.
1.1

Intergovernmental Cooperation versus Neo-functionalist Integration
I begin by examining the functionalist and neofunctionalist divisions in EU studies by a

review of the relevant literature which includes Mitrany’s (1948) functionalist perspective that
maintains that states do not have to surrender their sovereignty to a central authority, which is
more desirable by states. He argued that in international relations there are controversial and
non-controversial issues. States can come together in order to resolve a non-controversial issue
that is highly technical. Thus, states would surrender only a portion of their sovereignty in order
to successfully address this issue. Eventually, state cooperation may move onto solving more
controversial and less technical issues. On the other hand, Haas’ (1961) neo-functionalist
perspective maintained that EU integration is elite instead of state driven. According to this
approach, the elites switch their loyalty to an organization that seeks authority of their states.
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This is possible only through upgrading common interests and the process variables of ideational
similarity, certain level of economic development, country size, and policies that are enacted
during the process of integration. When these conditions exist, the economic integration will
automatically become political integration. Haas (1961) maintains that all of these existed in the
case of European integration and that European integration will proceed at much faster pace than
in other parts of the world, because they are not as similar as European states are. However, he
maintains that different functionalist approach or interest configuration may allow for integration
in other parts of the world. Nye (1965) provided a valuable addition to the functional and neofunctional approaches by observing that the functional arrangement may deepen, but it may not
really expand to other areas. In order for functional arrangements to deepen, he maintains that
the number of actors and bureaucracy must be increased in order to improve transparency and
allow for conversation of political integration. However, he also suggested that integration in
other parts of the world besides Europe is possible.
However, according to Martin (1992) the nature of the issue at hand determines regime
formation as well as its level of institutionalization. The nature of state interaction varies from
one issue area onto another, so do the games that are played and their solutions. In collaboration
games (Prisoners Dilemma) the optimal outcome for both actors is when they cooperate.
However, due to concerns of cheating, they decide to defect. Here a multilateral institution can
provide the monitoring, reciprocity, lower the transaction costs, and information and is,
therefore, the best approach. In cooperation games (Game of the Sexes), equilibrium is hard to
reach, but once reached, it is very stable. Here a formal organization is not needed, but the
multilateral norms will provide the necessary information in order for the actors to negotiate the
equilibrium. In a Suasion Game, the hegemon provides the public good, but is concerned that the
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smaller state will free-ride and benefit anyways. Here, the best solution can be if the stronger
state coerces or convinces the smaller state to cooperate through issue linkage. Here, multilateral
institutions can provide the platform for issue-linkage. And finally, in Assurance Games, what is
need for states to cooperate is some assurance and information. Here formal organization is not
needed, but instead multilateral norms would do. To this Young (1980) adds that the nature of
the issue must lend itself to contractarian arrangements, meaning that there cannot be a winner
and a loser, there must be some clear monitoring mechanism, the issue must be clear and simple
and provide equity, there may be some exogenous shock that prompts states to cooperate, and
entrepreneurial leadership is a must. Nevertheless, even if the issue at hands lends itself to
certain kind of institutional setting as Young (1980) and Martin (1992) argue, it is still
conceivable to increase institutional effectiveness and, therefore, appeal to other states by
designing better compliance mechanisms with increased transparency and early detection
systems that can reduce the burden for states by using an existing infrastructure for the new
compliance mechanism (Mitchell, Chayes and Chayes 1989).
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal's (2001) rational design perspective maintains that
institutions are the rational outcome of state negotiations. States create this design with
consideration of distribution, enforcement, and uncertainty about behavior, the preferences of
others, and the state of the world. Their work is rather different than earlier literature on
cooperation such as Keohane’s (1984), who concluded that recurring interactions can lead to
rational cooperation. However, Duffield (2007) criticized Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001)
because by only considering formal organization this view reverts back to a previous stage of
institutional research and avoids considerations of power and interests of states. Also, it neglects
the existence of institutions that evolve over time or previously existing institutions.
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With all of this in mind, the question that needs to be answered is what forces pushed
EU’s development into functional or neofunctional construct? I will search for the answer of this
question by looking into the history of the EU in order to understand the driving forces of EU
expansion East. Next, I will review and analyze the timeline of events available on the official
website of the European Union1 that lead to the creation of the EU as we know it today.
1.2

History of the European Union

1.2.1 Wave 1
1.2.1.1 Division of Europe into East and West
The recovery of Europe from WWII would not have been possible without the initiative
and commitment of the United States. In his speech in Harvard on June 5th, 1947, the US
Secretary of State George C. Marshall emphasized the responsibility of the United States to help
Europe by eliminating conditions that create aggression and promoting economic and social
development. The goal of the Marshall plan was to create a powerful political and economic ally
of the United States. As intended, the plan promoted the phenomenal economic and political
recovery of Europe, but it also set the official beginning of the division of Europe into East and
West. The reason for that was that the Marshall plan came in with an unusual twist: if a country
was to receive economic assistance, there could be no communists in the government receiving
the assistance. This practically excluded Russia and Eastern Europe from the recovery assistance,
thus transforming the Marshall plan into an exclusive club that made the unprecedented recovery
of Western Europe possible.

1

http://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en
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Encouraged by the US commitment to the recovery of Europe, Western Europe expressed
the political will to unite by 1948. Therefore, the Western European Union (WEU) emerged as a
military intergovernmental cooperation, a functionalist arrangement intended to counter defense
and security treats to the West. Initially, in March of 1947 France and Britain signed a treaty in
Dunkirk for mutual assistance against a potential threat from Germany. By March 17th of 1948,
motivated by the growing threat from the East, France, Britain, Belgium, Holland, and
Luxembourg signed the Treaty of Brussels. This treaty is considered the precursor of NATO that
guaranteed collective defense of the member states in response to armed aggression aimed at any
of them. After this manifestation of good will, the United States initiated negotiations in
Washington DC with the participation of Western Europe and Canada that lead to the signing of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on April 4th, 1949.
The Marshall Plan aid that was approved by US Congress was also the catalyst of the
creation of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) on April 16th of 1948
by six signatory members. The organization was imagined as the institutional mechanism that
would oversee the distribution and utilization of the funds provided through the Marshall Plan to
the countries willing to cooperate. The OEEC was to accomplish this by initiating the process of
liberalization of trade and gradual elimination of restrictions between member states. The
governing entity of the organization was the Council that was assisted by a variety of numerous
technical committees. Ultimately, the organization failed to deepen the process of European
unification and in 1960 OEEC became Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). The OECD re-oriented its activities to developmental aid to Third World
countries and involved European as well as other developed states with market economies.
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While the initial motivation for economic (OEEC) and military (WEU) cooperation in
Europe was initiated by the United States, the Council of Europe (CoE) was a consequence of
the genuine efforts of Europeans to unify the continent politically. Even though these efforts
were often charged by different political aspirations of its key member states, they were genuine
and spontaneous, so the CoE was the first genuine homegrown European political organization.
These efforts culminated when the Western European states managed to coordinate their efforts
in 1947 with the help of the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity that
prepared and convened the Hague Congress of Europe, held under the chairmanship of Winston
Churchill on May 7th, 1948.
During the congressional sessions at Hague, the functionalist and neofunctionalist
approaches to integration of the Union stood out clearly. The two perspectives juxtaposed the
representatives of various governments and lead to a compromise agreement that established the
new CoE organization. The treaty that established the CoE was signed in London on May 5th,
1949 by ten countries including the five members who signed the Treaty of Brussels along with
Italy, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The Treaty of London became effective on
August 3rd of the same year and overtime expanded to all members of the Union as we know it
today. Nevertheless, the CoE is distinctly different than the EU. For one, the CoE competence
excludes matters of national defense, which the signatory members entrusted to NATO that was
established a month before the CoE. Second, the CoE exercises its powers through
intergovernmental treaties, which means that the treaties have to be adapted by the constitutions
and the various governments of the member states and can be a long and complicated process.
Third, the major bodies of the CoE include the Parliamentary Assembly, with advisory powers
consisting of indirectly elected members of the parliaments of each state, the Committee of
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Ministers, the foreign ministers of each member state whose activities are often paralyzed by the
rule of unanimity, and General Secretary, who is the head of the organizations’ secretariat.
Lastly, the CoE has a very broad competence, but very modest means to achieve its objectives
expressed in Article 1 of the Statute of the CoE2, which broadly states that a closer union
between member states should exist in order to preserve and advance the ideals and values that
are their common philosophical legacy: political liberty, the rule of law, individual freedom, and
social and economic development.
Ultimately, the CoE was a failure for the proponents of the idea of establishment of a
European United States at the Hague Congress, so the neofunctionalist approach to union did not
succeed. Nevertheless, the CoE was immensely successful in the area of human rights, because it
managed to emphasize and expand the fundamental importance human rights throughout the
Union. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms that was
signed on November 4th, 1950 not only defined fundamental freedoms and human rights that
member states should recognize and ensure for its citizens, but also created an original and
effective institutional mechanism to guarantee compliance of member states by establishing the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
1.2.1.2 Establishing of the European Communities - Europe of “the Six”
The first successful step towards neofuntionalist type of integration was realized in 1950
when six neighboring European countries, West Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, France
and Luxembourg, became a part of a European community of federal type. In the mean-time,
these countries did not suspend their participation in the functionalist structures that they were
already a part of.

2
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The initial step in this direction was the unprecedented declaration of Rober Schuman,
then France’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, on May 9th of 1950. Although this declaration was
dubbed the Schiman Plan, this was a project of Jean Monnet, who at the time was one of the
most influential proponents of European federalism. Schuman made a declaration on behalf of
the French government which suggested the creation of Franco-German coal and steel
community that would be open to other European countries and be placed under a common High
Authority. In addition to Germany and France, the negotiations of this contract that started on
June 20th of 1950 also included the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium, while Britain
showed no political will to participate. On April 18th, 1951 the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) came in to existence, after the six countries involved in the negotiations
signed the treaty. The ESCS became effective on July 25th of 1952 and was envisioned to have a
mandate of fifty years. The High Authority chaired by Jean Monnet took residence in
Luxemburg on August 10th of the same year, which was the formal beginning of Europe of “the
Six”.
Even though the immediate goals of the community were of economic and strategic
nature, the long-term aim was political, since the ECSC resolved tensions between formal rivals
by upgrading their common interests. The immediate economic aim of the ECSC was to build a
common market for coal and steel with free movement of goods and capital and free
competition, leading to increased employment in these sectors, improving supply, promoting
modernization, expansion of production, and increase in quality on the territory of its member
countries. On structural level the Treaty of Paris provided the ECSC with an institutional model
that consisted of a High Authority, Council of Ministers, Parliamentary Assembly, and a Court.
This model is the foundation of the European Union as we know it today. It is founded on the
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principles of rule by international institutions within their appointed competence, independence
of these institutions by legal guarantees, cooperation between various state-level institutions of
member states, and equality between the member states. Ultimately, the Schuman Plan3 proved a
revolutionary response to a variety of diverse political problems at the time. For one, the
proposal marked a shift in French foreign policy toward Germany in the direction desired by its
strategic and military allies - inclusion of Germany in the Western alliance. The format of
cooperation offered by Monet via the Schumann Plan provided a new, much more reliable
guarantee against possible German military threat while soothing the French public opinion,
which was still very sensitive on the issue of remilitarization of Germany. Second, the Schuman
Plan met the need for reorganization of the steel industry that at the time faced a crisis of
overproduction and consequent risk of international cartelization that through restrictive
practices could lead to maintaining high prices. Thus, the merger of the coal and steel national
markets into a common market on European level removed the looming danger of a political
crisis in the region and allowed for increased productivity and political stability in the member
states. Finally, the Schuman Plan offered a new strategy for the unification efforts of the
courtiers of Western Europe. After all, mere functionalist cooperation between states on its own
as significant it was, was not intended to and, therefore, could not solve long-term political
issues. The aim was a fusion of the strategic interests of European nations by maintaining the
balance between those interests and not just aimed at resolving specific economic or strategic
goals. Thus, this neofunctionalist approach was extremely effective politically because Europe
could not be unified politically by force, but needed a gradual, comprehensive unification that
involved healing old rivalries and creating lasting bonds of solidarity between formal rival states.
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Following the success of the ECSC, France abandoned its strict stance that opposed the
rearmament of Germany by launching the Pleven Plan. This plan envisioned the creation of a
European Defense Community that included Germany. This implied the establishment of
European army, with a common command organ where each member state had the responsibility
to provide armament, defense, and army contingent. Most importantly, this meant a common
policy stance, which meant that European Political Community would be the next step and the
Six were moving ever closer to a deeper neofunctionalist arrangement. Negotiations began in
February of 1951 and concluded with the signing of a treaty establishing the European Defense
Community (EDC) in May of 1952 by the six member states of the ECSC. Meanwhile, in France
there was a political shift when the government of Pierre Mendès France rose to power. This
factor combined with ongoing international tensions contributed to the failure of the French
National Assembly to ratify the proposal for the EDC. The supranational power of the EDC was
the main reason for this failure and this signified that Europe was not ready to abandon the idea
of national sovereignty.
This failure prompted the Six to focus their attention to deepen integration into a less
controversial area of economic cooperation in June of 1955 at the Conference in Messina. This
conference was set up in order to find the replacement of Jean Monnet, who retired after the
failure of the EDC. The suggestion for this shift in focus was made by the representatives of
Benelux and the research and preparation of the corresponding projects was entrusted to P. A.
Spaak, who was Belgium’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. Spaak’s report4 was presented in April
of 1956 and suggested the creation of a powerful economic community that would allow gradual
expansion, increasing stability, rapid improvement of living standards as well as integration in
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the sector of nuclear energy. The proposal was agreed upon on May of 1956 at the Conference in
Venice. On May 25th, 1957 the signatory states of the ECSC signed two new conventions known
as the Rome Conventions that became effective on January 1st, 1958. These conventions
established the European Economic Community (EEC), also known as the Common European
Market, and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom). The signing of these
treaties was one of the most important events in EU unification as we know it today.
Overall the EEC and the EAEC were communities similar to the ECSC, but unlike the
ECSC had less of supranational overreach. Nevertheless, the two communities were an
expression of the continued will for cooperation of the EEC countries. The creation of the three
European Communities involved a merger of some of their organs. The executive body of the
EEC was the Commission that was independent from national governments, but with limited
powers. The norm-establishing power belonged to the Council. The already established
Parliamentary Assembly and the Court of Justice of the ECSC assumed the functions of the
newly-created EEC and the EAEC bodies.
In response to the EEC, the UK created the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in
May of 1960. EFTA, whose administrative center was Geneva, consisted of seven member
states, Iceland, Austria, Liechtenstein, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway, and aimed to
prevent economic discrimination for non-EEC European states. Unlike the EEC, EFTA
promoted trade, without submitting the sovereignty of individual countries to the EC and without
creating formal legislative institutions, a functionalist arrangement. Close relationship existed
between EFTA and EEC up until the creation of the European Economic Space in 1994.
Currently EFTA includes only Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland.
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After the signing of the Rome Treaties there were three separate European communities
with identical member countries. Although they had similar institutional structures, they
represented separate legal entities. In practice, the three communities had a common Court of
Justice and Parliament, but each has its own pair of executive and legislative organs – High
Authority and a Council for the ECSC and respectively a Commission and Council for the EEC
and EAEC. These legislative and executive bodies merged when the Treaty of Brussels was
signed on April 8th of 1965. When it became effective in 1967, the treaty established a joint
Council and General Commission of the European Communities, thus launching the European
Community (EC).
The official declaration of the creation of the European Union adopted by the European
Council in Stuttgart in June of 1983 had an immediate goal to overcome the political and
economic stagnation of the early 1980s. After the first direct election of the European
Parliament, the adoption of the Treaty establishing the European Union by Parliament on
February 14th of 1984 was a culmination of the EC’s resolve for political legitimacy. This treaty
was influenced the “Spinelli Plan”5, a brainchild of Altiero Spinelli, an avid supporter of
European federalism. However, the draft that was presented by the European Parliament proved
to be a tough challenge for the majority of the EC member states. Since it was more like a
constitution than an international treaty, most parliaments did not consider it worthy of
discussion and only the Italian Parliament adopted it.
In an effort to assist the process, in June of 1984 the European Council decided to
establish an ad hoc committee at the Summit in Fontainebleau that would investigate issues
related to institutional reform and present suggestions how to improve political cooperation. The
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proposals contained in the report of the ad hoc committee were adopted by the European Council
in Brussels in March of 1985.
In 1985 the European Council decided in Milan to summon a new intergovernmental
conference. The conference convened on September 9th of 1985 in Luxembourg and ended with
submission of the draft of the Single European Act (SEA) that became effective on July 1st of
1987. The SEA introduced the most significant changes in the EEC by providing provisions for
cooperation in the fields of security and foreign policy. The amendments to the EEC created the
necessary legal prerequisites for the establishment of a European Single Market on December
31st of 1992.
While the EC was institutionalized after a decade of existence but it still did not have the
status of a community institution, the SEA institutionalized the political cooperation contained in
the declarations in Luxembourg (1970), Copenhagen (1973), London (1981), and the declaration
of the European Union of 1984. Thus, the SEA solidified the links between European political
institutions by importing new elements of political and economic security, which produced a
community institution.
After the creation of a Single European Market, the next reasonable step was the creation
of a single European currency and creation of a European Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU). On July 1st of 1990 the European Council decided to begin the first stage of the creation
of the EMU based on the Delors Plan that was drafted in Madrid in June of 1989. This
necessitated the summoning of an intergovernmental conference that could prepare the following
stages and propose necessary revisions of the EEC. Meanwhile, the events in Eastern and Central
Europe began to develop with unexpected speed. These events included the fall of the Berlin
Wall, the possibility of reunification of Germany, and the subsequent transition of the former
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Soviet Blok countries to democracy, which presented the new European organization with
unexpected challenges. These events prompted the Franco-German initiative launched by
President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl that is known as the Extraordinary European
Conference in Dublin in April 1990. On that conference they called for an intergovernmental
summit that will discuss options to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the Union by
increasing the efficiency of its institutions, create uniform and joint action in the economic
sphere, and construct a common security and foreign policy. After overcoming a series of
hurdles both conferences convened at the second Summit in Rome that took place on the 14th and
15th of December, 1990. The results of their parallel operation that spanned over a year were
presented at the European Council meeting in Maastricht that took place on the 9th and 10th of
December in 1991. The final text of the European Union (EU) Treaty was signed on February 7th
of 1992 in Maastricht.
After the signing the Treaties of Rome, the creation of the EU is the second most
significant event in European history because it transformed the already existing disjointed
European communities into a new entity. This new neofunctionalist entity had improved policies
and new forms of cooperation that involved common foreign and security policy and cooperation
in internal and judicial matters. The EEC became the European Community (EC) with and
expanded powers and improved structure that also includes the European Council.
The EC and EFTA member states signed the agreement for the creation of the European
Economic Area in May 2nd of 1992 with effective date January 1994. The goal of this agreement
was to extend the EC market territory onto EFTA’s territory, so the members of EFTA would not
have to become members of the EC. In January 1st of 1994 the second stage of the EMU began
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when member states implemented the necessary programs for the transition into the third state,
the single European currency (Euro), which was to be introduced no later than 1999.
Overall, the European integration model was implemented over the span of six decades
under various conditions and different considerations in mind. During the Cold War, the success
of the European community was due primarily to the fact that European integration was a NATO
protected laboratory experiment, where potentially adverse external influences were isolated
through the mechanisms of the North Atlantic Alliance. This ensured the security of Europe from
the communist East, so the interests of the superpower United States were safely aimed at
supporting European integration and overcoming historical conflicts between European
countries. The hope was that the EU could “grow up” to be a valuable political and economic
ally for the United States. These privileged conditions for the unification of Europe enabled the
EU integration process of cooperation in the economic and social domains. The common foreign
policy was initially imagined primarily in the form of transatlantic cooperation in the West.
Eventually, the EU foreign policy evolved into a policy of enlargement.
1.2.1.3 EU Enlargement Process
While early EU history is marked by efforts to abridge political and economic gaps between
formal enemies, recent EU enlargement is a one of tensions between established and new
member interests and broader interests of the organization itself. The fall of the Berlin Wall and
the end of the Cold War opened the possibility for immense political and economic
transformation for Eastern European states. This transformation brought the unprecedented
opportunity for many post-communist states to join the EU. The stakes for the Eastern European
states were high because without EU membership, many of these states faced economic and
political uncertainty and hardship. This possibility, however, has been accompanied by a
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heightened sense of social and political unrest in established, new, and applicant countries. The
controversy is heated and has stirred rhetoric for and against the expansion towards the poorer
Eastern-European states.
Each new accession wave was related to corresponding changes in accession terms for
new members and affected the functioning of all organs of the EC. This is the official reason
why the EC required a period of consolidation of its new borders and a transitional period for
adaptation of new members.
1.2.2 Wave 2
Up to 1973 the EC consisted only of the six founding members, but the success and
international recognition of this IGO attracted the interest of a growing number of additional
European countries. Following its success in creating EFTA, Britain applied for membership. At
the time General De Gaulle expressed his concerns at a press conference on January 14th of
19636. He stated that Britain should not join the EC because he considered its close relationship
with the US detrimental and dangerous to the organization and he believes that the EC should not
accept the terms that Britain put forward for accession. In 1967 the French veto prevented the
beginning of negotiations with Britain.
However, a few years later a summit convened at Hague under the initiative of the new
French president Pompidou at which a decision was made to start negotiations with four new
member candidates – the UK, Norway, Denmark, and Ireland. On January 22nd of 1972, a treaty
for the accession of the UK, Denmark, and Ireland was signed in Brussels. The enlargement
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became effective as of January 1st, 1973. The negative vote in the referendum on accession
ratification in Norway thwarted its membership application.
1.2.3 Wave 3
The Southern expansion of the EC at first included only Greece, whose membership
application was submitted on June 1975. Officially, the desire of the nine EC members to assist
and stabilize democratic change in this country was among the reasons for relatively quick
completion the negotiations. On May 28th of 1979 the contract of accession was signed and on
January 1st, 1981, Greece became the tenth member of the Community. The second phase of the
Southern expansion included Spain and Portugal, whose membership applications were
submitted on 1977. Their accession agreements were signed on June 12th of 1985 and became
effective on January 1st, 1986.
1.2.4 Wave 4
On January 1st, 1995 Sweden, Finland, and Austria became official EU members, while
in Norway the second referendum to ratify the treaty ended with a negative vote. This wave of
applicants had by far the highest democratization index and experienced the fastest accession
application period compared to any of the earlier waves of EU applicants. At that point, the
number of countries belonging to the European Union reached fifteen.
1.2.5 Wave 5
The enlargement of the European Union towards Central and Eastern Europe, which
became possible after the profound economic, social, and political changes in the region in the
late 80s and early 90s, is one of the greatest events in the development of the unification process
of the European continent. EU accession of Southern and Eastern Europe took place within a
quarter of a century and some of it is still ongoing. In 2004 Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland,
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Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, and Cyprus joined the EU, marking a
historic expansion towards the former Soviet Satellites.
As Southern European members of Greece, Spain, and Portugal were accessed in the
1980s, these countries had relatively low democratic and economic performances compared to
these subsequent applicants. Overall, the following accession of a big chunk of Eastern Europe in
2004 that included Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia
and Slovakia was a little less seamless than the accession of Southern Europe.
1.2.6 Wave 6
The accession of the Balkan states of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 was very different
altogether. These states were put through a strenuous and demanding process of accession with
democratic and wealth indictors at similar levels with some of previous accession waves and the
same is applicable to Croatia’s accession in 2013. Nevertheless, these states are yet to become a
part of the Eurozone and up until 2014 Bulgaria and Romania were subjected to a work ban in
established member states.
1.2.7 Pending applicants
Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey
were also invited (at least rhetorically) to join the EU. However, their accession timeframe is
uncertain, even though some of these Balkan states exhibit economic and democratic
performance that is very close to the performance of other previously-accepted member states.
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1.3

This Project

1.3.1 Statement of the Problem
The functionalist and neofunctionalist design of the EU are only a part of the story that
cannot fully explain why the EU looks the way it does today: who and when is invited to join,
how long the application process takes, and what conditions do the candidate members need to
satisfy in order to join. This is because on the surface, the process of new member accession is
relatively straight forward: new members need to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria, meaning that
the states need to have consistent pro-democratic orientation. Next, all established member states
need to agree to grant membership to the applicants. However, in reality the integration of new
members is uneven and confusing, which raises questions about the nature of EU’s incentives for
accession of new members. Looking back to previous accession waves, there are some glaring
examples when countries with less than ideal economic and/or democratic indicators were
accepted fairly quickly. For instance, Greece was accepted after an application process that
lasted only seven years and Latvia was accepted after ten years, but their indicators of polity
were low compared to other recently approved members and current pending applicants, as
obvious from their Freedom House score at their time of accession. Also France, one of the
founding members of the EU, had one of the lowest GDP-per capita (current US dollars) when
they formed the Union. Yet, some eastern European states (particularly from the Balkans) are
held to high expectations and some, like Bulgaria and Romania, are granted unequal membership
rights at much higher GDP-per capita (current US dollars). Currently, Serbia has exceeded the
GDP-per capita (current US dollars) of Bulgaria at the time of accession into the EU, as evident
from the World Bank datasets7, but Serbia’s application is still pending. Examples like these are
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plentiful and politically controversial, so clarifying the motivations for EU expansion will
elucidate some of the uncertainty surrounding the process and timeframe of accession.
Despite the growing interest in international institutions, only a few studies have yet
seriously examined the remarkable variability and speed of membership approval that occurred
during the process of Eastern European accession of the EU. Consistent with the Copenhagen
criteria, the predominant theoretical consensus is that attitudes towards capitalism and
democracy in candidate states determine EU membership and can reasonably be connected to a
smoother and faster accession process (Christin 2005; Cichowski 2000; De Witte 2002;
Delsoldato 2002; Fish 2005; Hellman 2004; Plumper, Schneider, and Troegerv 2006; Nissen
2003; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002). Although this knowledge is still very relevant to the
study of EU expansion today, I contend the EU integration process is also the result of factors
not readily identified by this literature. These obscured additional factors cannot be identified by
simply looking at the official membership prerequisites, because they are the result of strategic
political aspirations of established member states and reveal weaknesses and frictions within the
EU itself. Identifying these factors will provide a valuable new perspective on how to strengthen
and stabilize the troubled IGO, because it can clarify the controversy associated with the new
member accession process.
1.3.2 Purpose
The objectives of this project are twofold. First, I intend to examine the motivations of
established member states that affect accession of new members. This includes an empirical
analysis of the ideational, rational, and structural motives that drive EU integration. Second,
based on the underlying established member motivations for new member accession, I will
identify the specific factors that affect the speed of accession of new members. Looking back to
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previous accession waves, the idea that factors other than democratic and economic performance
affect the speed and variability of accession can be supported by some obvious examples
discussed earlier when countries with less than ideal economic and democratic indicators were
accepted fairly quickly, whereas others were held back from accession at economic and/or
democratic levels that were deemed satisfactory for accession in earlier accession waves. Much
of the current research in the field is centered on the usual proxies of interest in democratic
progress, namely economic development and democratic indicators of states; therefore, my work
will be dedicated to identifying and understanding the additional factors that affect the speed and
variability of new member integration. My research is focused primarily on the newest and most
controversial additions to the EU - Eastern Europe with a special attention to the Balkan
applicants, since the Balkan states share many cultural, economic, and political similarities, but
are subjected to different accession timeframes. The questions that I plan to examine in this
project include: What motivates established EU members with respect to further integration and
expansion? What influences whether and when countries may be invited to join the EU? More
specifically: what are the factors that explain EU accession?
In this research project I contend that the different speeds of accession of the abovementioned regions located in close proximity to one-another are due to the fact that various
accession waves carry factors in addition to pro-democratic development that affect accession
speed. I argue that established EU member states slow down accession of Eastern European
members because they consider them not suitable for a western-style liberal democracy due to
the presence of factors such as the occurrence of armed conflict during the existence of the EU,
ethnic minority makeup of the states, and main-stream pro-Russian political support in the
region, that slow down democratization. I examine not only the accepted members, but also the
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pending members with a focus on Eastern Europe and the Balkan states on wave-by-wave basis
in order to get an accurate understanding of the changing expectations of EU applicants. I
evaluate the differences between the accession process for all accession waves by examining
their indicators of wealth and democracy and compare their relevance against the presence of the
additional factors that affect accession. Using the analysis of the different waves, I conclude that
the major underlying concern of established member states with accessing Eastern Europe is
Russia’s increased political influence and presence in the region.
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2

IDEATIONAL MOTIVATIONS OF EU ACCESSION

Chapter 2 examines the ideational motivations of established member states that affect
accession of new members. This chapter starts off with a review of the relevant literature that
offers two distinct traditional views of norms and their influence on institutions: the realist and
constructivist view. For realists, institutions are evidence of power play by dominant states and
in reality have no intrinsic influence on state behavior (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979;
Mearscheimer 1994). Therefore, realists would contend that the established member states in EU
are motivated by self-interest when they expand offers to Eastern Europe to join. Thus, they can
achieve their own desired political goals by political manipulation through EU institutions.
Conversely, for constructivists, social norms play a fundamental role in IR. Rather than acting in
overt self-interest, actors behave according to their sense of duty and obligation that is structured
by prevailing rules and routines. However, when the preferences are sufficiently homogenous, it
may be one's self interest to get along rather that to be deviant. For constructivists, international
institutions are important actors in the international arena (Wendt 1994; March and Olsen 2006;
Barnett and Finnemore 1999). Where for realism international institutions are power-play tools
in the hands of strong states, constructivism maintains that international institutions can actually
pursue their own goals and interests, even against the interests of the states that created them.
Therefore, the EU may also be expanding offers to Eastern Europe to join because established
member states want to achieve their own desired political goals by promoting binding European
norms. This literature analysis also contains an in-depth review of evidence from new-member
states aimed to establish whether expansion East is motivated by binding European norms or by
desirable political goals of powerful actors. The questions examined here are: What motivates
current EU members with respect to further integration and expansion? Is there evidence that
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binding norms guide EU expansion east? Are EU institutions set up to achieve desirable political
goals of powerful established member states?
This strand of the literature broadly suggests that the EU is expanding offers to Eastern
Europe to join because the established member states want to achieve their own desired political
goals either by a) political manipulation through EU institutions for self-interest, or b) promoting
binding European norms, or c) gaining the best of both worlds by winning the political fight with
Russia for influence over Eastern Europe.
2.1

Conventional Views of Norms and Their Impact on International Institutions
The literature has two distinct traditional views of norms and their influence on

institutions: the realist and constructivist view. These perspectives present two conflicting
accounts - for realists norms have no impact on the behavior of actors, while for constructivists
norms determine the behavior of actors.
According to realists, the anarchical environment undermines any possibility for normbased behavior in international relations, since actors’ actions are motivated by self-interest.
Classical realists like Morgenthau (1948) argued that interest, not morality is the essence of
politics. This is because reality leaves little room for norm-guided behavior, because the world is
a place of clashing interests where conflict is inevitable. Defensive neorealists like Waltz (1979)
argued that the self-help system is necessarily the product of anarchy, which obviated any
concern with idea- or identity-based explanations of international relations. Mearscheimer
(1994), an offensive realist, countered the importance of norms in international politics by
observing that it is unclear why the normative discourse that affects the behavior of states rises or
falls. Realists believe that international institutions are epiphenomenal entities that change once
the power of the dominant state(s) fades away. Thus, institutions are mere tools in the hands of
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powerful states and in reality have no intrinsic influence on state behavior. Realists would
contend that the established member states in EU are motivated by self-interest when they
expand offers to Eastern Europe to join. Thus they can achieve their own desired political goals
by political manipulation through EU institutions.
On the other hand Wendt (1994), a leading constructivist, challenged these views and
argued that explanations of international politics without taking norms in account cannot provide
an adequate explanation of the world we live in. He maintains that power and interest matter in
politics because society believes that they do. This shared social belief is constructed through
prevailing ideas and perceptions that we must understand in order to make sense of the conduct
of states in international relations. For constructivists social norms play a fundamental role in IR.
They differentiate between the “logic of consequence” (rationally chosen actions that maximize
utility) and the “logic of appropriateness” (actions chosen in accordance with prevalent social
norms). March and Olsen (2006) contend that actors are governed by the logic of
appropriateness, and thus institutions are embedded rules and routines that define what is an
appropriate action. Rather than acting in overt self-interest, actors behave according to their
sense of duty and obligation that is structured by prevailing rules and routines. However, when
the preferences are sufficiently homogenous, it may be one's self interest to get along rather that
to be deviant. For constructivists, international institutions are important actors in the
international arena. Where for realism international institutions are power-play tools in the hands
of strong states, constructivism maintains that international institutions can actually pursue their
own goals and interests, even against the interests of the states that created them. Barnett and
Finnemore (1999) argue that international institutions are powerful actors in international
relations because they create social knowledge through the norms they disburse. Therefore, the
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EU may also be expanding offers to Eastern Europe to join because established member states
want to promote binding European norms. Thus, EU institutions are a powerful source of social
change that can supersede the interests of powerful states.
Fearon and Wendt (2002), respectively a leading rationalist and constructivist, claim that
while the rationalist logic of realism maintains that actors adhere to norms when it “benefits
them” to do so, constructivist believe that actors follow norms because it is “the right thing to
do”. There is no intrinsic conflict here, they claim, unless one subscribes to thick rationalism,
according to which actors have no intrinsic preference to follow norms. Also, as far as the logic
of consequence (focus of realists) versus the logic of appropriateness (constructivists focus on
this one), the two need to be kept separate as actors utilize both in making decisions. Ultimately,
they maintain that norms and rational considerations both play decisive role in shaping the
behavior of actors, such as states and institutions. This perspective suggests that the EU may be
expanding offers to Eastern Europe to join because established member states want to gain the
best of both worlds by establishing political and economic influence over Eastern Europe.
2.1.1 Realism - Political Manipulation and International Institutions
The heated domestic debates about new member accession expose gaps in social
consensus within established member states, since nevertheless expansion East continues.
Broadly, social consensus in decision-making implies that minority and majority opinions are
taken into account. The alienation of a minority group(s) in decision-making is often utilized by
political rivals to spark a political backlash that can hurt the political reputation or jeopardize the
future of the dominant actors. Since decision-makers are keenly aware of this possibility, they
strategically establish options they prefer among competing alternatives. In regards to new EU
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member accession, this implies that interests of key actors, such as established member states,
may play a decisive role as to who becomes a EU member.
For Riker (1986) the definition of a successful political strategy in the absence of popular
consent is the one that utilizes democratic mechanisms to direct outcomes towards a desired
political goal. He invented the term heresthetics and defined it as “the art of political
manipulation”8. Riker ultimately concentrates on evaluating the dynamics of heresthetics among
individuals and in coalitions and assumes that decision-making is a deliberate, strategic process.
To a certain extent, Riker recognizes that institutions can strategically allocate resources just like
individuals or coalitions. The difference, according to him, is that unlike heresthetic individuals
or coalitions, the decision-making process of institutions is automated due to their structure and
procedures. His work in 1986 pays only marginal attention to institutions as a source of
heresthetic influence in decision-making on the state or international level. However, in some of
his later studies, Riker expresses interest in expanding the concept of heresthetics onto
institutions by suggesting they will affect European integration (Riker 1996).
2.1.1.1 International Institutions and Structure
So, can international institutions be the source political manipulation? This question
became very salient with the onset of EU integration, a process that also captivated Riker in his
later work. Some of the subsequent literature aimed to establish whether supranational
institutions of the EU allocate resources guided by self-interest or structure. In this debate
Pierson (1996) noted that the EU cannot provide solutions to the EU’s collective action issues.
Instead, the member states surrender their authority to the supranational institutions. He
concluded that the process is not the result of heresthetic strategy, but is rather the result of the
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structure of the supranational institution of the EU. In the same year, Pollack (1996) observed
that EU institutions are important because member states can lose their authority in some
instances, like in cases when qualified majorities lose a vote. Ultimately, he concurred that EU
institutions exert influence over individual states through their mechanisms and structure.
2.1.1.2 Key Actors Drive Institutions
In addition to mechanical distributors of resources, Riker also observed that institutions
are a tool for heresthetic actors who pull their levers. Some scholars expanded on these ideas, by
asserting that the political attitudes of key actors (i.e. powerful established EU member states)
shape how institutions distribute value and resources. In support of these ideas, Baumgartner and
Jones (1991) suggested that the policy image, which they describe as the interaction between
predominant political attitudes and the value of a policy, interacts with political institutions. If
favorable, this interaction can lead to a speedy creation of a policy, and if otherwise, the policy is
not created. Ultimately, within international institutions favorable political attitudes can improve
the likelihood that a policy will be given a priority. Hix (1999) supports this idea by examining
how the European community has shifted from Europeanization to EU politics. He discovers that
shifts in dominant political attitudes in the EU drive political processes in EU institutions. Most
recently, Checkel (2001) argued that domestic politics in international institutions reduce the
influence of social learning. Therefore, agents comply with the norms of the institutions because
of the influence of predominant domestic interests.
Overall, the literature confirms that institutions distribute value and influence
mechanically due to their structure. Also, key actors influence institutions by shaping how
institutions distribute value and resources. Ultimately, according to this perspective EU
institutions are set up to distribute value in a certain way by powerful actors – a realist
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perspective. Therefore, powerful established member states are motivated by self-interest when
they expand offers to Eastern Europe to join. Thus they can achieve their own desired political
goals by political manipulation through EU institutions.
2.1.2 Constructivism - Consistent Normative Framework in Supranational Institutions
As previously discussed, EU accession can be more broadly understood as a uniform
membership approval process guided by the Copenhagen criteria. At a deeper level, the EU is
dedicated to resolving uncertainties in the relationship between European states through the
creation of a supranational European institution guided by common European norms. Since the
dynamics of these institutions are driven by common values and goals, as outlined in the
Copenhagen criteria, it is reasonable to assert that formally norms drive contemporary trends in
EU integration. The norms that guide the behavior of actors form a consistent normative
framework. For a supranational institution, such as the EU, a consistent normative framework is:
1) structurally embedded into the organization (Pierson 1996; Pollack 1996), 2) will manifest in
the successful integration of new member states with established normative perceptions in the
EU (Subotic 2011), and 3) a standard of behavior for all members of the EU (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998). If these three assumptions hold true for the EU, the normative framework of the
organization can adequately allocate resources and authority across the EU and support EU
expansion East. Next, I examine if these three assumptions hold true for the EU according to the
literature.
2.1.2.1 Normative Framework Structurally Embedded in the EU
The process of EU development is characterized by uncertainty that often plagues joint
decisions and creates collective action problems that are overcome by the implementation of
uniform norms, or common European values such as “human rights”, “rule of law”,
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“democratization”, and “common foreign policy”. If there is uncertainty about the relevance of
these values in a supranational organization such as the EU, then the notion that a normative
framework binds the organization cannot be supported. The relevance of uncertainty in
international relations is discussed by the major political paradigms such as constructivism,
realism, and liberalism. According to realism, uncertainty causes conflict in the anarchical
environment of international relations, so defection from cooperation is a function of the utility
calculations of each state. For Mearsheimer (1994), when uncertainty prevails, the states that
disregard power politics will become victim to other states, therefore, states will prefer the realist
approach and aim to continuously increase their power in order to deal with collective action
issues. Thus, for realists power instead of norms resolves uncertainty in IR. For neo-liberal
institutionalists, the information and monitoring that is provided through the institutions is of
upmost importance for cooperation. Thus, uncertainty makes institutions even more important
because in complicated multi-state situations, institutions can step in and provide particular
cooperative outcome (Keohane and Martin 1995). For constructivists, uncertainty in international
relations can be resolved through norms. For Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) collective action
issues can be solved through norms, since they can narrow down the range of potential actions
and choices. They observe that in political science the term institution is used interchangeably
with norm. An institution is a pool of norms and procedures about particular issues such as
democracy and justice. When these are confused and defined under the same label, important
elements of institutions are missed and therefore, misunderstood. The term “institution”
underlines cognitive features of institutions rather than constraining features. Norms are the
standard of appropriate conduct for actors (states) with a certain identity. Ultimately, norms
standardize behavior and often restrain choice and actions for states. For the EU, a broad
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normative framework (as envisioned by the constructivists) of standardized behavior is
Europeanization.
Europeanization was first defined as “the process of European integration itself, or a
shorthand for the incorporation of European characteristics into domestic institutions, politics,
and identities” (Cini 2007). A few years later Moumoutzis (2011) defined Europeanization as “a
process of incorporation of EU norms, practices and procedures into the domestic level”. In
broad terms, EU’s development is measured by how successfully it deals with the uncertainty in
joint undertakings in the organization. Since the dynamics of the institution are driven by
common values and goals, in theory norms drive EU integration. This is achieved by the
adherence to uniform norms such as common European values (broadly referred to as
Europeanization) with a strong emphasis on human rights. More directly, Europeanization is
integration of new members with established normative perceptions in the EU. If there is
uncertainty about the relevance of these values in a supranational organization such as the EU,
then the new or potential member states are uncertain about the identity they are expected to
assume. Theoretically, Europeanization is supposed to spread evenly throughout the EU, but
research indicates that the process is permeating Eastern European and Balkan states at a slower
and uneven rate.
2.1.2.2 Integration of new members with established normative perceptions in the EU Europeanization
The case of the accession of the Greek part of Cyprus into the EU is an example of how
important Europeanization is for EU accession. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
declared independence in 1979. This act was condemned by the UN and was recognized only by
Turkey. At the time of the declaration, in Northern Cyprus the political system was mostly under
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the control of the Turkish military and did not promote Europeanization. Once Cyprus joined the
EU in 2004, the EU laws were halted in the parts of Cyprus that were controlled by the ethnicTurks. The reason for this was that the parts of the island that that were not controlled by the
ethnic-Greek government did not uphold human rights and democratic values, as perceived by
the EU vision (Ker‐Lindsay 2007).
According to Popescu (2010), Romania’s accession into the EU increased the number of
diplomats at the level of Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels and the Romanian foreign policy
is actively working to adopt EU values and practices. Projecting Romanian national interests is
successful to a certain extent, but appears to lack bureaucratic management. In addition, the
process has further slowed down due to the Eurozone crisis that has also impacted Romania.
Europeanization is still ongoing but, overall, due to these shortcomings Romania has a slower
level of adaptation and weaker standing within the EU.
In regards to the central Balkans, Bulgaria is a member of the EU since 2007. After the
transition in 1989, Bulgaria started a process of adoption of European norms. For that purpose,
Bulgaria had to implement a series of strategic changes and embrace European values. The
Union guarantees protection of human and political rights of its members. Bulgaria’s part of the
EU guarantees Bulgaria’s participation in a peaceful, stable, and safe zone, so the process of
Europeanization is essential for the country’s successful future. Becoming a part of the EU has
enabled Bulgaria to take place among other European states and with great prospects for
economic and political prosperity (Velev 2013). However, Atanasov (2014) maintains that the
hardships of the transition period and European integration of Bulgaria are due to mechanical
import of rules and values from the West for which there was no demand in Bulgarian society.
He perceives that the western societies that generate these values themselves suffer from their
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own normative downfalls and flawed democracy. Ultimately, he concludes that the European
model adopted by Bulgaria and Eastern Europe as a whole is superficial.
In regards to new and potential members, Subotic (2011) argues that Europeanization
advances with various speeds in different states because European identity is not equally shared
across applicant countries in the EU. In countries like Croatia where there is a strong
convergence with European values, accession is successful. However, EU accession is plagued
by setbacks in countries like Serbia, where European values are not widely shared. Also, the EU
has stressed that Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) accession is contingent on constitutional
reforms in line with the European Convention of Human rights. The EU had increased its
engagement and success through their new-found ally Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), in an
effort to supplement the work of dysfunctional governmental institutions in BiH. The EU has a
transformative impact in the region through CSOs in various aspects of Europeanization.
However, cooperation with the government is slow because of the lack of trust and cooperation,
so presently the EU is the biggest donor to CSOs in the region (Relex 2006).
Overall, Europeanization occurs through emulation, since the EU is seen as a model for
democratic norms. Europeanization then takes place in civil society that in turn becomes an
agent of the EU in the country. However, according to the prior paragraphs in the new and
pending member states, even though these efforts were rewarded with legislation and policy
work, it appears that Europeanization in its current shape fails to guarantee the successful
integration of new member states with established normative perceptions in the EU due to the
lack of popular support and low state capacity.
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2.1.2.3 Binding norms as a standard for behavior for all members of the EU
In practice, binding norms are not a standard of behavior for all members of the EU,
because adherence to common EU norms is far from uniform. For example, analysis of gender
rights and the rights of individuals with disabilities reveals the vulnerability of these norms in
new and pending members of the EU. In regards to the treatment of minorities such as the Roma,
this review reveals gaps in upholding their human rights in new, pending, and even established
member states. Ultimately, according to the literature the influence of human right norms in the
EU as a whole at this time appears to be plagued by double-standards despite of EU’s formal
commitment to uphold them. Just alike in other parts of the world, this occurs because human
rights policies are not adequately enforced, which increases incentives to make policy changes
without intent to implement them across the EU. These practices compromise Europeanization
because new member states have trouble converging their normative identities with the
ambiguous EU one.
In regards to practice of common norms as a standard of behavior, the process on the
Balkans overall appears to be superficial, especially in regards to such a fundamental cause in the
EU as the rights of the disabled. According to Phillips (2012), EU integration has overall
advanced the disability programs of Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, and Macedonia, but these
changes are insufficient and additional improvements are necessary. Overall, only small-scale
advances have been made in Bulgaria so far. In both Romania and Bulgaria institutionalization
of individuals with disabilities is a widely prevalent, and more efforts are needed in order to
abolish this practice. In both countries mental health programs are in dire need of reform and
integration of children with disabilities in is still lagging. Croatia is also slow to improve the
rights of disabled individuals. The lack of community based services leads to increase of
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institutionalizations and medical care for disabled individuals is far from satisfactory. In
Macedonia work is underway, but as in other parts of the Balkans, employment for disables
individuals is in sheltered enterprises which prevents them to integrate into society as equals.
Overall, throughout the region changes are implemented slowly and are often inadequate to
address the real issues of the affected.
Furthermore, EU upholds that equality is an integral part of the EU normative
framework, but legislation related to equal opportunities for men and women is not sufficiently
established in the newest additions from Eastern Europe (Weiner 2009). The exclusion of
Eastern European citizens by enacting superficial legislation by the elites is reminiscent of the
old authoritarian dynamics that are not consistent with EU expectations. The harsh economic
climates in the Eastern European states also explain the lack of the feminist agenda. Ultimately
gender knowledge and policy must align in established as well as new member states.
For Kacarska (2012), the EU’s merging of its visa-liberalization system with refugee
protection and anti-Roma migration strategies has resulted in organized discrimination against
many minorities, such as the Roma and foreign asylum seekers. The “white lists” are states
eligible for visas liberalization and the “black lists” are states that are not eligible. Judgments of
what countries go to what lists are based on performance standards for protection of citizens’
rights within a given state and respectable relations with neighboring states. Attempting to flee
one of these regions marked on the “black list” is very difficult. Refugees flee their country of
origin to escape prosecution, while asylum seekers have applied for asylum and are awaiting the
decision on their status, so according the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, refugees should not be subjected to further difficulties when resettling and are exempt
from deportation. The geographical scope of this document was expanded in the 1967 Protocol
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that guaranteed permanent protection for people seeking asylum to escape political prosecution
and all EU member states have ratified this. Even though the EU possesses the normative and
political capacity to eradicate the mistreatment of the Roma, these efforts have failed because of
the enactment of inadequate and inconsistent policies throughput the Union (McGarry 2012).
Unwanted minority groups like the Roma who are EU citizens are still deported, mistreated, and
discriminated within established, new, and potential EU member states. Worker movement
restrictions for Bulgaria and Romania are also utilized to justify mass deportations of the Roma
and established member states such as Italy and France clearly violate the EU free movement
and non-discrimination policies.
While some argue that EU conditionality has a strong impact on norm dissemination
throughout the EU, other scholars argue that these changes are only superficial. Normative
pressures are not sufficient for policy change, as evident by the fate of the Roma and other
disadvantaged groups in the EU. Arguably, the Roma are the most numerous and most
discriminated minority in Europe (Swimelar 2008). The EU has committed to improving the
status quo of the Roma, but anti-Roma sentiments are often expressed openly in all EU member
countries. Based on the preceding, the impact of EU conditionality appears to be influential on
minority statutes primarily during the accession process of new member states. However, the
impact of these EU supported policies has been limited afterwards and, thus, I agree that these
changes remained only superficial. To this I add that the problem is not superficial monitoring,
but the fact that EU grants membership despite existing minority discrimination. In addition,
discrimination is also practiced in established member states with impunity. For example, in Italy
the government has been defensive about its immigration policy and official brutality against the
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Roma continues. The extradition of Roma out of France has attracted public attention, but has
done little for the Roma people.
2.1.2.3.1 Growing anti-immigration sentiments and intolerant attitudes in the EU
The EU formally stands for free movement of peoples, but in fact the Union tends to
selectively admit only immigrants from poorer EU member states and non-member states who
can contribute economic value to the established members’ economy (Van Houtum and Pijpers
2007). The reality is that established member states put in place the Schengen visa regime also as
a means to monitor and in practice limit the movement of peoples in Europe. In fact, this was a
mechanism to keep unwanted minorities, such as the Roma, and immigrants legally out of
established EU countries. As demonstrated in the preceding paragraphs, these policies are often
enacted against immigrants who are EU citizens of poorer states, such as Eastern Europe.
However, these policies are also applied towards asylum seekers and demanded from states who
are in the process of visa-free regime negotiations. The EU is pressuring states seeking visa-free
status to limit their citizens’ applications for asylum in the EU and that policy is partially
motivated to keep the Roma and other unwanted ethnic and religious minorities out of
established member states. Ultimately, I think that this dominant idea presented in the literature
is accurate and to it I add that widespread racism, far-right wing voters, and prejudice often
determine the fate of immigrants in contemporary Europe. Ultimately, the EU’s formal assurance
of human rights disguises an actual policy of discrimination in pending, new, and established
member states.
2.1.2.3.2 EU Refugee Crisis
As the EU refugee crisis is currently in full swing, thousands of people from the Middle
East, Asia, and Africa cross into the EU daily seeking asylum. Most people fleeing today are
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trying to escape human rights deprivation in weak states rather than direct prosecution and this
does not fit the original definition of a refugee (Betts 2010). Because of this limitation, most of
these individuals can be rounded up and shipped back to their counties. Betts (2010) defines
survival migration as individuals who flee their country because they have no means to fix the
issue they are fleeing from in their own countries. He argues that on a global scale the protection
of these migrants is not due to how the legal norms are incorporated in the states, but rather if it
helps the interests of the key actors in the host countries. Regardless of the EU’s formal
commitment to protection of human rights, the same trends can be observed throughout
established, new, and candidate member states in the EU. As a result, the policies on refugee
treatment within different member states are often conflicting and inconsistent. To this I add that
ultimately this amounts to poorly-organized and ineffective migrant and refugee policies, such as
safe passage, accommodation, and integration of new-comers that can be the catalysts of a true
humanitarian disaster throughout the EU. In addition, although I agree with Betts’ (2010)
analysis, I do believe that his conclusions are incomplete because Eastern Europe’s unequal
standing in the Union also contributes to the existence of ineffective migrant and refugee
policies. Under the threat of impending humanitarian disaster, the Balkan countries of
Macedonia and Serbia, who are EU applicants, and Croatia, already an EU member, have refused
to let through their territory asylum seekers who do not come from war-torn territories such as
Syria, Afghanistan, or Iraq. Bulgaria and Romania have refused to let through any illegal
immigrants and Bulgaria and Macedonia have erected walls on their borders to prevent the
unrestrained influx of people. Throughout the Balkans there are wide-spread security fears
stemming from the unmonitored stream of refugees and asylum seekers. Yet, the Balkan states
are persuaded by the EU leadership against their prevalent domestic sentiments to create and
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maintain large asylum camps in their territories, an unpopular domestically and costly project of
indefinite duration. Overall, the Balkan states feel hard-pressed to live up to EU expectations, but
lack the economic resources and state capacity to effectively fulfill their obligations, as
prescribed by the EU. I believe that these dynamics indicate that domestic politics and interests
of established member states are at work instead of the normative framework of Europeanization.
Overall, the consensus in the literature is that although the normative framework of
Europeanization is structurally embedded into the EU (as a requirement of accession), this does
not result in an even and successful process of integration of new member states with established
normative perceptions in the EU. Ultimately, there is no consistent standard of behavior for all
member states - established and new, so in practice European norms cannot effectively drive EU
accession and integration of new members. I believe that this normative uncertainty leaves room
for discriminatory policies and practices in established, new, and pending members against
vulnerable social groups that are at odds with cherished EU values.
2.1.3 Proximity to Russia and EU Expansion East
The literature maintains the pertinence of the general requirements of the Copenhagen
criteria as accession criteria. However, I contend that accession into the EU cannot be predicted
solely based on economic and political indicators. One reason for this is because binding
European norms are not consistently spread throughout all applicants and members and, thus,
cannot singlehandedly guide EU accession of new members. The preceding analysis of the
literature also points to the current existence of specific political interests of powerful states that
may be embedded in the EU institutions. Looking back to previous accession waves, this idea
can be supported by some glaring examples discussed earlier when countries with less than ideal
economic and democratic indicators were accepted fairly quickly, whereas others were held back
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from accession at economic and/or democratic levels that were deemed satisfactory for accession
in earlier accession waves. Therefore, in the following paragraphs I identify an additional object
of interests of established member states from political and historical perspective. My analysis
looks into alternative explanatory criteria for EU accession of new members, such as the
existence of geo-political aspirations towards Russia. Ultimately, I suggest that the traditional
perspective is incomplete because geographical proximity to Russia also affects the speed of
accession of new members from Eastern Europe.
Gardner (2013) posits that the EU is a club with benefits and they motivate the applicants
to go through the difficult accession process. States want to be a part of the EU whenever their
utility from membership exceeds the costs. He concludes that Eastern enlargement is more likely
driven by strategic political calculations of member states rather than economics alone.
Furthermore, Bevan (2013) maintains that the Copenhagen criteria for accession into the EU
were strictly applied towards the former Soviet satellites from Eastern Europe in order to rebuild
them. The process of enlargement was mostly tailored for the Central and Eastern Europe in
order to preserve democracy in the continent. She also suggests that future accessions may
extend to the remaining European regions and eventually Russia. I agree with the proceeding
analysis, but think it largely downplays the significance of Russian presence in Eastern Europe
as a motivation for EU expansion East. Therefore, I contend that one alternative explanatory
criterion that affects the accession timeframe of new members is the existence of strategic geopolitical interests of established EU states (who approve the applications) in Eastern Europe.
Such a region of significant geo-political interest in the past and present for the Great European
powers in Eastern Europe is Russia. It can be reasonably perceived that proximity to Russia, a
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country with significant natural resources, but widely perceived as unstable democracy at best,
can prove to be a significant influence on decisions for accession of new members into the EU.
In historical perspective, many European powers have been traditionally determined to
limit Russian influence in Eastern Europe. During the 19th century, Britain was concerned that
Russia may have influence over a large Slavic country on the Balkan Peninsula and, thus, gain
access to a port in the Mediterranean Sea. This fear strengthened Britain’s formal support for the
Ottoman Empire, even though it committed documented atrocities in suppressing the rebellion of
the Christian population on its territory. During the 19th century, Russia fought a few wars with
Turkey formally motivated to protect that population, but with the genuine intent to gain access
to the Mediterranean. These wars weakened the Ottoman Empire and paired with uprisings of the
Balkan peoples against the Ottoman oppression in the 19th century, Greece, Serbia, Romania
gained their independence from the Ottoman rule, while Russia fought a war with Turkey to
liberate Bulgaria. After liberation, all of these formed independent states and British diplomacy
and their European allies continued their active policy aimed to limit Russian influence in the
area by shaping the state borders in the region to their strategic interests. This approach
inevitably triggered the bloody conflicts and political instability that plagued the Balkans almost
a century later. Almost half a century later, the Soviet Union openly occupied the countries of
Eastern Europe and replaced their governments with Communist ones. These governments
existed until the fall of the Soviet regime in the late 20th century, when many of the former
impoverished Soviet satellites adopted democracy with the economic and political support from
Western Europe. Russian influence was finally pushed away from the Eastern European region,
but the contemporary conflict in Ukraine is a powerful remnant of this struggle.
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Currently, I contend that geo-political proximity to Russia is still important for
established member states because Russia is sliding back into authoritarianism and is also a
major exporter of natural gas to the EU. Thus, for example, if accession of a state close to Russia
is unpopular on a domestic level, leaders of established EU states can strategically support
accession by addressing the possibility of political and economic instability in the region.
Consequently, if the state is closer to Russia, the motivation to approve the application over time
increases. Ultimately, in relation to interests of established EU member states in expansion
eastwards, the literature largely marginalizes this explanation of EU expansion East, but I
suggest that proximity to Russia should also be calculated as a determinant for accession in
addition to the Copenhagen criteria.
2.1.3.1 Economic Interests of the EU and Proximity to Russia
Fish (2005) examines Russia in relation to Michael Ross' (2001) finding that there is a
negative relationship between political openness and natural resources. He examines the three
mechanisms that feed this negative relationship - the renter effect (providing popular social
services while taxing lightly), the repression effect (maintaining a large repressive apparatuses
that would be unaffordable without the natural resource) and the modernization effect (boost of
wealth without the necessary socio-economic advances). Fish (2005) examines in depth the
mechanisms and establishes that Russia is not a rentier state and there is no evidence for
repression effect (there is significant military spending, but the military is not responsible for the
internal political control), and there is no evidence of anti-development in Russia (many
indicators of social development, industrialization, and culture are present in Russia while absent
in other recourse export countries). The author demonstrates, however, that in Russia there is a
positive relationship between natural resources and corruption. He concludes that in the case of
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Russia, corruption weakens elite demand for open politics, thus diminishing the quality of
democracy. In the context of EU expansion East, I interpret this as an issue of economic
contention between Russia and the EU, because while for the EU economic freedom is related to
political openness, in Russia the economic statism that hinders democracy is related to natural
resource abundance. Ultimately, there is a significant potential for frictions that stem from the
conflicting economic perspectives of the EU and Russia.
In the contemporary context of the complicated EU-Russian relationship, the gas crisis of
early 2009 deserves a mention. Russia's strategy for maintaining internal economic stability
through international expansion is based on the energy monopoly of gas exports to Europe
(Baran 2007). Destabilization and increasing tensions between Moscow and the West appear to
be the natural consequences of this behavior, but Russia has no resources to sustain such a
conflict environment. Neither economic infrastructure nor the political regime in the country are
sufficiently flexible and suitable for long-term handicaps to survival and development. The only
possible solution for Russia is tightening of the political regime in the direction of oppressive
authoritarianism that at a certain point, however, can backfire against the Kremlin (Fish 2005).
Although this perspective is accurate, I believe it is incomplete. To this I add that at the
same time, the EU is concerned that Russia may yet again come to influence the politically and
economically weak Eastern European states. Most recently, these fears of Russian economic
influence in the region became obvious in the unyielding EU refusal to ratify the South Stream, a
gas pipeline that would cross through the Black Sea, Bulgaria, Serbia, Slovenia, and into Austria.
The project would have greatly benefited the economies of the Balkans, the poorest European
region, but was cancelled officially in 2014 due to Russia’s non-compliance with EU energy
legislation and the economic sanctions imposed on Russia. That same year, negotiations between
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Russia and Turkey for an alternative Turkish stream were publicized that would allow Turkey to
resell gas to Europe. Since Turkey is currently not an EU member, it is possible that Turkey may
be able to sell gas to Europe at more favorable rates than if the pipes crossed through Bulgaria,
an EU member who is a part of the EU energy legislation. In reality, this process inadvertently
translated into a heavy economic blow on the poorest EU region, the Balkans.
2.1.3.2 Political Interests of the EU and Proximity to Russia
However, beyond diverging economic interests, Russia and the EU have very different
visions for the future of the former Soviet satellites. On the surface, there are certainly
differences in quality of democracy and human rights in Russia and the EU, but it is too
simplistic to perceive that the EU is the epitome of democratic prosperity and Russia is just a
backwards failure. As a postmodern political project, the EU was founded on the principle of
interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977). According to the EU vision, nothing overcomes
alienation and conflicts of the past better than the deployment of relations - bilateral and
multilateral - based on mutual benefit and mutual dependence. Evidence of this is the EU’s
continent-wide enlargement project currently expanding towards the East. The EU wants Eastern
Europe to be a part of this process along with the rest of Europe. According to the Russian
perspective, more political independence of decision-making in Eastern Europe from the West is
preferable (Van Ham 2001; Gibler and Sewell 2006). This will alleviate a lot of external EU
pressure on Russia when it seeks to implement large-scale regional projects, such as the Southstream pipeline for example. It should not be surprising then that EU’s calls for tighter political
integration with the former Soviet satellites are met with a dose of suspicion and discontent in
Russia. Thus, this review of the literature largely confirms that the fight for political influence
over the Balkans and Eastern Europe still rages with full force.
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I contend that although accurate, this assessment is lacking, so I add that politically and
economically this is dangerous for the Balkans and Eastern Europe who are caught in the crossfire. On the one hand it leads to slower advancement of pro-European norms and policies
towards the former Soviet satellites. Simultaneously, the helplessness of Europe to promote the
emancipation and national development of the post-Soviet space in a relatively nonconfrontational and non-interventionist way (Light 2008) outlines a difficult, long, and painful
transition of Eastern Europe to modern economic development and integration with the values
and structures of the democratic world. Therefore, I contend that geo-political proximity to
Russia is a powerful factor that delays EU’s expansion East.
Overall, my analysis of the literature thus far confirms that, ultimately, there is no
consistent standard of behavior for all member states - established and new. Binding European
norms are not consistently spread throughout all members and cannot drive EU integration alone.
To this I add that the normative uncertainty leaves room for discriminative practices against
minorities in established, new, and pending members. EU institution are setup to promote
specific interests by powerful established member states, so expansion East is motivated by this
at least in part. Geo-political proximity to Russia is a distinctive motivation for EU’s expansion
East, since it allows the EU to expand its influence over Eastern Europe in Russia’s stead. To
this I add that geo-political proximity to Russia is a factor that affects democratization and, thus,
EU integration, of Eastern Europe adversely.
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3

RELEVANCE OF PRO-DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT FOR EU ACCESSION
Chapter 3 investigates the relevance of the conventional requirements for EU

membership, namely pro-democratic development as outlined by the Copenhagen criteria, onto
the speed and variability of accession of new members. Here, the analysis is supplemented by a
literature review of the prevalent perspectives of the issues that affect the speed of EU
integration. The overwhelming consensus in the literature is that implementation of prodemocratic reforms appear to improve EU membership prospects and expedite the process.
Consistent with the Copenhagen criteria, the predominant theoretical perception is that attitudes
towards democracy and capitalism in candidate states determine EU membership and can
reasonably be connected to a smoother and faster accession process (Christin 2005; Cichowski
2000; De Witte 2002; Delsoldato 2002; Fish 2005; Hellman 2004; Plumper, Schneider, and
Troegerv 2006; Sylke 2003; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002). The literature also links EU
expansion to increase in tensions between established and candidate members on expected
economic performance in the application process, which in turn changes the rules and
complicates accession (De Witte 2002; Gray 2013; Janning 1996; Nello 2002; Plümper and
Schneider 2007; Sadeh, Jones, and Verdun 2007; Schimmelfennig 2001; Schneider 2007; Sylke
2003). Finally, some scholars (Kuštepeli 2006; Nello 2002; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006;
Uvalic 2002) maintain that delays in the application process are caused by the asymmetry of
political and economic development in established and new members. Currently, the ongoing
economic crisis in Europe hurt Eastern Europe disproportionately, but regardless of the political
and social sacrifices, the region maintained its pro-democratic orientation (Connolly 2012;
Myant, Drahokoupil and Lesay 2013; Kattel and Raudla 2013; Rae 2013; Popescu 2010;
Noutcheva and Bechev 2008). This chapter also investigates whether improvements in the
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economic well-being of poorer new member states curbs migration to established member states,
which affects the speed of EU integration. The most prevalent theoretical perception is that a
strong economy is considered an essential prerequisite to retain skilled labor in the home
country, because economic growth in the home country decreases migration (Beine, Docquier
and Oden-Defoort 2001; Beine, Docquier, and Hillel 2001; Commander, Kangasniemi, and
Winters 2004; Faini 2007; Franck and Owen 2008; Haque and Kim 1995; Miyagiwa 1991;
Romero 2007; Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz 1997; Wong and Chong 1999). The questions I
will answer in this chapter are: Can pro-democratic development alone explain the speed and
variability of accession of Eastern European states? Is there evidence that decrease in migration
enables smooth new member integration? Can other factors explain the speed of EU integration
of new members?
The largest segment of contemporary research explaining new member accession broadly
holds that the EU is expanding offers to Eastern Europe to join because they what to advance
economic development that can help a) counter the ongoing economic crisis in Europe, b) speed
up the economic development of the poorer Eastern bloc, and c) curb economic migration from
Eastern Europe.
3.1

Ongoing Economic Crisis in Europe
The ongoing economic crisis in Europe has significant political and economic

repercussions for the EU, as it threatened to undo almost half a century of EU integration. The
2008 financial crisis affected the liquidity of banking institutions that could result in bank runs
and insolvency for financial institutions worldwide. Even though systemic collapse was avoided,
the EU as a whole experienced significant economic slowdown in 2008, as reported by the EU
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commission9. In order to counter these effects in 2008, the European Economic Recovery Plan
(EERP) was launched. The plan aimed to increase demand by bolstering purchasing power,
revive the labor markets, and raise confidence in the financial system. Since the EU is only a
common currency union and not a fiscal union, it limited the ability of EU leaders and
institutions to respond. In result, the crisis escalated and in 2009 the European debt crises hit the
EU. During this period, some EU members were unable to pay their government debt or to bail
out their indebted banks on their own and called to EU financial entities for help. In 2010 leading
European countries created various entities such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to
deal with the crisis, while the Central European bank (ECB) helped by providing cheap loans and
reduced interest rates in order to sustain the money flow between European banks. As a result,
European banks became owners of substantial portion of sovereign debt. Due to these stabilizing
measures, Ireland and Portugal were able to complete their bailout plans in 2014, Cyprus
completed its bailout in 2016, while Spain never received bailout assistance and is slowly
recovering. Greece experienced the most dramatic crisis in 2015, since the state was on the verge
of financial default. Greece refused to accept the repayment conditions offered by the ECB, and
instead requested that its debt was partially forgiven. In the end, Greece accepted a revised
settlement plan which included some debt forgiveness. Overall, the economic crisis also had
lasting economic and political implications for the entire Union. For example, unemployment
soared to unprecedented levels in the EU. In affected countries like Greece, roughly a third of the
population was unemployed in 2013 according to Eurostat data10.
Connolly (2012) argues that actually the impact of the European economic crisis was felt
most severely in Eastern Europe than anywhere else in the Union. Myant, Drahokoupil and
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Lesay (2013) maintain that the economic crisis was the reason why more attention was paid in
the political sphere to how the state spends its money. Just like in many other states, cuts were
implemented, but in Eastern and Central Europe these cuts affected negatively already struggling
marginal social groups. Nevertheless, Eastern Europe maintained its pro-liberal orientation. For
example, even though the economic responses to the crisis varied in the Baltic States, their
orientation remained neo-liberal (Kattel and Raudla 2013). However, regardless of the proliberal economic orientation of post-Soviet Poland, pro-liberal oriented parties were rarely reelected in consecutive elections (Rae 2013). The reason for that is because pro-economic
austerity policies in already poor states promoted by pro-liberal platforms do not have strong
support among the electorate. The crisis affects countries with weaker standing, such as
Romania, significantly (Popescu 2010). This effect slows down European integration of new
member states because the gap between the practices of pro-European models on local and EU
level is wide. Noutcheva and Bechev (2008) maintain that during and after the economic crisis,
European conditionality has managed to promote and sustain the political will to implement proliberal reforms in Bulgaria and Romania. However, the demand for such reforms within the
countries lacks wider popular support. Overall, the prevailing perception is that Eastern Europe
paid the heaviest social and political price to maintain its membership standing, yet none of the
countries that required bailout assistance from the EU were from Eastern Europe.
Although accurate, I do believe that this view is incomplete and the implications of the
crisis in the Eurozone had much deeper negative implications on the EU expansion East.
Ultimately, there were three significant political implications from the EU economic crisis that
affected the standing of Eastern European members and applicants. First, there was a shift in
popular perception among the EU population at large that viewed the repayment option imposed
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on Greece as unreasonable and detrimental to the welfare of its people. This popular sentiment
and the economic hardships associated with the crisis lead to power shifts in many established
and new EU member states. However, the political polemic to help Greece never addressed or
acknowledged the fact that many Balkan countries, some of which EU members, already
function within similar to Greece’s or harsher conditions of economic austerity. In these Balkan
countries, this strengthened the perception initially produced by the EU employment ban
imposed on new Balkan EU members like Bulgaria and Romania, that they live in the periphery
of the EU and are second-grade EU citizens. Second, there was a significant potential for
Greece's exit out of the Eurozone and even the EU, should it fail to adhere the repayment
conditions offered by the ECB. Undoubtedly, this unprecedented drama demonstrated that good
economic performance of EU member states is fundamental for EU membership and overall EU
stability. Yet, it is also troubling that the Greek government apparently boosted their financial
documents in order to enter the EU and the Eurozone and the EU institutions failed to detect that.
This cast a doubt on the capacity of EU institutions to deal effectively with the challenges of
integration of new members as well as implanted a reservation among EU citizens that the EU
may not be immune to similar occurrences in the future. Finally, since the beginning of the
European economic crisis, the EU has accessed only one new member in 2013 - Croatia. Thus,
the stalling of EU expansion since the onset of the crisis can undoubtedly be attributed at least
partially to economic factors. Since the crisis is still ongoing, its long-term effects on EU
integration cannot be conclusively established at this point. However, I maintain that even
though the pro-democratic orientation of Eastern Europe was not affected by the crisis,
undoubtedly the crisis created obstacles for new member integration and does not seem to drive
EU expansion East.
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3.2

Slower Economic Development in the Eastern Block and its Impact on EU Accession
The Balkans have exhibited a capacity for economic growth that has the potential to

alleviate the economic inequalities that exist in the region. The realization of prominent regional
projects concerning transportation and energy is capable of transforming the region into an
important and stable regional European economic center. These improvements of regional
cooperation will increase the stability in bilateral relations. The implementation of the Regional
Cooperation Council and the South-East European Cooperation Process are essential for building
stable regional relationships and economic growth. Yet, the economic growth of the region is
slow in comparison to the established member states. In addition, while established EU members
are some of the least corrupt in the world and are established liberal democracies, some of the
new-comers bring in corruption which further slows economic growth and democratization in the
region. Undoubtedly, slower economic development in the Eastern Bloc prominently lowers the
prospects for EU membership. Currently, the popular attitudes in the established states that
oppose accession of new Eastern European members and pushes for unequal membership rights
appear to be shaped by these perceptions.
3.2.1 Conventional Wisdom about EU Accession of Eastern Europe
The literature on the Eastern expansion of the EU is dominated by studies seeking to
identify the overall expectations of candidates and the motives for established states to approve
or reject applicants. Consistent with the Copenhagen criteria, the predominant theoretical
consensus is that attitudes towards capitalism and democracy in candidate states increase the
chances and are related to faster EU accession (Christin 2005; Cichowski 2000; De Witte 2002;
Delsoldato 2002; Fish 2005; Hellman 2004; Plumper, Schneider, and Troegerv 2006; Nissen
2003; Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky 2002). A less dominant strain of the literature discusses how

53

lower economic performance of new applicants results in changes of the rules by established
members and, thus, delays new member accession (De Witte 2002; Gray 2013; Janning 1996;
Nello 2002; Plümper and Schneider 2007; Sadeh, Jones, and Verdun 2007; Schimmelfennig
2001; Schneider 2007; Nissen 2003). Finally, some scholars (Kuštepeli 2006; Nello 2002;
Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2006; Uvalic 2002) maintain the asymmetry of political and
economic development between established and new members is the reason for delayed
accession.
3.2.1.1 Pro-democratic Attitudes in Candidate States Determine EU Membership Timeframe
Overall, the irreversible implementation of reforms that reinforce pro-democratic
reforms, meaning that they promote economic development through capitalism and civil liberties
is closely related to EU accession, as evident from the Copenhagen criteria. The Copenhagen
criteria (established in 1993) specified the exact requirements that must be met in order to join
the EU:
“Any European country may apply for membership…Countries
wishing to join need to have: 1) stable institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and
protection of minorities, 2) functioning market economy and the
capacity to cope with competition and market forces in the EU, and
the 3) ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of
membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic
and monetary union.” 11
Not surprisingly, the overwhelming consensus in the literature is that implementation of
pro-democratic reforms appear to improve EU membership prospects and expedite the process.
For example, Hellman (1998) links the most advanced economies in Eastern Europe to prodemocratic reforms. In these countries, executives have shorter appointments, governments
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change often, and have a smooth transition into the EU. A few years later, Cichowski (2000)
adds that public support is necessary for obtaining and sustaining EU membership in the
countries undergoing democratic transitions. This public support also preserves the prodemocratic reforms implemented in the process and guarantees an easier accession into the EU.
Two years later, De Witte (2002) remarks the Eastern European enlargement is perceived as
threatening to the institutional capacity of the EU system. Therefore, pro-democratic reforms
aligning these institutions in candidate states should be implemented before enlargement. Yet
another model examines the attitudes of major transnational parties towards EU enlargement in
the East. This analysis draws parallels between their attitudes and the constitutional makeup of
the newcomers. Smooth Eastern European integration is linked to the process of permeation of
pro-democratic attitudes in the constitutional makeup of the new members (Delsoldato 2002). In
the same year, Tucker, Pacek, and Berinsky (2002) confirm that states that have enacted prodemocratic reforms are perceived to be more likely to integrate faster into the EU. The
following year, Nissen (2003) indicates that failure to develop a common European identity can
impede EU integration. This identity that consists of norms promoting democracy should be
promoted by the European political culture. Therefore, shared views of democracy will provide
for a smooth EU accession. Two years later, Christin (2005) directly links domestic support for
pro-democratic reforms to positive view of EU membership for Central and Eastern European
countries. This positive view helps for a faster and effortless accession. Fish (2005) adds that the
Freedom House index of democracy at the time of adoption of the constitution determines
election of a stronger legislative body or executive. He examines the constitutional types of all
formal post-communist countries and establishes that the parliamentary types are overall the
highest achievers, whereas the presidential types are the lowest achievers in democratization. Not
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surprisingly, the high achievers in democratization from Eastern Europe are quickly accessed to
the EU. Finally, Plumper, Schneider, and Troegerv (2006) link the level of pro-democratic
attitudes in applicants to decisions of whether to apply for EU membership and assess that
unconstrained pro-democratic reforms are an indication for policy support that increases the
likelihood of joining the EU.
Overall, this perspective holds that EU accession is driven and accelerated primarily by
improvement of political and economic indicators, as suggested by the Copenhagen criteria.
Thus, EU’s faster expansion into Eastern Europe is a function of shared pro-democratic attitudes
of the member and applicant states.
3.2.1.2 Tensions between Established and New Members Change the Rules of Accession
In addition, a smaller portion of the literature also links EU expansion to increase in
tensions between established and candidate members on expected economic performance in the
phase-in period. These tensions tend to change the rules and complicate the process, indicating
that the EU is uncertain or even unwilling at times to proceed without amending the terms of
accession for new members. For example, Janning (1996) assesses established members’
tensions that arise and slow down the process with simultaneous commitment to widening and
deepening of the EU. The author proposes a moderate intergovernmental approach as one of the
essential tools of successful EU integration. A few years later, Schimmelfennig (2001) adds that
the enlargement to the East is a consequence of the inability of the EU to go back on its
expansion rhetoric. Therefore, accession eastwards is complicated because it is a bargaining
process between the supporters of the enlargement and the opponents, who possess superior
material bargaining resources and fear the burdens of the weaker Eastern European economies. A
while later Plümper and Schneider (2007) also link discrimination of new members of the EU to
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distribution conflicts. These distribution conflicts result in a delay in integration of the new
members. In the same year Sadeh, Jones, and Verdun (2007) also argue that the realization of the
European Union's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has illuminated the differences in
economic performance of new and established members. The solutions of the tensions associated
with delayed EMU integration of some new member states lie in improved rules in decisionmaking. In addition, Schneider (2007) perceives that complication in the process and tensions
between established and new members are due to discriminatory membership. By utilizing a
game-theoretical perspective the author argues that these measures are the result of redistribution
of enlargement gains from new members to poorly performing established members. Most
recently, Gray (2013) argues that the associations of states with emerging markets are essential
in calculations for investment risk. Whenever such a state signs a contract with a stable,
established state, it is perceived to be stable and vice versa, which significantly complicates and
slows of the process of integration because it turns it into a bargaining process driven by strategic
interests.
This strand of the literature thus argues EU accession of Eastern European members is
subject to different rules and is, therefore, different than prior accession waves. Consequently, in
addition to the Copenhagen criteria, accession into the EU is also a function of an effort of the
established member states to protect their interests by new rules that complicate the process.
3.2.1.3 Asymmetry in Economic and Political Aspects of Integration Slows Accession
Another portion of the literature examines the effects of the asymmetrical economic and
political development in Eastern European and established member states. This appears to be
related to differing speed of integration of the new Eastern European member states. For
example, Uvalic (2002) assesses the role of sub-regional economic cooperation among the
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economies in transition in Central and Eastern Europe. This cooperation occurs due to the
varying speed of the EU integration process and serves to strengthen regionalism and regional
politics. The effect of sub-regional economic cooperation so far is overall positive, but it also
constrains integration. One year later Nello (2003) evaluates the asymmetry between the political
and economic aspects of integration of Eastern European states. For the author, the reason for the
asymmetry can be found in the fact that, as expected, new member market development is
fostered by outward trade and foreign investments, but these do not resolve some of the political
questions that affect enlargement. Three years later, Kuštepeli (2006) implies that there is no
Kuznets curve in the European Union, which means that the initial economic losses are not
mitigated by later gains. This connection between income inequality and economic growth
consequently slows the integration of new members. Most recently, Rohrschneider and
Whitefield (2006) argue that there is an assumed consensus over the instrumental advantages of
economic integration. However, this does not apply to the post-Communist states, even though
they are politically ready for the transitions and this ultimately stalls their integration.
This portion of the literature confirms the conventional perception that the general
requirements of the Copenhagen criteria are essential for EU membership because: 1) accession
into the EU is related to increase of pro-democratic reforms; 2) increase in wealth is linked to
smooth EU accession, as the economy is liberalized in order to become competitive in the new
environment. Overall, faster and consistent economic development and shared democratic values
speed up accession, while the opposite creates frictions between established and candidate
members. This analysis also confirms that EU accession is not a simple straight-forward process.
I contend that although accurate, the predominant view is incomplete because, as I mentioned
earlier, slower pro-democratic development actually motivated the accession of Southern
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Europe. However, the same does not apply to the accession of Eastern Europe and the Balkans
since, according to the literature, their slower pro-democratic development delayed their
accession. This selective application of the Copenhagen criteria is actually indicative of a more
guarded approach by established members and changing expectations from newer applicants that
cannot be explained entirely by the applicant’s pro-democratic development, but rather by
additional factors that determine the speed of accession.
3.3

Economic Migrants from Eastern Europe
Up until recently, work for poor new members of the EU was restricted in the established

EU countries. However, as of January 1st, 2014 the work ban was lifted for Bulgaria and
Romania, and this triggered a wave of fear in established EU member countries from an influx of
poor migrants. “Newspapers and politicians fear a wave of immigrants will come to Britain to
beg, the unruly young ones will stir up riots, and some will even try to sell babies”12. The ban
that was in place constrained the access to jobs and claims on state benefits, like healthcare or
unemployment. Low-skilled laborers from Bulgaria and Romania who worked in established EU
member countries such as the UK or Germany were required to obtain work permits up-until the
ban lift. With the ban removed, nationals from Bulgaria and Romania are able to work anywhere
in the EU, just like any of the citizens of the established members.
Yet, the heightened sense of urgency to address the fear of the influx of migrants from
poorer Balkan countries, as portrayed in the media, remains a prominent political problem for
established member states. For example, on November 9th, 2015, British PM David Cameron
requested reduction of immigration and welfare payments to European immigrants from poorer
EU countries, as a condition for UK’s future in the EU. After all, migrants from these poor
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countries, in particular the Balkan countries of Bulgaria and Romania, who were subjected to the
lifted work ban are presumably drawn to the wealthier countries because their home states are
poor. While immigration may be economically beneficial for established EU states as a cheap
labor source, to many the inflow of impoverished migrants who seek better living conditions also
presents substantial social and political problems. Poor economic performance in the home
country is commonly associated with increased migration, also referred to as “brain drain”.
However, stable economic growth associated with market liberalization is a requirement for an
EU membership. The European Council is not holding back criticism on members whose
economy is performing poorly and that can be grounds for substantial sanctions. However,
according to the World Bank dataset13, Bulgaria and Romania’s wealth is increasing. Their GDP
– per capita (current US dollars) is growing at a slow but steady pace since the overthrow of their
communist regimes in 1989.
The literature is dominated by studies seeking to identify the overall cause of migration.
The theoretical rationale is that “brain drain” effect is closely related to the economic
performance of a country. The predominant perception in the literature maintains that economic
growth in the home country decreases migration (Beine, Docquier and Oden-Defoort 2001;
Beine, Docquier, and Hillel 2001; Commander, Kangasniemi, and Winters 2004; Faini 2007;
Franck and Owen 2008; Haque and Kim 1995; Miyagiwa 1991; Romero 2007; Stark,
Helmenstein and Prskawetz 1997; Wong and Chong 1999).
3.3.1 GDP-per Capita and Migration
Scholars have presented various perspectives on how migration is linked to economics
since the invention of the term “brain drain” in the 1960s. The most prevalent theoretical
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perception is that a strong economy is considered an essential prerequisite to retain skilled labor
in the home country. One such perspective maintains that in order to maintain a healthy
economy, migration rate of skilled workers should not exceed 20 to 30 percent. This view clearly
associates increase in economic health with limited migration. (Beine, Docquier, and OdenDefoort 2011). Another perspective examines the benefits of the “brain drain effect”14 that links
increased levels of investment to higher returns of laborers from abroad. This model connects the
increase of wealth to decrease in migration by using cross-section data for 37 developing
countries (Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport 2001). The economic capacity of the state to employ
skilled labor is a determining factor in individuals’ choice whether to stay or migrate.
Consequently, the performance of the economy has a direct impact on the retention of skilled
labor (Franck and Owen 2008). Wealthy countries attract scarce skilled labor from poor
countries. This effect is costly to poor countries because of the high price they pay to finance the
education of the skilled workers and the subsequent loss of this investment. In turn, generation of
wealth is associated with the retention of skilled workers (Commander, Kangasniemi, and
Winters 2004). Yet another model examines the notion that skilled labor migration will remit
more funds to their home economy. By using Docquier and Marfouk’s (2004) data set, Riccardo
(2007) establishes an empirical equation of remittance as a measure of “brain drain”. This
evidences that highly skilled laborers actually have a smaller propensity to remit and this finding
dispels the notion of a positive effect of migration on wealth (Riccardo 2007). In another study,
an endogenous growth model demonstrates that reduction of income and economic growth in the
home country causes an increase of migration to wealthier countries. The home country may
attempt to correct this by subsidizing low-skilled level education, since the more educated labor
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force is likely to migrate. This can lead to permanent damage to the home economy since it
limits its output capacity for the long term (Haque and Kim 1995). Migration of skilled labor
hurts the labor force and output capability in the source country, regardless of whether the nonmigrants chose to stay or migrate. Again, this issue can be corrected through scale economies in
advanced education, since the brightest continue to migrate. Overall, retention of skilled labor is
closely connected to wealth in the home country (Miyagiwa 1991). Romero (2007) directly links
the “brain drain” effect to decrease in per-capita income in the source country. The reason for
that is that when the economy is down, all highly skilled labor will attempt to migrate according
to a heterogeneous agents’ model. Therefore, the increase in per-capita income is a must-have for
retention of skilled labor. Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997) examine the effect of
accumulation of unskilled human capital in source countries, as skilled labor migrates to higherpaying employment abroad. Higher paying jobs as a function of a healthy economy are an
essential means of retention of skilled labor in the source country. Wong and Chong (1999)
evaluate the effect of the economy on migration by constructing a two-sector overlappinggenerations model of endogenous growth. The model establishes that economic growth restrains
migration from the source country. Stark, Oded, and Wang (2002) directly link decrease in
wealth to increase in migration. A well-controlled migration policy can be enacted to improve
economic welfare, thus linking wealth and retention of migrants in the source country.
A smaller segment of the literature (Lundborg 2006; Mountford 1997; Peng 2009; Stark
and Wang 2002; Vidal 1998) argues that economic growth has multi-dimensional effects on
migration from the home country. For example, Lundborg (2006) argues that although migration
is associated with decreased welfare of the source country, it has a positive effect on
globalization. Mountford (1997) assesses average productivity and income as a positive function
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of human capital in the economy, so therefore retention of migrants is related to wealth.
However, increased productivity of the economy is associated with temporary migration, while a
decrease in productivity is linked to permanent migration. Therefore, economic productivity is
related to the time-frame of migration. Peng (2009) links depletion of production resources of the
source country to “brain drain”. However, migration can also reduce rent-seeking activities, thus
mitigating the effects of wealth reduction to an extent. Vidal (1998) links migration to an
incentive to invest in human capital generation in the source country. If the demand is high
enough, this can potentially stimulate a declining economy.
As evident in the World Bank dataset15, the economies of the Balkan states are growing
consistently, granted at a slower pace than their established EU counterparts. Since the preceding
paragraphs reveal that as the economic conditions in the Balkan countries are improving,
according to the literature the migration trends towards the established member states should
decrease over time. Ultimately, this indicates the fears from growing migration trends from
poorer European countries, such as the Balkans, are not empirically substantiated in the long run,
as the Balkan economies are improving. However, the accession of the poorer Eastern European
states remains a question of popular discontent and can be politically dangerous for political
leaders in established member states who support it. Regardless of the risks of tangible political
losses, EU expansion towards Eastern Europe is still ongoing.
The preceding analysis of the economic considerations for EU expansion East outlines
that the ongoing economic crisis slows EU accession and integration of new members. In
essence, strong pro-democratic reforms are a must-have for successful accession, regardless of
the social and political price paid by new members. The literature confirms that EU candidates
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must adhere to the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria for successful accession, but I add
that the Copenhagen criteria appear to be applied more strictly to Eastern European and Balkan
applicants. Even though economic development curbs migration to established member states,
new member states and candidates are under strict scrutiny by established member states, which
complicates new member accession.
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4

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EU EXPANSION EAST

Chapter 4 evaluates the structural considerations for expansion East. This chapter is
aimed to establish if there are additional factors from structural perspective that motivate when
and how fast new members join. The prevailing perspectives discussed in structural strand of the
literature suggest that the EU is expanding offers to Eastern Europe to join since the established
member states want to rebuild and improve the region because they perceive it as weak and
volatile and EU institutions can be utilized as powerful agents of pro-democratic political and
economic changes in the region. According to the literature, the Balkans emerge as a negative
self-image of Europeans that they would like to remove from their own history and cultural
narrative. This negative image is incompatible with the European one because of its perceived
political and social backwardness. This biased image is incorrect and affects negatively EU
integration of the countries from the region (Wolff 1996; Todorova 1997). Some researchers
(Huntington 1996; Radu 1998) maintain that this backwardness is partially due to the fact that
Orthodox Christianity impedes western-style democratization in the region. In reality, despite the
differences in opinion and trials faced by all, economic development and stability of the relations
between the countries in the Balkans were dominant in the twenty-first century and established
the Balkans as a region of peace (Tsatchevski 2008). Therefore, there is nothing war-prone or
different in the processes that occurred in the Balkans, when compared to their established
member EU counterparts. These political changes are irreversible, as many of Balkan states have
applied or joined the EU and NATO. In addition, EU institutions were successfully able to
produce linkage with Western Europe by guaranteeing security to Eastern Europe (Gibler and
Wolford 2006; Gibler and Sewell 2006). However, EU institutional effectiveness of promoting
leverage of the West cannot be adequately assessed from the stance of its new members or
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applicants on international political issues, since differences in opinion obviously exist
(Tsatchevski 2008). Thus, the ability of EU institutions to influence the region in conflict
resolution cannot be fully established. Analysis of the literature casts a doubt on the success of
EU institutions’ ability to follow through with the economic reforms and policies which they
championed and promoted to the newest members from Eastern Europe. These are strong
indicators that EU institutions were not fully successful in eliminating extractive and promoting
inclusive economic models and lowering income inequality in Eastern Europe. Throughout
Eastern Europe, the "red bourgeoisie" deliberately transformed transitional and uncertain state
assets to their own legalized heritage through a legal process supervised by EU institutions
(Atanasov 2014). Also, currently all Eastern European members exhibit substantial income
inequality when compared to their Western European counterparts, although some who delayed
reforms have more pronounced income inequality than others (Hellman 1998). The questions
examined here include: Why is the Balkan region perceived as weak and volatile? Are EU
institutions effective agents of pro-democratic political and economic changes in the region?
The prevailing perspectives discussed in this strand of the literature suggest that the EU is
expanding offers to Eastern Europe to join since the established member states want to rebuild
and improve the region because a) they perceive it as weak and volatile and b) EU institutions
can be utilized as powerful agents of pro-democratic political and economic changes in the
region.
4.1

Concerns of Established Member States that the Balkan Region is Weak and Volatile
As noted in the preceding paragraphs, the region of the Balkans has historically been of

interest to the Great European Powers from the West and East (Russia), since they all want
influence in the area due to its strategic location. However, EU expansion process into Eastern
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Europe is also motivated by the perceived “otherness” of the region that “needs to be
Europeanized” (Kuus 2004). While the region is popularly perceived in the West as a backwards
region that is unsuitable for liberal democracy, plagued by conflict and ethnic intolerance, there
is evidence that this may be the result of the continued struggle from East and West for influence
in the region. To “balkanize”16 has come to mean “to break up (as a region or group) into smaller
and often hostile units”. The Balkans have been and still are popularly perceived within the
established EU member states as a perfect breeding environment for internal or external (i.e.
Russian) authoritarian influences, ethnic intolerance, and poverty. However, the perception that
the Balkans are a backward, war-prone region are inaccurate and unsupported by the most recent
political developments in the region, as obviated by the review of the relevant literature in the
following paragraphs.
4.1.1 Balkanization
“Balkanization” is a term which was derived from the history of the region and reflects
the fragmentation into small particles and the perceived deep-seeded hatred between these small
particles. As Yugoslavia began to fall apart, the Balkan region became a hotspot of global
attention and concern because of the bloody conflict that unfolded there. Ultimately, these events
strengthened and solidified the popular perception that the Balkans are weak and volatile.
However, the process that constructed the region as such in Europe’s imagination started long
before then. Wolff (1996) suggested that the negative image of Eastern Europe was invented by
the eighteenth century philosophers during the Enlightenment. This was a Paris-centric view that
aimed to present Western Europe as more stable and progressive against the backdrop of the
weak and backwards Eastern Europe. Todorova (1997) investigated the origin of the modern
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perception of the Balkans as a place of hatred, violence, and disorder. This image was tracked
from the idyllic perception of the Balkans that prevailed in the eighteen century to the bitterness
of the fact the WWI started in the Balkans. The author addressed some controversial claims, such
as the one made by Robert Kaplan that Hitler adopted the idea of Nazism from the Balkans that
were the breeding grounds of ethnic conflicts. Therefore, the corrupting Balkan influence spread
all the way to Vienna. While the book recognized the influence of the Balkans on the West,
Todorova (1997) notes that this presence is felt because the Great Powers are greatly responsible
for carving the region in the nineteenth century not along ethnic or cultural lines but along lines
that were preferable for their own political needs.
Overall, the Balkans emerge as a negative self-image of Europeans that they would like
to remove from their own history and cultural narrative. This negative image is incompatible
with the European one because of its perceived political and social backwardness. In
contemporary context based on the preceding analysis, I think that this assessment is incomplete
on its own. To this I have to add that much of the popular discontent in established member
states towards poor migrants from the Balkans as well as the unequal membership rights granted
to Bulgaria and Romania can potentially be connected with this persistent negative image of
“balkanism” within the Western-European psyche. Thus, this constructed negative image of the
Balkans negatively affects accession and integration of new members from the region.
4.1.2 Eastern Orthodox Christianity
Some of the literature links the popular perception of Eastern European backwardness by
examining the relationship between religious beliefs in the region and democratization. For
example while Weber (1904) suggested that Protestantism practiced primarily in Western Europe
singlehandedly created liberal democracy, Huntington (1996) concurs and adds that Eastern
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Orthodox Christianity practiced primarily in Eastern Europe and Islam practiced by parts of the
region slow down democratization. The reason for that is because Protestantism was able to
separate church and state, which is not acceptable in Eastern Orthodox or Islam. Radu (1998)
agrees that the Eastern Orthodox Church does not contribute to the promotion of democracy in
Eastern Europe, but rather hinders it by promoting nationalism. Prodromou (1996) suggests that
this is a cultural image of Europe that is drawn in such a way to represent the West as modern
and Eastern Europe as backwards, where Eastern Orthodox Christianity is presented as Eastern
Europe’s essential characteristic. Huntington (1996) also suggested that the Orthodox world, a
geographical region including Russia, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans that practices Eastern
Orthodox Christianity, is not a part of the Western civilization, which includes Western and
Central Europe, the United States, and Canada. Although he admits the obvious cultural links
between Eastern and Western Europe, he argues that the Orthodox World can self-determine as a
separate civilization from the Western civilization altogether. This will be an issue of immense
importance for the region in the future and maintains the greatest civilization clash will be
between Islam and non-Islam civilizations. For Huntington (1996) the biggest clash between
civilizations is the clash between Islam and Christianity, a conflict based on theological and
historical reasons. Theologically, both religions claim that they are the only acceptable and
correct one and deny all others and have the mission to convert non-believers. Historically, the
bloody Ottoman conquest of Europe that passed through the Christian Orthodox Eastern Europe
was stopped by Western Europe. Ultimately, I believe that this perception is incorrect, for one
because Orthodox Christianity is not the main characteristic of the region and also because
Orthodox Christianity is no more or less conservative than Protestantism. Also, none of the Great
Powers that practice Protestantism were under Ottoman siege and rule, while the Balkans that
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practice Eastern Orthodox Christianity were for five hundred years. The Ottoman rule, which
obliterated the existence of pre-existing statehood in the region, undoubtedly prevented the
development of strong institutions that produce and support healthy liberal democracies in the
Balkan states. Instead of Orthodox Christianity, I believe Russian political influence in the
region is at odds with EU’s one and the resulting friction slows down the expansion of
democracy in the region.
4.1.3 Conflicts in the Balkans
Currently, there is a stability in relations amongst the Balkan countries, regardless of the
problems and tests faced by all. Democratization of the region, evident in the membership in the
EU and NATO of some Balkan states and active participation in the international arena rule out
the possibility that the countries in the region will ever resolve to warfare in their relations.
Kosovo was the last hurdle in the new reality of peace in the Balkans and has marked the end of
military confrontation between neighbors.
Tsatchevski (2008) maintains that economic development and stability in relations
between the countries in the Balkans were dominant in the twenty-first century and established
the Balkans as a region of peace. The region has also made tremendous strides towards EuroAtlantic and EU cooperation, so currently much of the territory and people of the Balkan region
are now a part of the European Union. The same is relevant NATO membership, and while
Greece and Turkey have been NATO members since 1952, Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO
in 2008, and Albania and Croatia became full members by 2009. All of this is evidence of the
undeniable positive political changes in the region in recent decades.
The most recent political challenges in the Balkans include the status of Kosovo, the
naming dispute between Macedonia and Greece, the separatist aspirations of ethnic Albanians in
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Southern Serbia, and the ethnic fragmentation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. The
greatest test to internal stability in the region was the declaration of independence of Kosovo in
2008. The independence was declared in discord with UN Security Council’s Resolution 1244,
but was recognized by a number of states in the Balkans and the international community. Serbia
has showed resolution to maintain peace by accepting new realities that cannot be changed by
the Serbian people who live in Kosovo as well as by the Serbian government. Nevertheless, in
response to Albanian separatism, the Serbs in Kosovo may resolve to separate as well, thus
further charging the situation. Currently Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence and is
not ready to do so in the foreseeable future. All of these incidents, however, will not impede the
overall peaceful intra-regional relations in the Balkans.
From the preceding analysis, the Balkans have moved away from armed conflict into an
age of peace that shows that the region has undergone tremendous political changes in a similar
fashion to the changes that occurred in Western Europe after WWI and WWII. Therefore, I agree
with this strand of the literature that maintains that there is nothing war-prone or different in the
processes that as occurred in the Balkans, when compared to their established member EU
counterparts. These political changes are irreversible, as many of Balkan states have applied or
joined the EU and NATO. Ultimately, I disagree with the strands of the literature that present the
Balkans as backwards and add that the reason for the lagging democratic development of the
region cannot be attributed to culture or religion, but is rather caused by geo-political conditions.
4.2

EU Institutions’ Ability to Influence Eastern Europe
Accession of new members from Eastern Europe into the Union is possible only through

good governance, effective institutions, and quality democracy. Good governance creates
effective institutions. These institutions produce quality democracy. Established member states
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want a democratic sub-continent that will support expansion towards Eastern Europe. Next, I
evaluate the literature in order to establish whether EU institutions have the real power to impact
the quality of democracy in Eastern European and Balkan members in order to support EU
expansion.
4.2.1 EU Institutions and Pro-Democratic Political Changes in Eastern Europe
Most broadly, EU institutions can promote pro-democratic political changes by providing
leverage and linkage with West (Levitsky and Way 2010). First, I examine how EU institutions
promote linkage and leverage with the West with the newest members in Eastern Europe. In
particular, I examine the role of EU policies and initiatives in promoting Western 1) linkage by
guaranteeing security and 2) leverage through conditionality in Eastern Europe, since those are
the two main issue areas that enabled Western presence and cooperation in the region.
4.2.1.1 EU and Security of Eastern Europe
Gibler and Wolford (2006) maintain that peaceful borders are an essential precondition
for the consolidation of democracy. Therefore, countries sign defense pacts with their neighbors
in order to reduce their militarization and the possibility of being drawn into a military conflict
while democratizing. Immediately after the Cold War, the Baltic States formed an alliance with
the WEU. This increased the perception that these former Soviet Republics will be protected
from external threats and demonstrated that they wanted close political ties with the West.
NATO significantly contributed to reducing the treats for the Baltic States by actively pushing
for withdrawal of Russian troops from their borders and became the guarantor of security in the
area until they became full EU members. The role of NATO was less obvious in Moldova,
Belarus, and Ukraine, and these post-communist states only partially democratized and are
currently not a part of the EU (Gibler and Sewell 2006). The EU played an indirect coercive role
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in the removal of Russian troops from the Baltic States. The Baltic States as well as other former
Soviet satellite states were invited as associated members in the EU. The same later applied to
other parts of Eastern Europe. Although no security guarantee was formally given to them,
security assistance from the West was expected. Russia expressed dislike of the fact that its
former republics and satellites were joining NATO, but did not appear to oppose their accession
into WEU, so EU expansion could mean indirect access of NATO to these regions. The
combination of NATO and EU magnified the effect of security in the area and allowed for
consolidation and democratization in the region and currently significant portion of Eastern
Europe is a part of the EU. The increased level of security associated with EU expansion in the
area provided zones of security and enabled democratic consolidation in the region. Therefore,
EU institutions were successfully able to produce linkage with the West in Eastern Europe,
although NATO undoubtedly was instrumental in the process.
4.2.1.2 EU Conditionality and Disagreement Resolution
In the last twenty-five years, the post-authoritarian states in Eastern Europe have made
tremendous strides towards Euro-Atlantic and EU cooperation. Following the Baltic and centralEuropean states, Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia were also accepted into the EU and currently
most of the territory in the Balkan region is a part of the European Union. EU institutions are
formally committed to accept the new additions to the Union immediately after they meet the
requirements for membership, and the same process is followed when joining NATO. Levitsky
and Way’s (2010) contend that in Eastern Europe there is high Western linkage and leverage that
lead to the spread of democracy in the region. I believe that this is not entirely correct because
while the EU was clearly successful in providing linkage through security for Eastern Europe,
the same cannot be said for EU’s approach to conflict resolution through conditionality in the
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region. For example, Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 caused tensions in the
region, since the Balkan EU members offered conflicting reactions that matched the divided
popular perceptions on the issue in the region (Tsatchevski 2008). However, the majority of the
established members of the EU recognized Kosovo’s independence. A few years later, the
reaction to the fragmentation of Ukraine across the EU was entirely different, even though the
Crimean separatists explicitly justified their actions with Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
Not surprisingly, EU members including the new additions from the Balkans condemned the
events in Ukraine and Russia’s intervention. After all, Kosovo declared independence after years
of human rights abuse by Serbia and as part of the final dissolution of the former Yugoslavia,
while Ukraine was fragmented because of Russian invasion. Never-the-less, some new member
applicants from the Balkans were more cautious in their official position on the issue and only
voiced support or the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Throughout all of this, the EU has
demonstrated resolve to find solutions to the local problems through conditionality, since various
EU membership benefits and membership itself are tied to maintaining and projecting peaceful
relations. These subtle differences in official position of the member states and new member
candidates in the region are significant because regardless of EU conditionality in conflict
resolution in the region, differences of opinion obviously exist. Therefore, it is unclear whether
European institutions have gained a firm foothold in the region through conditionality in conflict
resolution at this time.
Ultimately, based on the preceding I ascertain that EU institutional effectiveness of
promoting leverage with the West cannot be adequately assessed from the stance of its new
members or applicants on international political issues. Thus, the ability of EU institutions to
influence the region in conflict resolution cannot be fully established.
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4.2.2 EU Institutions and Economic Changes in Eastern Europe
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, EU institutions have been dedicated to reforming the
communist model in the post-authoritarian economies into an inclusive one, compatible with a
free market environment. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) perceive that democracy is sustained
when the elites give access to power to the opposition, otherwise elites make choices that
generate poverty on purpose, so politics are crucial in explaining inequality. Therefore, it is
reasonable to expect that EU institutions will promote democracy through enabling 1)
democratic access to power and resources and 2) policies that curb economic inequality in
Eastern Europe. Regardless of the strong formal resolve of EU institutions to reform the
economic structure of Eastern Europe, these policies and initiatives produced superficial results
because the process effectively 1) legally transferred power and resources in the hands of the
former communist elites and 2) generated significant income inequality during and after the
transition to democracy.
4.2.2.1 The Red Bourgeoisie
The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 was an unprecedented possibility for the former Soviet
satellites to join the EU. The EU offered a great possibility for economic prosperity by
promoting free markets and common currency, which would guarantee economic stability so
desperately needed in the poor post-authoritarian states. Through various policies, promises, and
initiatives EU institutions openly supported the transformation of the economies of new members
by providing subsidies and promising access to new markets. However, in Eastern Europe, the
transition process brought disenchantment with the ideal of the free markets, since during the
process former communist nomenclature became the new capitalists. They disproportionately
enriched themselves by misappropriating national assets, to whom the mass of the population
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had no access. The transition to the free market economy allowed the communist nomenclature
to cash in their political power and EU institutions still granted membership to these states,
largely overlooking the corruption that they brought in. Throughout Eastern Europe, the "red
bourgeoisie" deliberately transformed transitional and uncertain state assets to their own
legalized heritage through a legal process supervised by EU institutions (Atanasov 2014). This
took place in the vacuum of lawlessness and was committed by the former communist
nomenclature who remained in power after the transition. Today, even though the significant part
of Eastern Europe is a part of the EU, the red bourgeoisie still has a firm grip on the nationalized
wealth. Thus, EU institutions’ efforts to promote inclusive economic structures through denationalization of assets in the former communist states actually helped legally transfer them in
the hands of the former leaders of the extractive regimes. This process prevented the opposition
from equal access to economic resources and stalled the efforts to fully transform the economic
models of Eastern Europe into inclusive ones.
4.2.2.2 Economic Inequality
After the Cold War, the EU institutions have been actively working to help the new
members transform their economic models from extractive to inclusive ones. However, EU
member states struggle with economic inequality which is an indication that the reforms
promoted by EU institutions in the region were not entirely successful. Hellman (1998) links
economic inequality that is so prevalent in Eastern Europe to the superficial implementation of
economic reforms. There are instances in Eastern Europe, when governments were taken down
for implementing too drastic reforms or because the population at large valued more moderate
reforms. However, these instances did not discourage Eastern European states to reform the
economic system as a whole, as discussed at length in the preceding pages. Partial reforms are
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also associated with significant social cost, but there is a higher potential for profit for powerful
elites in areas that are still controlled by the state. These elites, or the “red bourgeoisie”,
exploited partial reforms to their advantage and created economic inequality in Eastern Europe.
Therefore, states with less economic reform exhibit more economic inequality, while states that
implemented the economic reforms promoted by EU institutions successfully exhibit less
economic inequality. Never-the-less, currently all Eastern European members exhibit substantial
income inequality when compared to their Western European counterparts, although some have
more pronounced income inequality than others (Hellman 1998).
The preceding analysis casts a doubt on the success of EU institutions’ ability to follow
through with the economic reforms and policies which they championed and promoted to the
newest members from Eastern Europe. These are strong indicators that EU institutions were not
fully successful in eliminating extractive and promoting inclusive economic models and
lowering income inequality in Eastern Europe.
Overall, the preceding analysis demonstrates that as a part of EU’s structure, EU
institutions are active agents of democratization of Eastern Europe. However, I maintain that the
EU on its own is not a consistent source of leverage in Eastern Europe, although it is a source of
linkage. In addition, EU institutions failed to effectively transform the political and economic
structures of Eastern Europe. Due to their limitations, I maintain that at this time EU institutions
lack real power to affect the quality of democracy in the new post-authoritarian member states
from Eastern Europe. Also, the literature contends that the negative image of the Balkans in the
Western psyche as weak, volatile, and backwards is incorrect and adversely affects the process of
EU integration of the region. In addition, I maintain that the popular idea that the region is not a
fertile ground for liberal democracy because of its predominant religious beliefs is not accurate.
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Instead, as mentioned before, the increased Russian political influence is at odds with EU’s
influence in the region, and thus hinders the spread of liberal-style democracy in Eastern Europe.
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5

THEORY OF EU ACCESSION

The conventional perception in the literature is that consistent pro-democratic
development is associated with a speedy EU accession. If the conventional wisdom is true, then
we can expect to see a reverse relationship between GDP (current US dollars) and polity average
per wave when compared to accession speed. In other words, the higher the GDP (current US
dollars) and polity averages for the entire application period per wave, the faster the accession.
However, Figures 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 that capture the actual data for wealth and democratic
performance and the respective accession speed per wave reflect a very different story. The
figures show that waves with very similar GDP (current US dollars) and polity averages (for the
entire application period) have very diverse and seemingly widely varying accession timeframes.
For example, referring to Figure 4.2.1 below, Wave 3, Wave 6, and Pending have virtually the
same GDP (current US dollars) for the entire application period, but the wide variance of their
accession times is visually obvious. Also, referring to Figure 4.2.2 below, Wave 3, Wave 6, and
Pending have very similar polity averages for the entire application period, but the wide variance
of their accession times again is visually obvious.
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Average Value During Application Period

Average GDP per capita (ln) and EU Application Duration per Acccession Wave
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Figure 4.2.1 Average GDP per capita (ln) and EU Application Duration per Accession
Wave
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Figure 4.2.2 Average Polity and EU Application Duration per Accession Wave
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5.1

Theory: Additional Factors that Explain EU Accession
Contrary to the conventional perception, I contend that consistent pro-democratic

performance does not adequately explain the accession timeframe of new member states. Instead,
other political considerations of established member states who approve the new member
applications explain accession speed better. The literature discussed in the previous chapters,
contends that factors such as Eastern Orthodox Christianity (practiced in Russia – the main
bastion of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans), Islam, income
inequality, and conflict slow down democratization. Keeping in mind that all of these factors
exist at higher levels in Eastern Europe than in the rest of Europe, I think they need to be
adjusted to better reflect political and demographic realities in the region. Therefore, I argue that
established EU member states slow down accession of Eastern European members because they
believe that they are not suitable for a western-style liberal democracy due to the presence of
factors such as main-stream pro-Russian political support in the region, high concentration of
Muslim and Roma minorities, and the occurrence of conflict during the existence of the EU that
slow down democratization. As discussed in the preceding chapters, I contend that pro-Russian
political support in the region that is defined by conservatism, nationalism, and statism is an
adverse influence on Eastern European participation in the EU and democratization as a whole.
Muslim and Roma minorities are subjected to discrimination and exclusionist practices that
affect democratic processes in the region negatively because those minorities cannot integrate in
society. Unless effectively resolved, armed conflict impedes the process of democratic
consolidation. Ultimately, this means that the additional determinants of critical importance for
EU accession speed are the specific geography and ethnicity of the states that apply for
membership. In order to support that, I will look in depth into various accession waves, with a
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focus on Eastern Europe and the Balkans (since they were subjected to the slowest accession
process) in particular in order to establish what differentiates the various waves.
5.1.1 Support for Russia in Europe
The first thing that jumps out when evaluating EU’s enlargement is that the various
waves represent different geographic regions – e.g. Southern Europe (Wave 3), East-Central
Europe (Wave 5), East-Central Balkans (Wave 6), West Balkans (pending and potential
members), so I will assess if the particular history and location of the geographic region in each
wave affects accession speed. The preceding analysis of the literature points to the existence of
specific political interests of powerful states that may be embedded in the EU institutions and
contends that Western Europe has long been interested in extending the borders of the Union
closer to Russia for strategic reasons. Ultimately, geo-political proximity to Russia is still
important for established member states for political reasons, since Russia is sliding back into
authoritarianism on the doorstep of the EU, as well as economic ones, since Russia is a major
exporter of natural gas to the EU (Bevan 2013; Fish 2005; Baran 2007; Van Ham 2001; Gibler
and Sewell 2006; Light 2008). Thus, geo-political proximity to Russia is a distinctive motivation
for EU’s expansion east, since it allows the EU to expand its influence over Eastern Europe in
Russia’s stead.
Before the fall of the Berlin wall, Russia had solid political and economic allies in the
face of the countries in the Warsaw Pact. Once the Warsaw pact fell apart, Russia itself became
vulnerable and isolated in the international community. A look at Figure 5.1.1 that examines the
relationship between proximity to Russia (measured in distance from Moscow to the respective
states’ capital) and accession timeframe indicates that at least for Eastern Europe, closer
proximity to Russia is related to longer accession timeframe. Based on the preceding analysis, it
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can reasonably be conceived that closer proximity to Russia is a source of anxiety for established
member states. The source of that anxiety is the close political relationship/bond that still exists
between Russia and some of the European states geographically close to it, particularly in the
Balkans. For example, since the fall of the Berlin wall the Baltic States, Hungary, and Poland
have formally exhibited concerns of Russian influence, whereas in countries like Bulgaria,
Serbia, and Macedonia pro-Russian sentiments are common and openly expressed even on
political level. In particular, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Macedonia have nationalist parties that closely
affiliate with Russia and pro-Russian policy. Therefore, I plan on examining the size and support
of pro-Russian parties in Eastern Europe by wave in relation to accession timeframe.
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5.1.1.1 Left and Right Wing Support for Russia in Europe
The mainstream left wing support for Russia across Eastern Europe dates back to the
beginning of the Soviet rule after WWII. During that time the only party affiliation that was
allowed in Eastern Europe by the Kremlin’s powerful political machine was the Communist one.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and with the ease of the Soviet grip in the region, this support
naturally faded away in Central Europe and the Baltic states. However, in the Balkan states like
Serbia and Bulgaria who share significant historical and cultural links with Russia, left wing
support for Russia is still rather pronounced, especially among the elderly part of the population.
Currently in southern Europe, contemporary far-left parties of Syriza in Greece and Spain’s
Podemos, who recently lead in the polls, openly express support for Putin and oppose the
western sanctions against Russia.
However, as of late Russia has also exhibited increased interest in the right-wing oriented
Eastern European parties, a tendency that started around 2010. In Eastern Europe right-wing
parties began to gain mainstream popularity after the onset of the global economic crisis that, as
mentioned in the literature review in the preceding chapters, disproportionately affected Eastern
Europe. This was an opportune time for Russia to court the political parties in Eastern Europe
that promote populist Eurosceptic and nationalist views. Even though Euroscepticism or
nationalism does not automatically translate into pro-Russian support, Russia’s financial and
political support for some key anti-EU establishment parties in Eastern Europe gave fruit in
growing pro-Russian political support. Russia achieved this by carefully exploiting their
electorates’ disillusionment with democracy that in Eastern Europe came at the price of a weaker
economic position in the Union, significant income inequality, and perpetual corruption. This
opened the possibility for a more favorable image of Russia in the region – a Russia that can
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bring lucrative gas projects and local business development, promises of national unity, and less
“foreign” rules and norms to follow. This propaganda helped Russia’s image, so it may be
perceived once again as a viable counterpoint to the IGO at least by a part of the Eastern
European electorate. This electorate, however, is continuously growing as these ideas gain
political momentum in Eastern Europe.
Within the last few years Russia also became involved with support for right-wing
political organizations in Western Europe for similar reasons. This involvement has evolved in a
factor that hinders and even threatens trans-Atlantic integration on state and EU level, a fact that
became obvious in the 2014 EU parliamentary elections when the far right parties lead by
France’s National Front formed a pro-Russian block in the EU parliament. Europa of Nations
and Freedom (ENF) is a political group in the European Parliament (EP), established on June
15th, 2015. With its 38 members (or five percent representation out of the EP’s 751 MPs), the
ENF is still the smallest in the EP. This pro-Russian block came as an addition the pre-existing
anti-EU establishment parties in the EP, such as the anti-EU EFDD and the far-left GUE-NGL.
After the European Parliament elections in May of 2014, the European Alliance for
Freedom (EAF), which includes right and far-right political organizations across Europe decided
to create a parliamentary group in the EP. In May 2014 the alliance led by Marine Le Pen, Geert
Wilders, and Matteo Salvini began negotiations to form a parliamentary group17, but after failing
to collect the necessary 25 MEPs from seven member states of the EU, it started its mandate as
independent members. On In June 15th, 2015 Marine Le Pen stated that the new group in the
European Parliament will join MEPs from the National Front (French: Front National (FN)-20
MEPs), the Alternative for Germany (German: Alternative für Deutschland, AfD – 1 MEP), the
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Northern League (Italian: Lega Nord(LN)- 4 MEPs), the Freedom Party of Austria (Austrian:
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) – 4 MEPs), Flemish Interest (Belgian: Vlaams Belang
(VB)), Congress of the New Right (Polish: Kongres Nowej Prawicy (KNP)-2 MEPs) and Party
for Freedom (Dutch: Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)-4 MEPs) and two independent members
from Romania and the UK18.
Regardless of its current marginal ability to influence EU politics, the presence of this
right-wing support is expected to only get stronger, since it makes up at least five percent of the
EP mandate. This will allow it substantial financial and political benefits from the very EU
institutions which it seeks to abolish, that include millions in funding from the European
Parliament, entitlement to longer speaking times, the ability to propose amendments, and the
right to maintain its own administration. All of this will support the ENF’s far-right agenda on
national as well as on EU level.
All of this helps the pro-Russian agenda in the EP, because with the ENF in the picture,
now the anti-EU EFDD and the far-left GUE-NGL’s marginal anti-EU establishment agenda
finally will gain political legitimacy. ENF’s voting patterns show consistent support for decisions
that support Russian interests, such as the vote on June 11th, 2015 regarding Russia’s annexation
of Crimea and its effect on the strategic situation in the Black Sea, the state of the Russia-EU
relations voted on June 10th, 2015, the assassination of Boris Nemtsov and the state of
democracy in Russia voted on March 12th, 2015, financials assistance for Ukraine voted on
March 19th, 2015, and Ukraine-EU Relationship Agreement voted on September 17th, 201419.
Even though, Le Pen’s NF party secured its most recent win in EP with a loan from the First
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Czech Bank, a financial institution that is associated with the Kremlin20, there is little support
that any other Western right or far-right parties have any direct financial support from the
Kremlin. There is, never-the-less, evidence that individual politicians from Eastern and Western
Europe have received support in various shapes and forms, such as donations or investments, in
return for their support for Kremlin-backed policies that will be discussed in the following
chapters.
Russia’s renewed foreign policy involvement has also tremendously helped Putin’s
popularity and support on international level. On a regional level, Putin described his plans for
the post-Soviet states as the creation of a Eurasian Union. This union would be built on true
sovereignty without the binding rules, restrictions, and conditionality imposed on the EU
members, with a mix of “post-communist neo-conservative rule”21. This term greatly overlaps
with Putin’s ideological authoritarian approach to rule by economic statism, right-wing
nationalism, promotion and adherence to Christian values, and the seemingly strict application of
the rule of law. This approach falls closely in line with the ideological doctrines of the far-right
movements that have gained popularity in Eastern and Western Europe, who are all unhappy
with liberalism and multiculturalism that are the fundamental concepts of the EU. Because of
this, they have become natural allies of Russia and have given hopes and credibility to its
imperial aspirations of renewed grandeur. In this context, distance from Russia matters
politically, because close proximity to Russia means more pro-Russian political influence that
significantly hinders and even threatens further EU integration. With all this in mind, it is
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reasonable to assume that the size and support of pro-Russian parties by wave affects applicant
states’ EU accession timeframe negatively.
5.1.2 Roma population
Some of the states from Eastern Europe that experienced accession lag also have high
concentrations of minorities, like the Roma, that are regular subject to discrimination within
established and new member states alike, so I plan to examine the concentration of Roma
population within the states in each accession wave and see if it can explain the EU accession
timeframe.
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EU Member and Applicant States

Roma population as percentage of total population by state
Turkey
Switzerland
Serbia
Norway
Morocco
Montenegro
Macedonia
Kosovo
Iceland
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Albania
Romania
Croatia
Bulgaria
Slovenia
Slovakia
Poland
Malta
Lithuania
Latvia
Hungary
Estonia
Czech Republic
Cyprus
Sweden
Finland
Austria
Spain
Portugal
Greece
United Kingdom
Ireland
Denmark
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Italy
Germany
France
Belgium

3.78%
0.38%
8.23%
0.21%
0.00%
3.17%
9.56%
2.07%
0.00%
1.54%
3.59%
8.63%
0.79%
9.94%
0.41%
9.02%
0.09%
0.00%
0.09%
0.56%
7.49%
0.08%
1.90%
0.11%
0.5…
0.21%
0.42%
1.63%
0.49%
1.55%
0.36%
0.84%
0.05%
0.24%
0.06%
0.25%
0.13%
0.62%
0.28%

0.00%

2.00%

4.00%

6.00%

8.00%

10.00%

Percentage of the Population That is Roma
Figure 5.1.3 Roma population as percentage of total population by state
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According to the literature review in the preceding chapters, the conflation of refugee
protection and visa-liberalization system in the EU have resulted in organized and legalized
discrimination against the Roma and other asylum seekers (Kacarska 2012) within individual
member states EU wide. Roma, who are the largest and most discriminated minority group in
Europe (Swimelar 2008) are still openly mistreated in established and new member states alike
due to inadequate legislation that fails to permanently address their needs and protect their rights
(McGarry 2012).
According to the European Commission data22 captured in Figures 5.1.2 and Figure 5.1.3
above, the majority of the Roma population in Europe can be found in Eastern Europe and in
particular in the Balkans. This population became EU citizens, respectively in Wave 5
(representing an estimated 15.17 percent of total Roma population in Europe) and Wave 6
(representing an estimated 26.67 percent of total Roma population in Europe). Even a larger
Roma population representing estimated 37.27 percent of total Roma population in Europe will
be added if the Pending members are accessed in the near future. Furthermore, the self-declared
Roma population that is spread across the EU totals 1,292,893, which represents 1.18 percent of
the overall EU population. This minority continue to suffer social discrimination in established,
new, and pending members alike due to institutional factors that accumulated over time and,
consequently, led to the deterioration of their living standards.
Many Roma throughout the Union and in particular in Eastern Europe, live in very poor
conditions often in ghettoes of illegally constructed buildings. Where the houses in the Roma
neighborhoods were built illegally, this means they have very limited access to public services.
Local municipalities often do not respond to calls to legalize these houses, so their standard of

22

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-249_en.htm
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living is often sub-optimal. Unemployment among the Roma is very high, with estimates in some
countries reaching 55 percent of Roma of working age23. Many Roma children do not attend
school, and among those who do, dropout rates are very high24. Among the reasons for these
phenomena are poverty25 and discriminatory school zoning practices. Roma schools usually lack
basic facilities and are overcrowded and the teachers there are often poorly trained. Regardless of
their standing as regular schools, schools in Roma neighborhoods in actuality are segregated
schools that provide low quality education. This places the majority of Roma children at a
competitive disadvantage when compared with the education received by their peers in regular
schools.
Access to healthcare and public services is also sub-optimal for the Roma at large26 in
particular in Eastern Europe. Many countries undertook action to facilitate the issuance of new
identity documents to representatives of ethnic minorities, because under social programs
minorities are a special target group. Even though physicians treating Roma patients receive the
regular fee for the patient plus additional fees for treating a vulnerable segment of the population,
the Roma still have less access to public health services27. Ultimately, since a large part of the
Roma population depends on social benefits due to high levels of unemployment and school
drop-out rates, this makes the Roma the economically the most vulnerable segment of society
and dependent on state-sponsored welfare programs. Since these resources are often precious and
scarce in Eastern Europe, popular narratives portray the Roma as criminals who receive financial
support from the state instead of other entitled and equally needy groups. While EU-wide official
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http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-roma-survey-employment_en.pdf , p. 20
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http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-roma-survey-employment_en.pdf , p. 35
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http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-roma-survey-employment_en.pdf , p. 30
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http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-roma-survey-employment_en.pdf , p. 30
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data confirming increased criminality among the Roma is scarce, this is a widely shared
sentiment that is a source of contempt among the population at large. However, some of the
research into criminal rates amongst the Roma points to a connection to criminality and poverty
instead of Roma ethnicity, since the crime rates are similar to other impoverished non-Roma
neighborhoods in the region28.
Overall, high concentration of Roma population is an important determinant of the speed
of new member accession because due to the Roma’s status of the most economically vulnerable
minority in Europe, adding such regions would not be politically desirable for established
member states. With all this in mind, I evaluate the population of the Roma in each accession
wave and assess if it can explain the EU accession timeframe. I suggest accession is slower for
the regions with larger Roma populations, since those states are expected to experience some
significant institutional and social problems. The smaller the Roma population, I expect to see
faster accession time-frame for applicant states overall. Since the regions are added in waves,
ultimately higher Roma population concentration affects the overall wave accession negatively.
5.1.3 Muslim population
Furthermore, many of the member and candidate states from Eastern Europe and the
Balkans that experience accession lag also have high concentrations of Muslim population.
Therefore, I plan to explore the concentration of Muslim population within the states in each
accession wave and evaluate whether its presence affects the wave’s overall EU accession
timeframe.
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Table 5.1 Estimated Percentage of the total EU Muslim Population per Accession Wave
in 2010 and 2030

Waves

Wave 1
Wave 2
Wave 3
Wave 4
Wave 5
Wave 6

Estimated
% of the
current
Muslim
Population
in 2010
62.57
16.40
8.43
5.06
1.62
5.91

Estimated %
of the
Estimated
Estimated
current
Muslim Population in Muslim Population
Muslim
2010
in 2030
Population in
2030
59.99
11,969,000.00
18,132,000.00
19.88
3,138,000.00
6,009,000.00
8.92
1,613,000.00
2,696,000.00
6.28
968,000.00
1,897,000.00
1.15
310,000.00
347,000.00
3.78
1,131,000.00
1,143,000.00

Estimated % of the total Muslim Population

Estimated Percentage of the total Muslim Population per Acccession Wave

Wave 1

Wave 2

Wave 3

Wave 4

Wave 5

Wave 6

Waves of EU Accession
Estimated % of the total EU Muslim Population in 2010

Estimated % of the total EU Muslim Population in 2030

Figure 5.1.4 Estimated Percentage of the total EU Muslim Population per Accession
Wave in 2010 and 2030
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Muslim population projections for 2010 and 2030 by state

EU Member and Applicant States

Percentage of 2010 Population that is Muslim

Projected Muslim Population Increase by 2030

Turkey
Serbia
Montenegro
Macedonia
Albania
Romania
Croatia
Bulgaria
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Latvia
Hungary
Estonia
Czech Republic
Cyprus
Sweden
Finland
Austria
Spain
Portugal
Greece
United Kingdom
Ireland
Denmark
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Italy
Germany
France
Belgium
0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

100.00%

Percentage of the Population That is Muslim
Figure 5.1.5 Estimated 2010 and 2030 Muslim population as percentage of total
population by state

The refuge system of 1951 was created as a guarantee that even when a state is unwilling
to provide basic rights to its citizens, these rights should be provided from an alternative source.
This system was created for a particular area and era and foresaw only a limited role for the
UNHCR because the resolution of Europe’s refugee crisis in post WWII was perceived as
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inevitable. During the Cold War the regime continued to function in Europe and the US and it
was all of a sudden considered sufficient to address the issue on a global scale. Based on that,
only individuals subjected to persecution are eligible to obtain asylum but this misses a large
segment of individuals who are threatened by food insecurity, natural disasters, climate change,
famine, state failure, etc. Since then sources of supplemental protection have emerged, but they
are limited in scope geographically, normatively, and in their actual implementation. The
ambiguity of international law in regards to running away from deprivation means that the
political situation rather than law decides the fate of the threatened people in weak states (Betts
2010). Granting asylum to some people who seek protection and not others is rather arbitrary
normatively and in the case of the influx of Muslim refugees into Europe, often shaped by
islamophobic considerations. These limitations have an adverse effect on foreign nationals who
look for asylum in the EU. All EU member states are formally committed to protect the rights of
refugees and asylum seekers, but mass deportations and organized discrimination point to the
existence of prejudice and racism in established, new, and pending member states.
According to PEW Research Center data29, the projected Muslim population in the EU in
its current dimensions will total 30,224,000 in 2030. This means that if no new member states
are accessed, Muslims will make up approximately 6 percent of the projected total EU
population in 2030. This is 30 percent increase of the Muslim population within EU’s current
borders from its 2010 value of approximately 4.3 percent. Figure 5.1 reveals that within the
current EU borders, the six founding members (Wave 1) are currently home to 62.57 percent of
the total Muslim population in the EU. This trend is expected to continue through 2030, when the
Six are projected to be home to 59.99 percent of the total Muslim population in the EU. Figure
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http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/

95

5.1.5 above shows that this trend will be reversed only if Turkey becomes an EU member, since
its total population that is over 80 percent Muslim is projected to be around 87 million (or 14
percent of the EU population if the EU accesses all current pending members)30 by 2030. All of
this will hold true unless the migration stream into Europe from predominantly Muslim countries
dramatically increases. If that happens, according to various other estimates, the number of
Muslim Europeans may constitute a third or even half of Europe's population by 2050. This
means that the face of the EU will inevitably change over the next few decades. There will be a
new reality where this Muslim population will be a determinant in key domestic and foreign
policy decisions of the EU. This, some have speculated, is a decisive factor of the EU accession
timeframe for new member states. Islamophobia has taken a strong hold of predominantly
Christian Europe, although I argue the perceptions and concerns of the “Islamic issue” are
slightly different in Western and Eastern Europe.
Islamophobia is defined as a “prejudice against or demonization of Muslims - which
results in an overall negative attitude, violence, harassment, discrimination and stereotyping”31.
This phenomenon also includes biased attitude of the media towards Islam and Muslims
(Fredman 2001; Haddad 2002; Quraishi 2005). The origin of the term can be traced to 80s of the
20th century, although the term gained popular parlance after the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. In result, there is open denunciation of Islam and its history as radical, denial of the
existence of a moderate Muslim majority, and projection of Islam as a global problem in the
social and political space in established and new member states. Ultimately, the “Islamic issue”
is a salient political concern for the EU population at large and is shaping support for and against
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2005.
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political leaders, as in the case of decline of popular support for the avid supporters for the opendoor migrant policy Angela Merkel in Germany or François Hollande in France.
5.1.3.1 Islamophobia in Western Europe
For the first time, the topic of Islam was discussed at a session of PACE (Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe) in 2008 in the report “European Muslim communities
confronted with extremism32". This was prompted by the recurring phenomenon in Western
Europe, where a soaring numbers of home-grown young European Muslims increasingly
strengthen their attachment to the norms of Islam at the expense of state law. Terrorist acts in
recent years that were carried out by foreigners and their fellow citizens born and educated in
Western Europe, forced Europeans to question their safety and their governments. According to
PACE’s report on the issue of extremism among European Muslims, the responsibility for this
situation lies in both the European governments for creating a breeding ground for extremism
and on the unhindered multiplication of Islamic fundamentalist organizations across the
continent. Ultimately, the EU and the national governments are guilty of not doing enough for
the integration of Muslims into the European family and its values and do not adequately fight
poverty in Muslim communities as more new Muslim migrants are pouring in. Several ways of
solving the problem on EU level were identified in the report: combating Islamophobia primarily
through mass media outlets, tracking overseas Islamic finance organizations training imams on
the ground, involvement of Muslims in public life, and the formation of an Islamic secular
intelligentsia33. However, contemporary success in building a bridge between Muslim
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http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetailsEN.asp?fileid=17635&lang=EN&search=RXVyb3BlYW4gbXVzbGltIGNvbW11bml0aXN8Y29ycHVzX25hbWVf
ZW46Ik9mZmljaWFsIGRvY3VtZW50cyI=
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communities and Western European government are mixed at best in conditions of poverty and
segregation of Muslim communities in Western cities. Not surprisingly, Muslims in Western
Europe increasingly find a sense of belonging within their religious community instead of the
country they grew up in. A testament of that is PEW Research data34 that shows that many
British, French, and German Muslims claim that they consider themselves Muslim first and then
citizens of the state they reside in.
With all this in mind, there is an ever-growing migrant influx of Muslims in Western
Europe. A quick glance by country reveals that currently in France, for example, there are five
million Muslims, about a million in Italy, over 3 million in Germany, 1.5 million in the UK,
around 700 000 in Switzerland, over 500 000 in Spain and Sweden35 and all this is without
taking in account illegal immigration. This phenomenon has prompted unprecedented political
action among the Western European political elites. For example, Paris and Berlin have proposed
different versions of a plan with a similar goal – to keep the influx of Muslim migrants in their
native countries, while the EU will provide financial assistance to the cooperating countries and
in the future these countries may be invited to join the EU, as in the case of the 2016 agreement
with Turkey. However, an interesting (and rarely mentioned) fact is that the number of Muslims
in Western Europe is growing not only through unrestrained immigration flow, but also through
local residents, ethnic Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen, etc. Europeans, who convert to Islam.
Their number already exceeds hundreds of thousands, with European women surpassing four
times the number of male converts to Islam36. Some speculate that this is an inevitable sign of the
decay of Western society and failure of liberal values, while others maintain that this is
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inalienable right of religious freedom, a deeply cherished value in Western Europe. Regardless,
the growing number of Muslims in Western Europe is one of the main contributing factors for
the growing wave of islamophobia in the region.
5.1.3.2 Islamophobia in Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe and in particular the Balkans has its own native Muslim minority
populations, remnants of the Ottoman Empire, that have co-existed with the general population
for centuries. Furthermore, Eastern Europe, due to its relative economic austerity when
compared to Western Europe appears to be but a stop for the incoming Muslim migrants, whose
desired final destination is the wealthy Western European states of Germany and Scandinavia.
As the Balkan route into Europe was closed, politicians in the Balkans and Eastern Europe
openly argued that scarce local economic recourses had to be given to the migrants at the
expense of vulnerable local social groups. This rhetoric immediately resonated with Eastern
Europeans, since the majority of Eastern Europe still struggles with poverty and economic
austerity measures. Ultimately, as discussed in the preceding chapters in Eastern Europe poverty
and human rights violations are phenomena of structural nature, which currently also shape
islamophobia in the region. Many states in Eastern Europe operate in conditions of limited
resources and do not actively seek opportunities for structural changes or on how to utilize the
limited available resources more efficiently. Slight economic stabilization at the turn of the last
century positively affected the financial and social daily lives of the general population. The
most marginalized groups, however, battled on with problems of survival, deeply rooted in the
existing structural foundation of society. Their issues can be alleviated, but not solved through
humanitarian programs, such as EU emergency programs of social assistance.
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Also, unlike in Western Europe in Eastern Europe in the sphere of religious freedom, a
serious problem is the lack of tolerance, fostered largely by the lack of adequate actions to
alleviate the issue by the state governments. Political change at the beginning of 1990s raised
hopes that positive measures will be implemented in the field of human rights as well. In Eastern
Europe, the term "minorities" is inevitably connected to belonging to “other” religious groups,
while the norm is to interpret minorities as a threat against existing traditional religious
communities. Thus, minority social groups are marginalized, which makes them vulnerable and
isolated. In recent decades the focus of this intolerance is starting to increasingly shift towards
Muslim minorities. As discussed previously, binding European norms such as human rights are
not consistently spread throughout all applicants and members, so while the new governments
proclaimed genuine respect for human rights and undertook measures to solve some of the
toughest problems, serious structural violations of human rights continued (Popescu 2010; Velev
2013; Atanasov 2014; Subotic 2011; Relex 2006; Phillips 2012; Weiner 2009; Kacarska 2012;
McGarry 2012; Swimelar 2008; Van Houtum and Pijpers 2007). These systemic violations can
ultimately be traced to the lack of effective judicial court systems that can confront the
deficiencies in human rights within a reasonable timeframe and without prejudice. Thus, because
of the structural constraints in Eastern Europe, religious freedom often receives only superficial
attention in legislation and by the government.
Overall, high concentration of Muslim population is an important determinant of the
speed of new member accession since due to the spread of islamophobia in Europe at large,
adding such regions would not be politically desirable for established member states. With all
this in mind, I suggest that the presence of Muslim population in each accession wave can
explain its EU accession timeframe, where it is slower it for the regions with higher Muslim
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population. The smaller the Muslim population, I expect to see faster accession time-frame for
states overall. Since the regions are added in waves, ultimately I expect to see that the higher
concentration of Muslim population affects the overall wave accession time-frame negatively.
5.1.4 Conflict Resolution and the EU
Furthermore, in this research I examine the possibility that the existence of recent conflict
and the need of its resolution play a role in the determination for speed of accession of new
members. On the surface, the emergence of international governmental organizations (IGOs) as a
model of governance in the EU was prompted by the economic cooperation between Western
states. However, that cooperation served a deeper purpose, namely effective resolution and
elimination of prospects of armed conflict in Europe after WWII. The following analysis
examines the advantages of IGOs (institutionalist concept) such as the EU and its design for
conflict resolution and juxtaposes it to the notion of conflict resolution in other major theoretical
paradigms. Through this analysis I demonstrate that the EU was designed as an IGO in order to
prevent conflict and not simply promote democracy and wealth for its members.
Conflict resolution is a very important issue for all major paradigms. For realists conflict
in inevitable in international relations. Lack of trust produces uncertainty that in turn creates the
security dilemma, a central paradigm of realism. When a state becomes too powerful, the other
states will also increase their military might. This security dilemma will result in a balance of
power that will prevent conflict temporarily. According to Waltz (2010), the anarchic
international system places constraints on actors, so states avoid conflict because of these
systematic constraints. For constructivists, there is a cultural-institutional framework within
which states operate and which defines them. The recognition of the states’ identity by their
citizens shapes state behavior. The reason that motivates states to conform to norms of behavior
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is legitimacy. This process can ultimately reduce the possibility of conflict (Finnemore and
Sikkink; 1998). However, if legitimacy is undermined, the process of international norm
conformation can be compromised. For liberal institutionalists, cooperation with respect to
power and interests can undoubtedly reduce the possibility of war (Keohane and Martin; 1995).
Conflict is the result of incompatible preferences of states at a time when the benefits of conflict
outweigh the costs (Moravcsik 1997). For liberal institutionalists states are the primary actors in
international relations, so conflict can be resolved through organizations that address their issues.
The EU successfully resolved conflict for its member states because it eliminated policy
differences between former enemies.
The cost of reaching agreements is an essential aspect of conflict resolution and is
therefore also addressed by all of the major paradigms. Constructivists value formal international
organizations as forums for agreements because these organizations create transparency for the
actors, increase international legitimization of these agreements, and provide a forum for global
politics (Kratochwil and Ruggie; 1986). However, insufficient mechanisms for enforcement can
significantly undermine the entire process. For realists, the uncertainty of the capabilities and
intentions of others prevents states from reaching agreements. Snyder (1990) maintains that
understanding of the balancing tendencies of states will elucidate the mechanisms of reaching
agreements. For realists, military strong states will attempt to dominate in all areas including
agreement negotiations. For liberal institutionalism, there are multiple channels that connect
societies on various issues, so military force is not always the relevant solution. This declining
of the significance of military force will push states to rely on other instruments, such as
institutions, to reach agreements at a lower cost. For liberal institutionalists, institutions can
alleviate fears from unequal cooperation (Keohane and Martin; 1995). The EU has successfully
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managed to lower the costs of reaching agreements by creating a common platform through its
institutions. Cohesion is yet another essential attribute of effective conflict resolution. For
constructivists, cohesion in international relations is achieved whenever international norms are
accepted indisputably and unconditionally. Once norms become universal, they are reinforced by
habit and serve as a guide to the needs and intentions of other countries (Finnemore and Sikkink;
1998).Therefore, this process is often uneven, uncertain, and slow. Collectively, realists maintain
that cohesion between countries occurs only during periods of balance of power. For Walt (1985)
balance of power is the reason for alliance formation. For liberal institutionalists, institutions are
essential tools for cooperation. According to Keohane (2005), cooperation is not possible
through institutions if there is a conflict of interest between states. Therefore, the resolution of
these conflicts via adoption coherent policies can effectively resolve these differences. The EU
has provided a platform for the intentions and needs of states, thus enhancing cooperation
between established and new members as suggested by liberal institutionalists. Thus, the EU has
successfully influenced and created coherent policies that promote political and economic
stability.
In conflict resolution, collaboration is an essential prerequisite for success and is a subject
of debate for all major paradigms. Constructivism views institutions as ideas shared by members
of a collectivity where collaboration is possible. Institutions have formal elements referred to as
rules and as long they are followed by the collectivity in the setting, collaboration is attainable.
For realists, states engage in actions that promote their interests by any means necessary, thus
limiting collaboration only to a means to attain dominance. Where realism perceives the
effectiveness of collaboration as marginal at best, liberal institutionalism perceives collaboration
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as essential in international relations. For liberal institutionalists, institutions operate based on
reciprocity so they can promote peace and cooperation (Keohane and Martin; 1995).
Overall, although the paradigms of realism and constructivism have undoubtedly
contributed to understanding political processes in the past and present, neoliberal
institutionalism provides the most comprehensive guide to current trends of EU governance and
expansion. As captured by the literature, initially economics contributed greatly to European
integration, but consequently this process spurred beyond economics into the pursuit of common
political interests across national borders. The proliferation of these trends in contemporary
political settings in the EU supports liberal institutionalist ideals and demonstrates that
contemporary trends of governance and expansion of the EU as an IGO are distinctly shaped to
promote conflict resolution. In regards to Eastern Europe’s integration within the EU, the
literature review in the preceding chapters confirmed that EU institutions were successfully able
to produce linkage with Western Europe by guaranteeing security to Eastern Europe with
NATO’s aid (Gibler and Wolford 2006; Gibler and Sewell 2006). With all this in mind, the need
for IGOs persisted on the continent even after the Cold War ended, because there was still
demand for NATO, a transatlantic IGO for military cooperation and security. Interestingly,
NATO membership is subject to virtually the same requirements (except being a European
territory) as for EU membership, so it can be argued that EU and NATO membership accession
timeframe are affected by similar factors. Overall, since conflict resolution appears to be very
important aspect in the creation and existence of the EU, it is reasonable to assume that from
political perspective regions committed to peace experience faster and smoother accession while
regions where conflict is not effectively resolved suffer a slower and bumpier EU accession.
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5.2

Methodology
My research plan consists of the evaluation of the EU accession of Europe with a focus

on Eastern Europe and the Balkan states on wave-by-wave basis in order to get an accurate
understanding of the changing expectations of EU applicants. Very little research appears to have
been done in the field outside of measuring broad indicators for the entire Union over its entire
period of existence. Taking the wave-by-wave approach will provide the opportunity to compare
and contrast the accession of states that are in close proximity and levels of pro-democratic
development and yet are the subject of various speeds of accession. I plan to examine not only
the accepted members, but also the pending members from the Balkans. I will evaluate the
precise differences between the accession process for all accession waves by examining their
indicators of wealth and democracy over the span of their EU applications. That will allow me to
compare and contrast each wave and establish the additional factors that determine the speed of
accession. The factors that I will take in consideration are existence of main-stream pro-Russian
political support, ethnic minority makeup of the states, and the existence of conflict in the region
during the existence of the EU. As I mentioned earlier, given that these factors exist in Eastern
Europe at higher levels, I argue that established EU member states slow down accession of
Eastern European members because they believe that they are not suitable for a western-style
liberal democracy. Since these factors were identified by the literature in the preceding chapters
as impeding democratization, I will weight all these factors equally in my analysis.
5.2.1 Hypotheses
I suggested that earlier waves of accession of new member states exhibit lower
expectations of democratic and economic development and shorter timeframe of accession into
the EU in the following hypotheses:
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Accession of Western Europe (H1): The wealthy and democratic Western European
states (Wave 2) of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom were accessed in the EU
faster than their Eastern European counterparts because they brought very few
additional factors perceived as problematic by the established member states.

Accession of Southern Europe (H2): Despite of their lower pro-democratic and economic
performance, the Southern European states (Wave 3) of Greece (1981), Spain, and
Portugal (1984) were accessed in the EU faster than their Eastern European
counterparts because they brought very few additional factors perceived as problematic
by the established member states.

Accession of Northern Europe (H3): EU accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden
(Wave 4) in 1995 was fast due to the fact that these states did not bring in significant
volume of additional factors that impede accession speed.

Accession of Eastern Europe (H4): Despite of their positive pro-democratic and economic
performance, accession of the Eastern European states of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, and Slovakia (Wave 5)
was slower than previous accession waves due to the fact that they brought over factors
that impede accession speed.
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Accession of the Central Balkans (H5): Despite of their positive pro-democratic and
economic performance, accession of the Balkan states of Bulgaria, Romania (2004), and
Croatia (2013) in Wave 6 was slower than previous accession waves and with unequal
membership rights due to the fact that they brought over factors that impede accession
speed.

Pending members from Western Balkans (H6): Despite the fact that the pro-democratic
and economic performance of the Pending members exceeds other successful applicants
in the past, the EU membership of Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey, and Serbia
is still uncertain due to the fact that they will bring over factors that impede EU
accession speed.

In addition, in regards to all member and applicant states, I suggest that geographical
proximity to Russia, while controlling for wealth and democracy of the states, affects accession
speed in the following hypotheses:

Proximity to Russia (H7): The likelihood of an applicant accession into the EU decreases
over time the closer a state is to Russia.

Economic Health (H8): The likelihood of an applicant accession into the EU increases
over time for wealthier states.
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Party competition (H9): The likelihood of an applicant accession into the EU increases
over time for states with higher party competition.

5.2.2 Data
All of this information of the additional factors that affect the speed of accession in the
EU is collected for each respective state and is evaluated through Boolean analysis. The factors
that are not readily identified by the mainstream literature include 1) the support for pro-Russian
parties within each state, 2) percentage of the population in each country that is Muslim, and 3)
percent of Roma as a total of the population for each of the states, and 4) the involvement of the
state in conflict in the region during the EU’s existence. The data for the countries in each wave
is gathered from various sources: the voting support for pro-Russian parties in each of the
countries is generated from each state’s respective official voting authority online platform, data
on the Muslim population per state is available at the PEW Research Center37, data on the Roma
residing in the respective states is available in the European Commission database38, and records
of conflicts that the state participated in with the continent for the duration of the EU’s existence
are available at the COW’s database39.
For the durational analysis, I utilize a complete longitudinal datasets of wealth and
democracy indicators that are available for the period of 1952 through 2014 for all European
applicants respectively from the Polity IV40 and World Bank41 datasets. Included in the dataset
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are all potential, current, and denied applicants – a total of 37 countries available on the EU
legislation website.
5.2.3 Analysis
5.2.3.1 Boolean analysis
In general, Boolean analysis results in a dichotomous classification of either 0 or 1 of a
set of PCUs by recording how each state rates on the pre-selected set of criteria or responses. The
utilization of PCU, which stands for ultimate canonical projection, allows for the simultaneous
analysis of the factors that affect a process of interest, as suggested by Flament (1976). For the
purposes of this project, I will rate the states during the EU application period in each of the
accession waves based on the above-identified alternative criteria 1), 2), 3) and 4) identified to
slow down the speed of EU accession. Every non-zero pattern of a PCU implies a presence of a
factor of that impedes EU accession, but it does not reflect a causal relationship between the
indicators. Instead, it only provides information about their presence, frequency of occurrence,
and shape they take in the particular state.
Figure 5.2.1 below shows that there are three (3) possible patterns that reflect the
presence of factors that slow down EU accession of a state, where the (0000) position reflects no
presence of factors 1), 2), 3) and 4) that slow down EU accession and the (1111) position reflects
the presence of all factors that slow down EU accession. My expectation is to find a higher
frequency of factors marked as 1 that slow down EU accession within the waves that
experienced the longest accession times.
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Figure 5.2.1 Digraph shows the EU integration pattern of states

Furthermore, the dichotomous nature of classification of factors that affect the speed of
accession in this case requires a grading structure, where some responses that are technically
non-zero are treated as if they are zero. For the purposes of this project, the dichotomization is
based on a mathematical criterion in which a state’s alternative factor of accession speed is
marked as 0 if it falls below the EU average at the time of accession and marked as 1 if the value
is calculated to be above the EU average. Dichotomization of the values in this case is necessary
in order to determine a central tendency within a state, so the values can be appropriately
categorized for the purposes of this analysis. Therefore, from statistical perspective, all instances
marked as 0 are values that fall below the EU average, and, therefore, below the mathematically
calculated central EU tendency at the time of accession. Conversely, all instances marked as 1
are values that fall above the EU average and lie above the mathematically calculated central EU
tendency at the time of accession. The dichotomization threshold for each of the additional
integration criteria is described as follows:
1) For the support of pro-Russian parties, if the state has politically influential pro-Russian
parties that existed during the time of the state’s EU application period, then the value
will be treated as 1. If not, the value will be treated as 0.
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2) For percentage of the population in each country that is Muslim, the EU average of
Muslims as a part of the population is calculated at the time of accession. If the Muslim
population in a country is above the calculated EU average, then the value will be treated
as 1. If not, the value will be treated as 0.
3) For percentage of the population in each country that belongs to the Roma minority, the
EU average of Roma minority as a part of the population is calculated as at the time of
accession. If the percentage of the Roma population in a country is above the EU
average, then the value will be treated as 1. If not, the value will be treated as 0.
4) For conflict, if the state was engaged in armed conflict within the region during its EU
application period or preceding it (while the EU existed), then the value will be treated as
1. If not, the value will be treated as 0.

Finally, Boolean analysis involves the creation of a hierarchical structure of factors that
affect the process of interest, which means that the equivalent implications can be organized by
the frequency of their occurrence. Since I am analyzing the presence of alternative factors that
slow down EU accession of each of the states per wave, this will allow me to make general
inferences and compare the presence of various levels of factors impeding accession by wave.
In the case of Hypothesis 1, I trace and analyze the historical trajectory of the EU
membership application process for the Western European states of Denmark, Ireland, and the
United Kingdom (1973). I provide a brief overview as to when and why they were invited to join
and assess their accession timeframe through process-tracing. The independent variables are their
respective economic and pro-democratic performances, while the dependent variable is accession
into the EU. The unit of analysis is the timeframe of EU accession for each of the states. I utilize
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a complete longitudinal datasets of wealth and democracy indicators that are available for the
period of 1952 through 2017 respectively from the Polity IV and World Bank datasets for the
states. This data provides graphical support for the brief process-tracing analysis. At that point, I
will evaluate the additional factors that may have determined their speed of EU accession,
namely presence of influential pro-Russian parties, ethnic makeup of the states, and conflict
involvement of each state through Boolean analysis.
In the case of Hypothesis 2, I trace and analyze the historical trajectory of the EU
membership application process for the Southern European states of Greece (1981), Spain, and
Portugal (1984). I provide a brief overview as to when and why they were invited to join and
assess their accession timeframe through process-tracing. The independent variables are their
respective economic and pro-democratic performances, while the dependent variable is accession
into the EU. The unit of analysis is the timeframe of EU accession for each of the states. I utilize
a complete longitudinal datasets of wealth and democracy indicators that are available for the
period of 1952 through 2017 respectively from the Polity IV and World Bank datasets for the
states. This data provides graphical support for the brief process-tracing analysis. At that point, I
will compare and contrast this relationship to the previous accession wave. Then, I will evaluate
the additional factors that may have determined their speed of EU accession, namely presence of
influential pro-Russian parties, ethnic makeup of the states, and conflict involvement of each
state through Boolean analysis.
In the case of Hypothesis 3, I trace and analyze the historical trajectory of the EU
membership application process for the Northern European states of Austria, Finland, and
Sweden (1995). I provide a brief overview as to when and why they were invited to join and
assess their accession timeframe through process-tracing. The independent variables are their
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respective economic and pro-democratic performances, while the dependent variable is accession
into the EU. The unit of analysis is the timeframe of EU accession for each of the states. I utilize
a complete longitudinal datasets of wealth and democracy indicators that are available for the
period of 1952 through 2017 respectively from the Polity IV and World Bank datasets for the
states. This data provides graphical support for the brief process-tracing analysis. At that point, I
will compare and contrast this relationship to the previous accession wave. Then, I will evaluate
the additional factors that may have determined their speed of EU accession, namely presence of
influential pro-Russian parties, ethnic makeup of the states, and conflict involvement of each
state through Boolean analysis.
In the analysis of Hypothesis 4, I examine the historical trajectory of the EU membership
application process for Eastern European states of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Hungary,
the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, and Cyprus who joined in 2004. I provide a brief
overview as to when and why they were invited to join and assess their accession timeframe
through process-tracing. The independent variables are their economic and pro-democratic
performance, while the dependent variable is accession into the EU. The unit of analysis is the
timeframe of EU accession for each of the states. I utilize a complete longitudinal datasets of
wealth and democracy indicators that are available for the period of 1952 through 2017
respectively from the Polity IV and World Bank datasets for the states. This data provides
graphical support for the brief process-tracing analysis. At that point, I will compare and contrast
this relationship to the previous accession wave. Then, I will evaluate the additional factors that
may have determined their speed of EU accession, namely presence of influential pro-Russian
parties, ethnic makeup of the states, and conflict involvement of each state through Boolean
analysis.
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I evaluate Hypothesis 5 by analyzing the historical trajectory of the EU membership
application process for the Balkan states of Bulgaria, Romania (2007), and Croatia (2013). I
provide a brief overview as to when and why they were invited to join and assess their accession
timeframe through process-tracing. The independent variables are economic and pro-democratic
performances, while the dependent variable is accession into the EU. The unit of analysis is the
timeframe of EU accession for each of the states. I utilize a complete longitudinal datasets of
wealth and democracy indicators that are available for the period of 1952 through 2017
respectively from the Polity IV and World Bank datasets for Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia.
This data provides graphical support for the brief process-tracing analysis. At that point, I will
compare and contrast this relationship to the previous accession wave. Then, I will evaluate the
additional factors that may have determined their speed of EU accession, namely presence of
influential pro-Russian parties, ethnic makeup of the states, and conflict involvement of each
state through Boolean analysis.
I evaluate Hypothesis 6 by evaluating the historical trajectory of the EU membership
application process for the Balkan states of Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, and
Turkey. I provide a brief overview as to when and why they were invited to join and assess their
accession timeframe through process-tracing. The independent variables are their economic and
pro-democratic performances, while the dependent variable is accession into the EU. The unit of
analysis is the timeframe of EU accession for each of the states. I utilize a complete longitudinal
datasets of wealth and democracy indicators that are available for the period of 1952 through
2017 respectively from the Polity IV and World Bank datasets for Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia,
and Macedonia. This data provides graphical support for the brief process-tracing analysis. At
that point, I will compare and contrast this relationship to the previous accession wave. Then, I
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will evaluate the additional factors that may have determined their speed of EU accession,
namely presence of influential pro-Russian parties, ethnic makeup of the states, and conflict
involvement of each state through Boolean analysis.
5.2.3.2 Durational model
I will finalize this project with a durational analysis of the effects of geographical
proximity to Russia while controlling for wealth and democracy, since the Boolean analysis tests
congruence, but cannot really control for confounding factors, while duration analysis can
provide that. For the purpose of the analysis, I will utilize application time-line data of all
European countries that ever applied for EU membership from the year of application through
accession. This variable is transformed into a dummy variable (years associated with EU
membership are coded as 1 while years a country is not a part of the EU are coded as zero). I also
include a variable for all EU member and applicant states about their proximity to Moscow,
converted in their logarithm value, as well as indicators of wealth in GDP per capita (current
USD) and democracy in Party Competition for the same time period in order to compare their
impact on EU accession to the impact of proximity to Russia. Proximity to Russia, Party
Competition, and GDP per capita (current USD) are my independent variables, while EU
Accession is my dependent variable. I will test the impact of Proximity to Russia (Hypothesis 7),
GDP per capita (current USD) (Hypothesis 8) and Party Competition (Hypothesis 9) on EU
application success over time. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, the most appropriate
model will be a Weibull model - an event history model that predict the time to an event.
5.3

Alternative Explanations
In the preceding paragraphs I mentioned that each new accession wave was related to

corresponding changes in accession terms for new members and affected the functioning of all
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organs and institutions of the EC. This is the official reason why the EC requires a period of
consolidation of its new borders and a transitional period for adaptation of new members. In
terms of new member accession this means that the issue of slower accession of the latter waves
is not due to the Eastern states’ geographic and ethnic makeup, but rather because their accession
came at a later time when the EU was larger and more complex. Ultimately, this insight is very
useful because it identifies the transformative nature of EU integration and the fact that the
growing complexity of the IGO indeed requires careful re-tuning of the EU institutions, so they
can function properly. While this sounds reasonable, it undermines the fact that new member
states are hand-picked and undergo an application period when their political and pro-democratic
performance is strictly monitored by established member states. New members are invited to join
selectively and accessed only when all necessary expectations for membership are met.
Therefore, the period of institutional adaptation is minimized by design by the process of EU
accession.
Furthermore, it is also conceivable that the differences in accession time between east and
west are merely the result of changing standards between 1952 and 2017. Even though the
standards have undeniably improved during the EU’s existence, during the application period the
democratic and economic performance of new members is measured for their consistency. In
other words, it is not necessarily the standards, but the stability of the institutions and processes
that produce pro-democratic development that is a fundamental prerequisite for EU membership,
as discussed by the Copenhagen criteria.
Overall, while both scenarios are plausible, these perceptions underplay the importance
of geography and ethnicity for expansion of the EU into Eastern Europe. The reason for that is
because accession of new member states in the latest waves of accession as well as the promises
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for future accession made to pending members are subjected to widely varying and inconsistent
expectations that cannot be adequately explained by neither of the above. Furthermore, the fact
that some new member states were subjected to unequal membership terms, such as employment
bans and delay in Euro zone participation defy these conventional explanations.
5.4

Significance
The crucial objective of this research is to arrive at a new perspective of the process of

EU integration of the region in order to understand the additional factors not readily identified in
the previous studies that explain EU accession. The research presented here obviates some gaps
in the existing literature, shows how the conventional knowledge cannot fully explain the
integration process and speed of accession, and finds new explanations of the phenomenon of
EU enlargement in Eastern Europe. For political science as a whole, this research can clarify and
enhance understanding of processes that promote and hinder democratization and equality
beyond the EU. Ultimately, this study will contribute and broaden our understanding of
contemporary international organizations and contemporary political events.
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6

WAVE 2: ACCESSION OF WESTERN EUROPE

Chapter 6 consists of analysis of the accession of the Western European members, which
includes the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and United Kingdom in 1973. After the historical
and political overview, I will evaluate my claim that the established member states speed up
accession of new members from desirable regions such as Western Europe, since they exhibit
fewer additional factors that impede accession through Hypothesis one (H1):

Accession of Western Europe (H1): The wealthy and democratic Western European states
(Wave 2) of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom were accessed in the EU faster
than their Eastern European counterparts because they brought very few additional factors
perceived as problematic by the established member states.

The success of the Union created by the Six attracted international recognition. However,
the Six never went through an accession process, but further enlargement after the initial Wave 1
would require a formal application and approval process. In 1967, despite the afore-mentioned
concerns and objections from France, the United Kingdom renewed its application in the EU.
Ireland, Denmark, and Norway also applied for membership and the Six decided to begin
negotiations with them at the Hague summit. Norway’s application was rejected in 1967 due to
lack of popular support for its EU membership in a nation-wide referendum. In 1973 the United
Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark became official members of the Union.
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6.1

Denmark
Denmark is a Scandinavian country located on the archipelago and the Jutland peninsula,

whose capital is Copenhagen. Denmark has a long coastline by the North Sea and borders
Germany to the South and is connected to Sweden via a bridge. The total area of Denmark is
26,672 square miles (or 42,924 square km) and a total population of 5,659,715 as of 2015, that
comprises a 1.1 percent share of total EU population as of 2015. The political system is
parliamentary constitutional monarchy and Denmark is an EU member since January 1st, 1973.
Denmark holds thirteen European Parliament seats and has held the rotating EU Council
presidency seven times for the period of 1973 through 2012. Its official currency is the Danish
Krone (DKK) and is a member of the Schengen Area since March 25th, 200142.
The 1864 defeat in the Danish-German war, lead to the loss of the Danish territories of
Schleswig and Holstein, but the country manages to maintain neutrality during WWI. 1948
marked the end of absolutism in Denmark and a year later the first Danish constitution was
ratified. After the end of the war, in 1920 a referendum is held in Schleswig that leads to the
territory’s successful return to Denmark. Even though Denmark signed a ten year peace
agreement with Germany, in 1940 Nazi Germany invaded Denmark and the country remained
under Nazi occupation for the entire duration of WWII. Following the Nazi invasion, the Danish
government surrendered, but resistance movements formed that managed to save thousands of
Jews from death camp deportation. Other Danes cooperated with the invading forces and even
joined the Nazi Party lines. After the end of the war in 1945 Denmark became a member of the
UN and in 1949 it became a member of NATO.
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Pro-Russian political parties
The Danish People's Party (Danish: Dansk Folkeparti, DF) is right-wing populist party
that identifies with national conservatism and is led by Kristian Thulesen Dahl. It was founded in
1995 when it broke away from the Danish Progress Party. In the 2015 elections the DF received
21.1 percent of the vote and 37 seats (see official statistical data published by the Ministry for
Economic and Interior Affairs43), which made it the second party in the country. The DF
participated in the March 2015 pro-Kremlin summit of conservative parties in St. Petersburg that
aimed to endorse Putin’s conservative values.
Regardless of the existence of this Pro-Russian political party in Denmark, for the
purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 0, since the DF did not in exist during the
country’s EU application and accession.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Denmark according to the PEW Research Center data44, the Muslim population totaled
around 226,000, which is 4.1 percent of the total population, by 2010. By the time of EU
accession in 1973, the country’s Muslim population was 2.1 percent, which is smaller than the
average EU Muslim population of 2.15 percent in the EU up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for
the purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 2,500 Roma residing in Denmark as of 2010
according to the European Commission data45. At time of accession, the Roma population in the
country made up 0.05 percent of the total population, which is less the average EU Roma
population of 0.29 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the analysis.
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Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Denmark participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data46, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean coding for Denmark

6.2

Ireland
Ireland in country that consists of the majority of the island of Ireland with a capital

Dublin. Ireland has a long coastline on the Celtic Sea to the south and the Atlantic Ocean to the
west, and the Irish Sea separates it from the island of Great Britain to the East. The total area of
Ireland is 43,370 square miles (or 69,797 square km) and a total population of 4,628,949 as of
2015 that comprises a 0.9 percent share of the total EU population as of 2015. The political
system is parliamentary republic and Ireland is an EU member since January 1st, 1973. Ireland
holds eleven European Parliament seats and has held the rotating EU Council presidency seven
times for the period of 1975 through 2013. Its official currency is the Euro and is a Eurozone
member since January 1st, 1999, but it is not a member of the Schengen space47.
In 1921 in negotiations led by Michael Collins, the Treaty of London led to a partition of
the island. Southern Ireland gained its autonomy followed by a civil war between the partisans of
autonomy and those supporting an independent republic. The official end of the Civil War was in
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May of 1923 when a cease fire was issued by the leader of the opposition led by Éamon de
Valera. Northern Ireland remained attached to the United Kingdom. Despite of maintaining
neutrality during WWII, the state offered support for the allies, especially in relation to
defending Northern Ireland, so thousands of volunteers joined the British army forces. After the
end of WWII, the impoverished country experienced significant migration and the Republic of
Ireland remained very poor until the 1990s. Since its accession to the European Community in
1973, the country has experienced extremely dynamic economic development. Currently in
Northern Ireland, Republicans (Catholics) want their region to leave the UK to join the Republic
of Ireland, while the Unionists (Protestants) wish to remain British.
Pro-Russian political parties
There is no substantial popular support for Pro-Russian political parties in Ireland, so for
the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 0.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Ireland according to the PEW Research Center data48, the Muslim population totaled
around 43,000, which is 0.9 percent of the total population, by 2010. By the time of EU
accession in 1973, the country’s Muslim population was 0.4 percent, which is smaller than the
average EU Muslim population of 2.15 percent in the EU up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for
the purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 37,500 Roma residing in Ireland as of 2010
according to the European Commission data49. At time of accession, the Roma population in the
country made up 0.84 percent of the total population, which exceeded the average EU Roma
population in the EU up to that point of 0.29 percent, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the
analysis.
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Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Ireland participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data50, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis of Ireland

6.3

The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (commonly known to as the

United Kingdom) is a country in Europe with capital London. It includes the island of Great
Britain that is made up by England, Scotland, and Wales as well as northern-eastern part of
Ireland and some smaller islands. Northern Ireland borders the Republic of Ireland to the south.
Besides that, the United Kingdom is surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean, which includes the
English Channel to the south, the North Sea to the east, and the Celtic sea to the south. The total
area of the UK is 154,428 square miles (or 248,528 square km) and a total population of
64,875,165 as of 2015 that comprises 12.8 percent share of total EU population as of 2015. The
political system is parliamentary constitutional monarchy and the United Kingdom is an EU
member since January 1st, 1973. The UK holds seventy-three European Parliament seats and has

50

http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war/cow-war-list

123

held the rotating EU Council presidency five times in the period of 1977 and 2005. Its official
currency is the Pound Sterling (GBP) and it is not a member of the Schengen space51.
The prosperity and peace for the people of Britain brought about by the Victorian era
ended with World War I, when Britain took the side of the Entente against Germany. Nearly one
million Britons were killed before Germany surrendered in November 1918. In World War II
together with France, the USSR, and the USA, the UK was among the major powers that led the
victory of the anti-Hitler coalition. The UK suffered a tremendous loss of life and destruction
during WWII. Much of the success of the UK in WWII is attributed to its Prime Minister
Winston Churchill (1940-1945). Around the time of the withdrawal from politics of Churchill in
1955 there are some major strategic changes for Britain, as the state began developing its own
nuclear weapons and became one of the world's greatest nuclear powers. This lead to warming of
the relationship with the United States, leading to an agreement of military deployment of US
troops on British territory. King George VI died in 1952 and his daughter Elizabeth II ascended
to the throne. Tensions between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland exacerbated in the
late 1960s when the Irish Republican Army launched a campaign of armed struggle and
terrorism that lasted several decades until the end of the 1990s. On June 23rd, 2016 the UK held a
referendum on UK’s status as a member of the European Union and the vote of the referendum
indicated that 51.8 percent of voters support UK’s exit out of the European Union. Currently, the
future of “Brexit” is unclear.
Pro-Russian political parties
The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is a right-wing political party led by
Diane James. The party was founded in 1993 by historian Alan Sked and its main platform is that
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the UK should leave the European Union. The party maintains the views of Euroscepticism and
reduction of immigration. UKIP has attracted some members of the ruling Conservative Party,
but UKIP in essence is more of a populist party, since it attracts protest voters. After serving as
the party leader from 2006 to 2009, Nigel Farage was re-elected by the party members as a
leader on November 5th, 2010. Farage openly admires Putin and is overall supportive to Russia’s
foreign policy course of action referring to it as “brilliant”52. According to the results of
parliamentary elections May 7, 2015 the party won 12.6 percent of the vote, thus finishing third
among parliamentary parties (see UK Electoral Commission data53), losing only to the
Conservatives and the Labour Party. On July 4, 2016 Nigel Farage announced his resignation
from the post of leader of the party due to the favorable outcome of the referendum for the
withdrawal of the UK from the European Union on June 23rd 2016. Farage states that the
successful Brexit vote was the reason that he entered politics, but these are speculations that he
left his post because of his party’s inability to follow through with the Brexit promises. On
September 16th 2016 Diane James became the new party leader.
The British National Party BNP is a right-wing political party led by Nick Griffin. The
party was founded in 1982 as the successor to the National Front party that split in the early
1980s. The founder of the party, John Kindle does not hide his admiration for the National
Socialist ideology. A major point in the platform of the party is expelling all non-white
immigrants from Britain. The party has no representatives in the British parliament, but in the
EU elections in 2009, the BNP gained two seats in the European parliament (see UK Electoral
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Commission data54), with one of the seats give to the party leader Nick Griffin. Nick Griffin has
openly expressed his support for Russia, claiming that Russia is a democratic state and defends
its foreign policy choices. The BNP participated in the March 2015 pro-Kremlin summit of
conservative parties in St. Petersburg that aimed to endorse Putin’s conservative values.
Regardless of the existence of these Pro-Russian political parties in the United Kingdom,
for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 0, since they were not in existence during
the country’s EU application and accession.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In the United Kingdom according to the PEW Research Center data55, the Muslim
population totaled around 2,869,000, which is 4.6 percent of the total population, by 2010. By
the time of EU accession in 1973, the country’s Muslim population was 2 percent, which is
smaller than the average EU Muslim population of 2.15 percent in the EU up to that point, so it
is coded as 0 for the purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 225,000 Roma residing in the
United Kingdom as of 2010 according to the European Commission data56. At time of accession,
the Roma population in the country made up 0.36 percent of the total population, which
exceeded the average EU Roma population in the EU up to that point of 0.29 percent, so it is
coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
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Conflict
There were no recorded wars that the United Kingdom participated in within the
European neighborhood for the duration of the EU’s existence according to COW’s data57, so for
the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 0.
Boolean analysis of the UK

6.4

Boolean analysis of Wave 2

Figure 6.4.1 Compilation of factors that impede EU accession speed in Wave 2

Figure 6.4.1 is a compilation of the additional factors identified in the previous chapters
that affect EU accession speed for all three states, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom,
who joined the EU in Wave 2. These factors are evaluated by analyzing their presence and
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coherence within the wave, where coherence illustrates the variety of these factors within the
wave. In the case of accession of states in Wave 2, two out of three of the states had Roma
minorities that exceeded the EU average at the time of their EU accession (see position 0010 at
73.68 percent). There were no significant Muslim minorities, pro-Russian parties, or conflict in
the states accessed in Wave 2, so the grid is limited only to one branch in the second row. By
looking at Figure 6.4.2 below, we can also see that the pro-democratic development of the states
accessed in Wave 2 ranks them as third highest in the EU’s accession history, once we exclude
the member applicants with Frozen application status. As mentioned before, if the conventional
wisdom is true, then we can expect to see a reverse relationship between GDP (current US
dollars)/polity average per wave and accession speed. In other words, the higher the GDP
(current US dollars)/polity averages for the entire application period per wave, the faster the
accession. This is not what we see, and Wave 2 shows the second fastest time of accession after
Wave 4. If the conventional wisdom was true Wave 5 should have had faster accession time than
Wave 2, because of its higher GDP (current US dollars)/polity averages. Since Wave 2 is very
coherent and limited in factors that impede EU accession speed, this lends a valuable explanation
for H1. Ultimately, this supports the idea that established member states allowed the faster
accession of the Western European states in Wave 2 not solely based on their successful prodemocratic development, but also because the states in Wave 2 displayed relatively few factors
perceived as problematic for accession.
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Average Values per Accession Wave

Average GDP per capita (ln) and EU Application Duration per Acccession Wave

Frozen

Wave 4

Wave 5

Pending

Wave 3

Wave 6

Wave 2

Wave 1
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Figure 6.4.2 Compilation of pro-democratic development and application duration by
wave compared to Wave 2
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7

WAVE 3: ACCESSION OF SOUTHERN EUROPE

Chapter 7 consists of analysis of the accession of Southern European members, which
includes Greece (1981), Spain, and Portugal (1984). The question I will answer here is: Why was
the accession of the Southern European states easier for poorer Southern European states than for
Eastern European states? After the historical and political overview, I will establish whether
earlier waves of accession of new member states exhibit more relaxed expectations of
democratic and economic development and shorter timeframe of accession into the EU. Here, I
will evaluate my claim that the established member states speed up accession of new members
from desirable regions such as Southern Europe, since they exhibit fewer additional factors that
impede accession through Hypothesis two (H2):

Accession of Southern Europe (H2): Despite of their lower pro-democratic and economic
performance, the Southern European states (Wave 2) of Greece (1981), Spain, and
Portugal (1984) were accessed in the EU faster than their Eastern European
counterparts because they brought very few additional factors perceived as problematic
by the established member states.

The end of the last fascist regimes in Europe came with Salazar’s removal from power in
Portugal in 1974, the collapse of the dictatorial government in Greece in 1974, and the death of
General Franco in Spain in 1975. The EU began redirecting substantial funding in order to
generate jobs and infrastructure in these poor European states. The Southern states quickly
committed themselves to pro-democratic development, which is a prerequisite for EU
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membership. In 1981 Greece became the tenth EU member and was joined by Portugal and
Spain five years later.

7.1

Greece
Greece is located in the northeast of the Mediterranean Sea and occupies the southern

part of the Balkan Peninsula in southeastern Europe with capital Athens. Its territory includes
islands in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Ionian seas. Two-thirds of the territory of Greece is
comprised of mountains, the highest in the country being Mount Olympus that stands at 9570
feet tall (2917 m). The total area of Greece is 50,948 square miles (or 131,957 square km) and a
total population of 10,858,018 as of 2015, that comprises a 2.1 percent share of the total EU
population as of 2015. The political system is parliamentary republic and Greece is an EU
member since January 1st, 1981. Greece holds twenty-one European Parliament seats and has
held the rotating EU Council presidency five times in the period of 1983 and 2014. Its official
currency is the Euro and became a Eurozone member on January 1st, 200158.
After World War II, a three-year civil war broke out between communists and anticommunist forces in the country. The war ended in defeat for the Communists. As a result of this
violent conflict, Greece remained politically unstable and tensions between leftist and right-wing
politicians persisted for the next 30 years. By accepting the Marshall Plan, Greece took a major
step towards what became known as the "Greek economic miracle." In 1965 King Constantine II
dissolved the government of George Papandreou and the subsequent period of political clashes
ended with a military coup in 1967. The coup established a regime of colonels that lasted until
1974. The end of the military regime was marked by a bloody uprising that was brutally
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suppressed by the military. This event shook the foundations of the junta that collapsed the year
of Turkish occupation of Cyprus. In protest against the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Greece
withdrew from the military structures of NATO on August 14th, of 1974. In the summer of 1975
after carrying out democratic elections, Greece established a new constitution and formally
dissolved monarchy. In 1980 the country returned to the NATO structures and in 1981 Greece
joined the European Communities that later became the European Union. In the ensuing decade,
the increased investments in the heavy industry, EU subsidies, and the increasing flow of tourists
boosted the Greek economy and the standard of living rose to unprecedented up until that point
levels. In addition, the traditionally hostile relations between Greece and Turkey improved after
the earthquake in Izmit in 1999. The country suffered a severe blow from the global financial
crisis at the end of the first decade of the 21st century. The subsequent government measures
aimed at cutting government spending and tax increases led to the outbreak of protests and riots
on May 5, 2010 and the political crisis still exists to this day.
Pro-Russian political parties
Golden Dawn (Greek: Χρυσή Αυγή, Chrysi Avgi) is a right nationalist political party in
Greece chaired by Nikolaos Michaloliakos. The party opposes immigration, globalization,
Marxism, and multiculturalism. Golden Dawn was founded in 1980 by convicted neo-Nazi
Nikolaos Michaloliakos on behalf of one of the imprisoned leaders of the military junta from
1967 to 1974, Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos. The party was formed one year before Greece’s
accession into the EU and maintains close ties with similar groups in Europe, such as
organization supported by Serbian and Russian nationalists. Golden Dawn is extremely opposed
to the existence of the Republic of Macedonia and Albania and maintains that Serbia and Greece
should have a common border. On September 28, 2013 the party leader Mihaloliakos, other MPs
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and party activists were arrested on charges of forming a criminal organization and carrying out
killings, extortion, as well as repressions against immigrants. Party activists are still awaiting
trial in prison. Nevertheless, according to the Greek Ministry of the Interior election data59 the
party continues to gain popularity at the polls by finishing 3rd and winning 18 out of 300 seats in
the parliamentary elections in September 2015.
Syriza (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ) or the Coalition of the Radical Left (Greek: Συνασπισμός
Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς) is left socialist political party in Greece founded in 2004 as a
coalition of several left and far left organizations. The biggest among them is the party
Synaspismos (Coalition of the Left of Movements and Ecology). After the success of the
elections of May 2012, when it received 16.8 percent of the votes and became the second
political force, Syriza was registered as a political party led by Alexis Tsipras. In a vote on June
17 the same year, Syriza received 26.9 percent of the vote and 71 seats in Parliament,
strengthening its position as the most influential leftist party in the country. In July 2013 the
Congress of Syriza agreed on the dissolution of the constituent parties and became a single
political entity. Syriza won the elections in January 2015 and its leader Alexis Tsipras drew up a
coalition government with the Independent Greeks party. In July 2013 a significant portion of
Syriza’s MPs who did not accept the terms of the contract between the Greek government and
the EU and other creditors, split and formed the National Unity party led by the former Minister
of Energy Panagiotis Lafazanis. This forced Tsipras to resign, but in the early elections in
September 2015 Syriza won the majority of seats again (see the Greek Ministry of the Interior
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election data60). Tsipras’s party and his supporters openly back Putin and his policies and oppose
EU’s sanctions against Russia.
Because of the existence of these parties for the purpose of the analysis, this element is
coded as 1 as of 1980 and 1981 when Golden Dawn was established and is coded as 0 from 1975
to 1979, when there were no pro-Russian political parties in existence in Greece.
Muslim and Roma minorities
According to the PEW Research Center data61, in Greece the Muslim population totaled
around 527,000 that is 4.7 percent of the total population in 2010. By the time of EU accession in
1980, the Greek Muslim population was 2.5 percent of the total population, which is larger than
the average EU Muslim population of 2.1 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the
purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 175,000 Roma residing in Greece as of 2010
according to the European Commission data62. At time of accession, the Roma population in the
country made up 1.55 percent of the total, which exceeded the average EU Roma population of
0.30 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Greece participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data63, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the analysis.
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Boolean analysis of Greece

7.2

Spain
Located on the Iberian Peninsula, high plateaus and mountain ranges make up much of

Spain’s mainland. To the west Spain borders Portugal and to the north it borders France. Spain’s
territory also includes the Canary Islands, the Mediterranean Balearic Islands, and the
autonomous territories of Melilla and Ceuta. The total area of Spain whose capital is Madrid is
195,346 square miles (or 505,944 square km) and a total population of 46,449,565 as of 2015
that comprises 9.1 percent of the total EU population as of 2015. The political system is
constitutional parliamentary monarchy and Spain is EU member since January 1st, 1986. Spain
holds fifty-four (54) European Parliament seats and has held the rotating EU Council presidency
four times during the period of 1989 through 2010. Its official currency is the Euro and became a
Eurozone member on January 1st, 1999 and a member of the Schengen space as of March 26th,
199564.
After the bloody Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the Republic of Spain was overthrown
by General Francisco Franco, who established an authoritarian regime that existed until his death
in 1975. During World War II, despite his sympathy for the Axis, Franco's Spain remained
nominally neutral. The fascist Spanish Falange that was founded in 1937 remained the only legal
party in Spain until end of Franco’s reign. Immediately after World War II, Spain was isolated
politically and economically because Franco’s close ties with Hitler and Mussolini. The country
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became a member of the United Nations in 1955 after Spain came out of international isolation.
During the 1960s, the Spanish economy had an unprecedented growth that became known as the
"Spanish miracle". At his death, Franco requested that Prince Juan Carlos I become king, so the
new monarch was inaugurated in 1975. In October 1977 politicians, various parties, and trade
unions signed an agreement on how to plan and carry out the economy during the transition from
dictatorship to democracy. This agreement was the first step toward democracy in Spain. As a
result of this agreement, the new Spanish Constitution was approved by a referendum on
December 6th of 1978 and Spain became democratic state that provided autonomy to all
provinces. In 1986 the country became a member of the European Union, which further
stimulated the economy. The country’s economy suffered a strong blow from the global financial
crisis in 2008 and is currently slowly recovering.
Pro-Russian political parties
Podemos (in Spanish: Podemos, "We") is a left socialist party in Spain that was founded
in 2014 by political scientist Pablo Iglesias. A few months later, according to the Spanish
Ministry of the Interior election data65, the party received 8 percent of the votes in the European
elections. In the general elections in December 2015 Podemos received 21 percent of the vote
and 69 of 350 seats in the lower house of parliament. In 2016, this result slightly improved to 21
percent of the vote and 71 seats. Ultimately, Podemos is currently the third most influential party
that openly supports Russia and is an avid critic of sanctions against Russia.
Because this party was established in 2014, which is three decades after Spain was
accessed into the EU for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 0.
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Muslim and Roma minorities
In Spain according to the PEW Research Center data66, the Muslim population is
estimated to be 1,021,000, which is 2.3 percent of the total population in 2010. By the time of its
EU accession in 1986, Spain’s Muslim population was 0.7 percent, which is less than the average
EU Muslim population of 2.1 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the
analysis. There is an estimated 750,000 Roma residing in Spain as of 2010 according to the
European Commission data67. At time of accession, the Roma population in the country made up
1.63 percent of the total population, which exceeded the average EU Roma population of 0.30
percent up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Spain participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data68, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis of Spain

7.3

Portugal
Portugal is located in the western part of the Iberian Peninsula and its capital is Lisbon.

The country borders Spain to the east and north and has an open southern and western coastline
on the Atlantic Ocean. Besides the mainland, Portugal includes the Azores and Madeira
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archipelagos. The total area of Portugal is 35,609 square miles (or 92,226 square km) and a total
population of 10,374,822 as of 2015 that comprises a 2 percent share of total EU population as of
2015. The political system is semi-presidential and Portugal is an EU member since January 1st
of 1986. Portugal holds twenty-one European Parliament seats and has held the rotating EU
Council presidency three times during the period of 1992 and 2007. Its official currency is the
Euro and is a Eurozone member since January 1st, 1999 and a member of the Schengen space as
of March 26th of 199569.
In 1910 the monarchy in Portugal was replaced by a parliamentary republic with two
chambers. This First Republic was unstable from the beginning and at the end of the WWI it
degenerated into a dictatorship with elements of a totalitarian state. The participation of Portugal
in WWI caused a deep rift in society that exacerbated the economic and political crises. All of
this led to the coup of May 28th of 1926, which established the Second Republic. The Republic
became the pro-fascist regime of Eshtado Novu in 1933 that maintained close relations with the
Axis under the direction of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. Salazar was a traditionalist who
opposed liberalism, communism, socialism and anti-colonialism. For decades, the international
community criticized him for his totalitarian views. The regime was overthrown in 1974 by the
so-called "Carnation Revolution" that led the country to modern democracy and ensured the
independence of the last colony in Africa. One million Portuguese left their homes in the
colonies, becoming refugees, since the newly-independent states that replaced the colonies were
ravaged by bloody civil wars. In 1986 the country joined the European Economic Community
that marked significant economic progress.
Pro-Russian political parties
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There is no substantial popular support for Pro-Russian political parties in Portugal, so
for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 0.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Portugal according to the PEW Research Center data70, the Muslim population totaled
around 65,000, which is 0.6 percent of the total population in 2010. By the time of EU accession
in 1986, the country’s Muslim population was 0.1 percent, which is smaller than the average EU
Muslim population of 2.1 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the
analysis. There is an estimated 52,000 Roma residing in Spain as of 2010 according to the
European Commission data71. At time of accession, the Roma population in the country made up
0.49 percent of the total population, which exceeded the average EU Roma population of 0.3
percent up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Portugal participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data72, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis of Portugal
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7.4

Boolean analysis of Wave 3

Figure 7.4.1 Compilation of factors that impede EU accession speed in Wave 3

Figure 7.4.1 is a compilation of the additional factors that affect EU accession speed for
all three states, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, who joined the EU in Wave 3. In the case of
accession of states in Wave 3, all of the states had Roma minorities that exceeded the EU
average at the time of their EU accession (see position 0010 at 74.07 percent). The presence of
Muslim minorities, pro-Russian parties, or conflict in the states accessed in Wave 3 was
minimal, so the grid is limited to two low-concentration branches in the second and third rows.
By looking at Figure 7.4.3 below, we can also see that the pro-democratic development of the
states accessed in Wave 3 ranks them as fourth in the EU’s accession history, once we exclude
the member applicants with Frozen application status. As mentioned before, if the conventional
wisdom is true, then we can expect to see a reverse relationship between GDP (current US
dollars)/polity average per wave and accession speed. In other words, the higher the GDP
(current US dollars)/polity averages for the entire application period per wave, the faster the
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accession. This is not what we see, and Wave 3 shows the third fastest time of accession after
Waves 2 and 4. If the conventional wisdom was true Wave 5 should have had faster accession
time than Wave 2, because of its higher GDP (current US dollars)/polity averages. Since Wave 3
is very coherent and limited in factors that impede EU accession speed, this lends a valuable
explanation for H2. Ultimately, this supports the idea that established member states allowed the
faster accession of the poorer Southern European states in Wave 3 not based on their prodemocratic development, but because the states in Wave 3 displayed relatively few factors
perceived as problematic for accession. Next, I will compare Waves 2 and 3 for presence of
additional factors that impeded EU accession.

Figure 7.4.2 Comparison of factors that impede EU accession speeded in Wave 2 and
Wave 3

In Figure 7.4.2 above, I examine the structures of additional factors that impede EU
accession speed for Waves 2 and 3 again by comparing the waves’ coherence. At a glance, it is
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obvious that the states accessed in Wave 2 had a lot in common and were overall very coherent
as far as displaying a minimal number of factors in only one pathway that impede EU accession
speed. The states accessed in Wave 3 also had a lot in common, but were overall a little less
coherent, since they displayed two instead of one branch. Most of the states in both waves had
Roma populations that exceeded the Roma population in the EU at the time of their accession.
Overall, the comparison of the two structures shows that Wave 3 produced a slightly more
complicated structure of factors that impede EU accession. Never-the-less, from Figure 7.4.2
above it can be deduced that very few of the factors that impede EU accession speed are present
in either Waves 2 or 3. This relative lack of structural diversity and similarity in nodular
concentration of factors in Waves 2 and 3 all lend support for H2. This is indicative that speedy
accession into the EU was allowed by established member states for the poor and lagging in prodemocratic development South European states of Greece (1981), Spain, and Portugal (1984),
since the presence of factors impeding their EU accession was minimal. Ultimately, this is
reasonable explanation as to why the recently democratized South-European states were
accessed faster than Eastern Europe in the EU, even though at time of their EU accession they
had GDP per capita (current USD) and polity scores averages close in value to the applicant
states in Wave 6 the currently Pending members. Furthermore, this can also explain why the
South-European states were accessed faster even than the recently democratized states in Wave
5, who displayed higher pro-democratic development (see Figure 7.4.3 below) at time of their
accession. Had there been no additional consideration outside of the pro-democratic
developments of the states, then the application duration for Wave 3 should be proportionate to
its political and economic development and thus be accessed at a slower rate, which lends
additional support to for H2.
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Figure 7.4.3 Compilation of pro-democratic development and application duration by
wave compared to Wave 3
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8

WAVE 4: ACCESSION OF NORTHERN EUROPE

Chapter 8 consists of analysis of the accession of Northern European members and will
evaluate my claim that there are political considerations of established member states that speed
up accession of new members from desirable regions, such as Northern Europe. This will include
the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995. After the historical and political
overview, I will conduct the analysis of hypothesis three (H3). The question I will answer here is:
Why was the accession of the Northern European states smoother and faster than for Eastern
European applicants?
In this chapter I evaluate whether earlier waves of accession of new member states
exhibit lower expectations of democratic and economic development and shorter timeframe of
accession into the EU in the following hypotheses:

Accession of Northern Europe (H3): EU accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995
was fast due to the fact that the states accessed in Wave 4 did not bring in significant volume
of additional factors that impede accession speed.

In 1992 Norway’s EU application was rejected due to a second negative referendum vote
on EU accession. Austria, Finland, and Sweden were accessed in 1995 and the EU members total
fifteen. These countries had the highest pro-democratic indicators of development thus far within
the history of the Union and the shortest accession timeframe.

8.1

Austria
Located in the Alps, Austria is a country with mostly mountainous terrain and a capital

Vienna. It borders Italy and Slovenia to the south, Slovakia and Hungary to the east, Switzerland
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and Liechtenstein to the west, and Germany and the Czech Republic to the north. In contrast to
the high southern and western parts, the eastern provinces are low-lying plains along the Danube
River. The total area of Austria is 52,120 square miles (or 83,879 square km) and a total
population of 8,576,261 as of 2015, that comprises a 1.7 percent share of total EU population as
of 2015. The political system is federal parliamentary republic and Austria is an EU member
since January 1st, 1995. Austria holds eighteen European Parliament seats and has held the
rotating EU Council presidency two times in 1998 and 2006. Its official currency is the Euro and
is a Eurozone member since January 1st, 1999, and member of the Schengen Area since
December 1th, 200773.
In 1867 King Franz Josef approved the establishment of the dual monarchy of AustriaHungary, where both parts of this monarchy have their own parliament. The joint rule pertained
only to defense, foreign and economic policy. After World War I the Austro-Hungarian Empire
was dismembered. As a result, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary became independent states
and other lands of the former empire became part of the territories of Poland, Romania, Italy, and
Yugoslavia. Thus, Austria became a small German-speaking country. On November 12th, 1918
the Republic of Austria was established. In 1938 German troops entered Austria, and in the
meantime a referendum took place for or against joining Germany. The result is decisively in
favor of accession into Germany and Austria became a part of Germany. On May 15th, 1955
after occupation by Allied troops, the independent Republic of Austria was restored. After years
of efforts to participate in the European integration, Austria became a member of the European
Union on January 1, 1995.
Pro-Russian political parties
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The Freedom Party of Austria (Austrian: Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) is a
right-wing populist party led by Heinz-Christian Strache since 2005. The party was founded in
1956 and identifies with national conservatism. In recent elections to the National Council (lower
house of the Austrian parliament) held on September 29th 2013 the party won 20.5 percent, this
finishing third and getting 40 mandates (see election result data on the Austrian Ministry of the
Interior website74). On the first round of presidential elections held on April 24th 2016, the
party's candidate Norbert Hofer won the uninitiated with 35.4 percent of over 68 percent of
Austrians who voted for him. The party maintains a close relationship with the United Russia
party, the leading Russian party in Russia that put forward Vladimir Putin. The FPÖ participated
in the March 2015 pro-Kremlin summit of conservative parties in St. Petersburg that aimed to
endorse Putin’s conservative values. Because of the existence of the Freedom Party of Austria
since 1956 for the purpose of the analysis, this element is coded as 1 as of 1989 and 1995.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Austria according to the PEW Research Center data75, the Muslim population totaled
around 475,000 that is 5.7 percent of the total population by 2010. By the time of EU accession
in 1995, the country’s Muslim population was 2.1 percent, which is larger than the average EU
Muslim population of 1.84 percent in the EU up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose
of the analysis. There is an estimated 35,000 Roma residing in Austria as of 2010 according to
the European Commission data76. At time of accession, the Roma population in the country made
up 2.09 percent of the total population, which exceeded the average EU Roma population in the
EU up to that point of 0.53 percent, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
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Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Austria participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data77, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis of Austria

8.2

Finland
Finland is a sparsely populated country in northeastern Europe with capital Helsinki. It

borders the Baltic Sea to the southwest and northern border with Norway, northwestern border
with Sweden, and to the eastern border with Russia. The total area of Finland is 210,297 square
miles (or 338,440 square km) and a total population of 5,471,753 as of 2015 that comprises a 1.1
percent share of total EU population as of 2015. The political system is parliamentary republic
and Finland is an EU member since January 1st, 1995. Finland holds thirteen European
Parliament seats and has held the rotating EU Council presidency two times in 1999 and 2006.
Its official currency is the Euro and is a Eurozone member since January 1st 1999, but is a
member of the Schengen space as of March 25th 200178.
Shortly after the Communist Revolution in Russia Finland declared its independence on
December 6th, 1917, which was recognized by the Russian communist government. Soon after,
the Finnish civil war erupted between supporters the government and the far-left. The
government managed to prevail only for a few months and the war involved a lot of violence on
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both sides that lasted several decades. The Treaty of Tartu of 1920 established the Soviet-Finnish
border. According to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Finland fell within the Soviet sphere of
influence and in November 1939 the Soviet Union invaded Finland. In the ensuing Winter War,
despite its superiority in numbers, the Soviet forces suffered many casualties, but managed to get
further into Finnish territory at the beginning of next year. After the Soviet bombing in June
1941, the war between the two countries resumed and continued until the signing of a new truce
in 1944. In the coming months the Finnish troops launched the Lapland War against the German
troops stationed in the northern part of the country. Although the Soviet Union imposed heavy
reparations and Finland was unable to regain their lost territory, the Finns managed to avoid
Soviet occupation of the country. The payment of reparations strengthens industrialization in the
postwar years, and after the final payment of reparations, trade relations with the Soviet Union
remained important for the Finnish economy. During the Cold War, although Finland was
formally neutral, the Soviet influence in the country was strong and hundreds of books and films
were banned by the Soviet censorship. Urho Kekkonen, a Finish politician with close ties to the
Kremlin, was President for 26 years, with his last term ending in 1982.
Pro-Russian political parties
There is no substantial popular support for Pro-Russian political parties in Finland, so for
the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 0.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Finland according to the PEW Research Center data79, the Muslim population totaled
around 42,000 that is 0.8 percent of the total population by 2010. By the time of EU accession in
1995, the country’s Muslim population was 0.2 percent, which is smaller than the average EU
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Muslim population of 1.84 percent in the EU up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose
of the analysis. There is an estimated 11,000 Roma residing in Finland as of 2010 according to
the European Commission data80. At time of accession, the Roma population in the country made
up 0.22 percent of the total population, which is less than the average EU Roma population in the
EU up to that point of 0.53 percent, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Finland was a part of within the EU neighborhood for
the duration of the EU’s existence according to COW’s data81, so for the purpose of the analysis
this element is coded as 0.
Boolean analysis of Finland

8.3

Sweden
Sweden is the most populous Scandinavian country with capital Stockholm and is fifth in

size in Europe. It is bordered by Norway in the west, Finland in the northeast, and has a coastline
along the Baltic Sea in the east. It is connected to Denmark by the Öresund Bridge. The total area
of Sweden is 272,517 square miles (or 438,574 square km) and a total population of 9,747,355 as
of 2015 that comprises 1.9 percent share of total EU population as of 2015. The political system
is parliamentary constitutional monarchy and Sweden is an EU member since January 1st, 1995.
Sweden holds twenty European Parliament seats and has held the rotating EU Council
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presidency two times in 2001 and 2009. Its official currency is the Swedish Krona (SEK) and it
is a member of the Schengen Area since March 25th 200182.
With the advance of the Industrial Revolution, Swedes gradually began to move to
metropolitan areas to work in factories and many became members of socialist groups. Rising
socialist revolution was averted in 1917, followed by restoration of parliamentarism and the
country returned to democracy. Sweden retained its neutrality during the First and Second World
Wars, although its neutrality during the Second is often called into question because of its
concessions with both sides during the war. Sweden secretly allowed Alliance spies to work on
its territory, but also openly supplied Nazi Germany with iron ore in exchange for coal. These
German concessions were imposed by the Nazis and were considered unavoidable if Sweden
was to maintain its neutrality. Unfortunately, its contribution to the Alliance and its purely
humanitarian assistance are often overlooked because of its collaboration with the Nazis. After
the end of WWII, Sweden was part of the Marshall Plan, but during the Cold War remained
unattached to any side and still is not a member of any military organization. After the end of
WWII Sweden took advantage of its natural resources and the lack of destruction on its territory
and developed industry in order to meet the needs of post-war Europe. In doing so, Sweden soon
became one of the richest countries in the world.
Pro-Russian political parties
The Swedish Democrats (Swedish: Sverigedemokraterna, SD) is a far-right party
founded in 1988. Jimmie Åkesson is the leader of the far-right Sweden Democrats party and
member of the Swedish Parliament after the parliamentary elections in 2010. Party supports strict
immigration restrictions and called Islam the greatest foreign threat to Sweden since World War
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II. The party entered parliament for the first time in 2010 and was represented in parliament after
winning 5.7 percent of votes. In the 2014 elections the SD finished third by winning 12.86 of the
votes (see the Swedish election authority results83). The SD participated in the March 2015 proKremlin summit of conservative parties in St. Petersburg that aimed to endorse Putin’s
conservative values.
Because of the existence of the Swedish Democrats since 1988 for the purpose of the
analysis, this element is coded as 1 as of 1991 and 1995.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Sweden according to the PEW Research Center data84, the Muslim population totaled
around 451,000 that is 4.9 percent of the total population by 2010. By the time of EU accession
in 1995, the country’s Muslim population was 1.7 percent, which is smaller than the average EU
Muslim population of 1.84 percent in the EU up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose
of the analysis. There is an estimated 50,000 Roma residing in Sweden as of 2010 according to
the European Commission data85. At time of accession, the Roma population in the country made
up 1.72 percent of the total population, which exceeded the average EU Roma population in the
EU up to that point of 0.53 percent, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.

Conflict
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There were no recorded wars that Sweden participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data86, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis for Sweden

8.4

Boolean analysis of Wave 4

Figure 8.4.1 Compilation of factors that impede EU accession speed in Wave 4

Figure 8.4.1 is a compilation of the additional factors that affect EU accession speed for
all 3 states that joined the EU in Wave 4. In the case of accession of states in Wave 4, 2 out of 3
of the states had, pro-Russian parties, Muslim minorities, and Roma minorities that exceeded the
EU average at the time of their EU accession (see the 1110 nodule with the highest factor
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concentration at 43.75 percent). Overall, the wave is rather coherent and limited in factors that
impede EU accession speed, which provides a valuable explanation for H3, so the grid is limited
to two higher concentration branches in the second and third rows. Ultimately, this means that
established member states allowed the faster accession of the wealthy Northern European states
because they displayed relatively few factors perceived as problematic for accession.
Next, I will compare Waves 2, 3, and 4 for presence of additional factors that impeded
EU accession.

Figure 8.4.2 Comparison of factors that impede EU accession speeded in Wave 2 and
Wave 3 and Wave 4

In Figure 8.4.2 above, I examine the structures of additional factors that impede EU
accession speed for Waves 2, 3 and 4 again by comparing the waves’ coherence. At a glance, it
is obvious that the states accessed in Wave 2 had a lot in common and were overall very coherent
as far as displaying a minimal number (in only one pathway) of factors that impede EU accession
speed. The states accessed in Wave 3 also had a lot in common, but were overall a little less
coherent, since they displayed two instead of one branch with higher concentration towards the
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bottom rows. The states accessed in Wave 4 also had a lot in common, but were overall a little
less coherent, since they displayed two instead of one branch with higher concentration towards
the top rows. Most of the states in all waves had Roma populations that exceeded the Roma
population in the EU at the time of their accession. Overall, the comparison of the structures
shows that Wave 4 produced the most complicated structure of factors that impede EU
accession. Never-the-less, from Figure 8.4.2 above it can be deduced that very few of the factors
that impede EU accession speed are present in either Waves 2 or 3. Also, a gradual increase in
factors that impede EU accession is observed between Wave 2, 3 and 4, which is a more accurate
explanation of the waves’ sequential placement in time than the states’ pro-democratic
performance during their application period, which lends support for H3. This is indicative that
speedy accession into the EU was allowed by established member states for the wealthy
Northern European states of Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995, since the presence of factors
impeding their EU accession was relatively low. Had there been no additional consideration
outside of the pro-democratic developments of the states, then the application duration for the
earlier waves, such as Wave 4, should be proportionate to their political and economic
development and thus place them towards the front of the chart as Wave 2. This is not what we
observe here and the additional factors discussed above explain why Austria, Finland, and
Sweden were accessed in Wave 4 instead (see Figure 8.4.3 below).
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Average Values per Accession Wave

Average GDP per capita (ln) and EU Application Duration per Acccession Wave

Frozen

Wave 4

Wave 5
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Waves of EU Accession
Average of GDP per capita (ln)

Average of application duration

Figure 8.4.3 Compilation of pro-democratic development and application duration by
wave compared to Wave 4
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9

WAVE 5: ACCESSION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Chapter 9 consists of analysis of the accession of the Eastern European members and will
evaluate whether the political landscape in the EU changed since the accessions of Southern
Europe. This will include analysis of Wave 5, which consists of the EU accession of Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, and Slovakia in
2004. After the historical and political overview, I will conduct the analysis of hypothesis four
(H4). The question I will answer here is: Was Eastern European states’ pro-democratic and
economic performance during the accession process the only determining factor for their slower
accession speed?
In this chapter I evaluate whether earlier waves of accession of new member states exhibit
lower expectations of democratic and economic development and shorter timeframe of accession
into the EU in the following hypotheses:

Accession of Eastern Europe (H4): Despite of their positive pro-democratic and economic
performance accession of the Eastern European states of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus, and Slovakia (Wave 5) was
slower than previous accession waves due to the fact that they brought over factors that
impede accession speed.

After the fall of the Berlin wall, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe sought a closer
political affiliation with the Western Europe and NATO. In 1997 EU leadership approved the
beginning of membership negotiations for Eastern and Central European countries of Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania with the
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addition of the two Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta. All applicants except Bulgaria and
Romania joined the EU in 2004.

9.1

Estonia
Estonia is a Baltic member of the EU with capital Tallinn. Estonia has mostly flat terrain

and a long shoreline on the Baltic Sea to the north and west. The total area of Estonia is 17,462
square miles (or 45,227 square km) and a total population of 1,313,271 as of 2015, which
comprises a 0.3 percent of total EU population. The political system is parliamentary republic
and Estonia is an EU member since May 1st, 2004. Estonia holds six European Parliament seats
and will assume the revolving EU Council presidency for the first time at the end of 2017. Its
official currency is the Euro and it became a member of the Eurozone on January 1st, 2011 and
the Schengen space on December 21st of 200787.
Estonia won its war for independence from Soviet Russia in 1920. Even though Estonia
became a member of the League of Nations on September 22nd 1921, it managed to maintain its
independence only for twenty years. In 1944 the USSR re-conquered Estonia, but Estonia
regained independence on August 20th, 1991. During and shortly after WWII Estonia lost about a
quarter of its population to the Holocaust during the German occupation, forced military drafting
into the Red Army, and to Soviet deportations to labor camps in 1949. After establishing
independence in 1991, Estonia’s foreign policy has been conducted in close cooperation with its
Western partners, so in September 1991 Estonia joined the United Nations, on March 29th 2004 it
joined NATO, and the European Union in May 2004. Since the early 1990s, Estonia has actively
cooperated with Latvia and Lithuania and the Nordic countries on political and economic levels.
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Today, there is extensive economic interdependence between Estonia and its northern neighbors,
where three-quarters of Estonia’s foreign investment originates in the Nordic countries.
However, the international reorientation of Estonia to the West has been accompanied by a
general deterioration of the relations with Russia.
Pro-Russian political parties
The Estonian Centre Party (Estonian: Eesti Keskerakond) is social-liberal center-left
party in Estonia. The party was founded on October 12th, 1991 from the support base of the
Popular Front Party and is a currently an associate of the European Liberal Democratic Reform
Party. It is led by Tallinn’s Mayor Edgar Savisaar. After joining the party on August 21st, 2005
the Estonian Party of Pensioners, the party became the second by number of members in Estonia.
In Estonia, where a quarter of the population is ethnically Russian, the Centre Party maintains a
close relationship with one of Russia’s dominant political parties, United Russia. Estonian
authorities fear that this relationship is utilized in order to organize various activities of civil
discontent of the ethnically Russian population in the region, such as the rally in Tallinn in
support of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The party finished second in the 2011 general
elections for the Estonian Parliament (Estonian Riigikogu) with 23.3 percent of the votes and 26
seats88.
Because of the existence of this party since 1991, for the purpose of the analysis, this
element is coded as 1 for the duration of the entire EU application period from 1995 to 2004.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Estonia according to the PEW Research Center data89, the Muslim population totaled
around 2,000, which is 0.1 percent of the total population in 2010. By the time of its EU
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accession in 2004, the country’s Muslim population was 0.6 percent, which is smaller than the
average EU Muslim population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the
purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 1,050 Roma residing in the country as of 2010
according to the European Commission data90. At time of accession, the Roma population in the
country made up 0.08 percent of the total population, which is less than the average EU Roma
population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Estonia participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data91, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis for Estonia

9.2

Latvia
Latvia, whose capital is Riga borders Estonia, Lithuania, Russia, and Belarus and has a

long coastline to the north and north-west with the Baltic Sea. Latvia is a flat country half of
whose territory is covered by forests with more than 3,000 lakes and 12,000 rivers. The total area
of Latvia is 24,931 square miles (or 64,573 square km) and a total population of 1,986,096 as of
2015 that comprises a 0.4 percent share of the total EU population as of 2015. The political
system is parliamentary republic and Latvia is an EU member since May 1st of 2004. Latvia
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holds eight European Parliament seats and took over the rotating EU Council presidency for the
first time in 2015. Latvia’s official currency is the Euro and is a Eurozone member as of January
1st, 2008 and a member of the Schengen space as of December 21st, 200792.
The Soviet Union annexed the country under the name of Latvian SSR on June 17th of
1940, as an indirect consequence of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939. The war
between Nazi Germany and the USSR led to wide-spread repressions within the new Soviet
republic. Over 35,000 Latvians were deported to Siberia, many of whom died there. Except for
the repressive Nazi occupation from 1941 to 1944, during World War II, Latvia was still under
Soviet rule as the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic. After the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953,
Latvian communists led by Prime Minister Edwards Berklavs pushed a nationalist policy. These
attempts did not appeal to the central government in Moscow and in 1959 the republic
experienced a political purge and subsequent attempts to push pro-Russian agenda were much
more intense than in neighboring Baltic republics. The reforms of the Soviet leader Gorbachev in
the late 1980s stimulated the Latvian independence movement. In result on August 21, 1991
Latvia became independent again. Since then Latvia has dramatically strengthened its ties with
the Westby becoming a member of NATO and the European Union in 2004.
Pro-Russian political parties
The Social Democratic Party Harmony (Latvian: Socialdemokratiska partija "Sask"
SDPS) is a left-wing Latvian political party founded in 2009. The group’s leader is Jānis
Urbanovičs. From 2009 to 2014 it was a part of the Harmony Centre coalition, and after 2014 it
became an independent political entity. The party was formed in June 2009 from the merger of
three political groups who up until then operated within the Harmony Centre coalition: Consent
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of the National Party, New Centre, and the Social Democratic Party. The newly–created political
organization was leftist and continued to operate within the Harmony Centre, so its members ran
for seats in the 2010 Parliamentary election list of the Centre. In 2014 SDPS split from the
Harmony Centre coalition and launched independently in the European Parliament elections,
obtaining 13.04 percent of the votes. Its representative in Strasbourg was Andrei Mamykin. In
the parliamentary elections in 2014 the party obtained 23 percent of the vote and 24 seats93. The
core supporters of the party are ethnic Russians and the SDPS is the leading party in the
country’s capital, Riga. However, regardless of its significant support base, it was excluded from
the ruling collation in 2011 because of its open pro-Russian positions.
Because this party came into existence in 2009, that is after the country applied and was
accessed into the EU, for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 0 for the duration of
the entire EU application period from 1995 to 2004.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Latvia according to the PEW Research Center data94, the Muslim population totaled
around 2,000 that is 0.1percent of the total population in 2010. By the time of its EU accession in
2004, the country’s Muslim population was 0.1 percent, which is smaller than the average EU
Muslim population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the
analysis. There is an estimated 12,500 Roma residing in the country as of 2010 according to the
European Commission data95. At time of accession, the Roma population in the country made up
0.56 percent of the total population, which is less than the average EU Roma population of 2.18
percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the analysis.
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Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Latvia participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data96, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis for Latvia

9.3

Lithuania
Lithuania is a state located along south-eastern coast of the Baltic Sea with capital

Vilnius. It is the largest and most populated Baltic State. The landscape is flat and one-third of it
is covered by forests. It borders Latvia to the North, Poland to the south, and Belarus to the East
and South. The total area of Lithuania is 25,207 square miles (or 65,286 square km) and a total
population of 2,921,262 as of 2015 that comprises a 0.6 percent share of the total EU population
as of 2015. The political system is parliamentary republic and Lithuania is an EU member since
May 1st of 2004. Lithuania holds eleven European Parliament seats and has held the rotating EU
Council presidency once in 2013. Its official currency is the Euro and is a Eurozone member
since January 1st, 2015 and a member of the Schengen space as of December 21st of 200797.
Lithuania was occupied by Germany during World War I. On February 16th of 1918 the
Council of Lithuania proclaimed the country’s independence in Vilnius. From 1920 to 1922 the
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Lithuanian state was recognized by the international community with a capital Kaunas. On
October 10th of 1939, after the conquest and division of Poland between Germany and the USSR
as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the territory of Lithuania was overtaken by Soviet
troops. On June 15, 1940 Lithuania became part of the USSR as the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist
Republic after Moscow gave an ultimatum to the Lithuanian government to resign and demanded
increase of Soviet troops on Lithuanian territory. From 1941 to 1944 Lithuania was occupied by
Nazi Germany. From 1944 to 1990 the country became a part of the USSR again. On March 11th
of 1990 Lithuanians proclaimed independence. On March 29th of 2004 Lithuania became a
member of NATO and in May 1st of 2004 Lithuania became a member of the EU.
Pro-Russian political parties
The Order and Justice Party (Lithuanian: Tvarka ir teisingumas) is a right-leaning
populist organization in Lithuania. The party was originally founded in 2002 as a LiberalDemocratic Party (LDP) by Rolandas Paksas. In 2003 a scandal erupted because Paksas had
granted Lithuanian citizenship to a Russian businessman in return for political favors. In
addition, it was revealed that Paksas’ staffers had political connections to Russian criminal
groups. All of this lead to his impeachment from the President’s office in 2004. In 2004, the LDP
took part in the Parliamentary elections and received 11 mandates or 11.36 percent of the votes,
typing with the coalition partners, the Lithuanian People's Union for Fair Lithuania. In 2006, the
LDP adopted its current name. The party is also represented in the European Parliament - in the
2004 EP elections it received 6.8 percent of the votes, or 1 out of 13 set aside for Lithuania.
However, in the 2009 elections it received 11.9 percent of the votes and 2 seats out of 12. The
OJP participates in the EP as a fraction of the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group.
In 2014, police conducted a series of investigations into the party’s headquarters and its
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members. Nevertheless, in the Lithuanian parliamentary elections in 2016 it gained 5.33 percent
(67,817 votes) and finished 5th according to the official results posted by the Lithuanian
Ministry of the Interior98. Rolandas Paksas left the post of chairman of the party day after the
elections on October 10th, 2016 and is to be replaced.
The People's Party (Lithuanian: Lietuvos liaudies partija) is a center-left leaning proRussian party in Lithuania. The party was founded on April 20th 2003. It has no seats in the
Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas) or the European Parliament and is led by Rolandas Paulauskas.
The party maintains close ties and often politically cooperates with United Russia, Russia's
ruling party. In Lithuania where 6 percent of the population is Russian, the party has a solid
support base which raises concerns that this population may be mobilized politically in order to
destabilize the country. In the Lithuanian parliamentary elections in 2016 it gained 1.01 percent
of the votes and finished 10th according to the official results posted by the Lithuanian Ministry
of the Interior99.
Because of the existence of these parties for the purpose of the analysis, this element is
coded as 1 as of 2002 and 2004 when Order and Justice Party was established and is coded as 0
from 1995 to 2001, when there were no pro-Russian political parties in existence in Lithuania.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Lithuania according to the PEW Research Center data100, the Muslim population
totaled around 3,000, which is 0.2 percent of the total population in 2010. By the time of its EU
accession in 2004, the country’s Muslim population was 0.2 percent, which is smaller than the
average EU Muslim population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the
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purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 8,500 Roma residing in the country as of 2010
according to the European Commission data101. At time of accession, the Roma population in the
country made up 0.09 percent of the total population, which is less than the average EU Roma
population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Lithuania participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data102, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis for Lithuania

9.4

Poland
Poland is a Central European state whose capital is Warsaw. Poland has a long coastline

along the Baltic Sea. To the south it borders Slovakia and the Czech Republic, to the west Germany, and to the East - Belarus and Ukraine, and to the North - Russia and Lithuania. The
total area of Poland is 120,726 square miles (or 312,679 square km) and a total population of
38,005,614 as of 2015 that comprises a 7.5 percent share of the total EU population as of 2015.
The political system is parliamentary republic and Poland is an EU member since May 1st of
2004. Poland holds fifty-one European Parliament seats and has held the revolving EU Council
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presidency once in 2011. The Polish Zloty is its official currency and is member of the Schengen
space since December 21st of 2007103.
After the withdrawal of Russia in 1918, Poland gained back its independence. In
September 1939 Poland was simultaneously attacked by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany
who split Poland between themselves according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This attack
started World War II. WWII resulted in the death of six million Polish citizens, including most of
its Jewish population. In 1945 the USSR imposed a Communist regime that fell in 1989. The fall
of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 was the beginning of the Third Polish Republic.
Despite the enormous destruction by WWII, Poland was able to recover and since 1989 it has
successfully developed and maintained a democracy and a market economy. The country is a
member of the European Union, NATO, UN, WTO and other international organizations.
Pro-Russian political parties
In Poland, Congress of the New Right (New Right, KNP) is a Polish right-wing
political party with conservative Eurosceptic views. It was registered on March 25th, 2011 as the
Union of Real Politics - Freedom and the Rule of Law. In May 12th, 2011 the party led by
Janusz Korwin-Mikke assumed the name Congress of the New Right. Janusz Korwin-Mikke,
finished 4th out of ten candidates in the presidential election in 2015 with 3.26 percent votes in
favor (see National Election Commission (Polish: Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza, PKW)
Election Results data104), but was ousted and replaced by Michael Marusik in the same year.
Congress of the New Right defines themselves as the party of anti- and pro-European at the same
time, since it criticizes the European Union’s leftist ideology, bureaucracy, and strong
interventionist action on the economies of member countries. However, the party calls for its
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liquidation and restoration of the original free trade space of the European Economic
Community, but supports the maintenance and expansion of the Schengen Agreement and
economic libertarianism.
Self-defense of the Republic of Poland (Polish: Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej, abbreviated SO or SRP) is a right-wing party in founded on January 10, 1992 and led
by Andrzej Lepper. On social issues, the party takes a conservative stance that opposes the
legalization of gay marriage, separation of church and state, and supports the death penalty, but
insists on the introduction of free education and health care. In foreign policy, the party adheres
to Euroscepticism, but it did not call on voters to vote against the country joining the EU during
the wave of populism in the referendum on joining the EU. Instead, it chose the slogan "You
decide". The party opposed the incitement of ethnic hatred in the scandal with the "Union of
Poles in Belarus" in 2005 and announced its support for the President of Belarus Alexander
Lukashenko. The SRP is openly in favor of improving relations with the Russian Federation. In
2009 elections for the Polish Sejm it finished sixth with 1.5 of the vote105.
The party Zmiana (Polish: Change) was formed in April 2012 by Mateusz Piskorski. The
party holds left-wing anti-capitalist views and maintains a close relationship with representatives
of the newly-proclaimed Donbas Republic. In May of 2016 Mateusz Piskorski was detained by
officers of the Internal Security Agency in Poland and charged with conspiring to spy on behalf
of Russia, promoting Russian interest and accepting payments in return. Subsequently, the
decision of the court was temporarily suspended.
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Because of the existence pro-Russian political support during the country’s EU accession
period since the SPR was founded in 1992 for the purpose of the analysis, this element is coded
as 1 as of 1994 through 2004.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Poland according to the PEW Research Center data106, the Muslim population totaled
around 20,000 that is 0.1 percent of the total population in 2010. By the time of EU accession in
2004, the country’s Muslim population was 0.1 percent, which is smaller than the average EU
Muslim population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the
analysis. There is an estimated 32,500 Roma residing in the country as of 2010 according to the
European Commission data107. At time of accession, the Roma population in the country made
up 0.09 percent of the total population, which is less than the average EU Roma population in the
EU of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Poland participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data108, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis for Poland
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9.5

Slovakia
Slovakia is located in the eastern part of Central Europe with a capital Bratislava. To the

north it borders Poland, to the west it borders Austria and the Czech Republic, to the east it
borders Ukraine, and to the south - Hungary. The river Danube passes through the southern
lowlands. The area of Slovakia is 18,933 square miles (or 49,035 square km) and a total
population of 5,421,349 as of 2015 that comprises a 1.1 percent share of the total EU population.
The political system is parliamentary republic and Slovakia is an EU member since May 1st of
2004. Slovakia has thirteen European Parliament seats and currently holds the revolving EU
Council presidency for the first time since becoming a member. Its official currency is the Euro
and is a member of the Schengen space since December 21st of 2007109.
In 1918, Slovakia joined the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia and together they
formed Czechoslovakia. After the collapse of Austria-Hungary, for a short time in 1919 Slovakia
became the Slovak Soviet republic. Later, in the interwar period, the country was a part of
Czechoslovakia. In 1938 the Munich agreement put an end to Czechoslovakia and Slovakia was
established as a separate country - the First Slovak Republic led by Jozef Tiso. The new state had
formal independence, but was in fact strictly controlled by Nazi Germany. This caused a lot of
internal resistance, leading to the Slovak National Uprising in 1944. After World War II
Czechoslovakia reunited and fell within the Soviet sphere of influence. As a member of the
Communist camp, Slovakia signed the Warsaw Pact in 1955. In 1969, after the Prague Spring,
Czechoslovakia became a state federation of the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics. After the
Velvet Revolution and the end of communism in 1989, the Czech Republic and Slovakia
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embarked on separate paths on January 1st, 1993. In May 2004, Slovakia joined the European
Union and in the same year the country also joined NATO.
Pro-Russian political parties
The Slovak party Direction – Social Democracy (Slovak: Smer–sociálna demokracia,
Smer-SD) is a center-left social democratic political party led by Robert Fico. It was founded in
1999 when the right annex of the former Communist Party of Democratic Left led by Robert
Fico, seceded from the main party. In subsequent years, the party became dominant in the
political left and absorbed smaller left-wing parties, including the Party of the Democratic Left.
Fico headed the government between 2006 and 2010. In March 2012 the party won early
parliamentary elections with 44.42 percent and received 83 mandates out of 150 (see Slovakia's
National Council (Národná rada) data110) and dew up a single-party government with Prime
Minister Robert Fico. In 2016 the party remained first, but lost its majority with 28.3 percent of
the vote and 49 members of Parliament (see Slovakia's National Council (Národná rada) data111).
In 2006 Smer formed an alliance with the right-wing nationalist SNS and for that the Party of the
European Socialists (PES) suspended its membership. PES’ justification for this unprecedented
move was that the SNS supports attitudes that are intolerant to minorities and that is
incompatible with the values of PES and EU norms in general. Smer was reinstated as a member
of PES in 2008.
The Slovak National Party (Slovak: Slovenská národná strana, SNS) is a right-wing
nationalist party in Slovakia led by Andrej Danko, who claims to act in defense of traditional
Christian values and national identity of Slovaks. The party emerged in 1989 in the midst of the
Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. In the 2010 parliamentary elections the party overcome
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the five percent barrier, receiving only 5.08 percent of the votes and 9 seats (see Slovakia's
National Council (Národná rada) data112). The party is known for its xenophobic anti-Roma
platform, criticism of the current government and EU policies as well as its campaign for the
rehabilitation of Jozef Tiso, a Slovak politician who supported the deportation of Slovak Jews in
concentration camps, which are highly incompatible with EU norms.
The People Party - Our Slovakia (Slovak: Ľudová strana – Naše Slovensko, ĽSNS) is a
right-leaning political organization led by Marian Kotleba. The party was founded in 2010. The
origin of the party is closely linked to the neo-fascist and ultra-nationalist organization Slovak
Togetherness. Members of the ĽSNS are connected with extremist movements and express their
admiration for the pro-fascist former Slovak President Jozef Tiso. However, the party denies any
connection with fascism, but criticizes Slovakia’s liberal foreign policy stance. The party's
platform consist of anti-Semitic and anti-Roma rhetoric, strict immigration control, exit of
Slovakia from the Euro zone, NATO, and the EU. In 2014, the party leader stated his support for
the overthrown pro-Russian president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych and Russia’s actions the
Ukraine and stated that the Maidan protesters support Western interests and weaken Ukraine.
Because of the existence pro-Russian political support during the country’s EU accession
period since the Slovak National Party was founded in 1989 for the purpose of the analysis, this
element is coded as 1 as of 1996 through 2004.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Slovakia according to the PEW Research Center data113, the Muslim population totaled
around 4,000 that is 0.1 percent of the total population in 2010. By the time of EU accession in
2004, the country’s Muslim population was 0.1 percent, which is smaller than the average EU
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Muslim population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the
analysis. There is an estimated 490,000 Roma residing in the country as of 2010 according to the
European Commission data114. At time of accession, the Roma population in the country made
up 9.02 percent of the total population, which is greater than the average EU Roma population of
2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Slovakia participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data115, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis for Slovakia

9.6

Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is a landlocked country with capital Prague located in Central

Europe that borders Austria to the south, Germany to the west, and Poland and Slovakia to the
north-east. It became an independent state in 1993 after Czechoslovakia fragmented into two
countries. The total area of Slovakia is 30,451 square miles (or 78,868 square km) and a total
population of 10,538,275 as of 2015 that comprises a 2.1 percent share of the total EU
population as of 2015. The political system is parliamentary republic and the Czech Republic is
an EU member since May 1st of 2004. The Czech Republic holds twenty-one European

114
115

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-249_en.htm
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war/cow-war-list

172

Parliament seats and has held the rotating EU Council presidency in 2009. Its official currency is
the Czech koruna (CZK) and is a member of the Schengen space since December 21st of
2007116.
After the Velvet Revolution in 1989, the Czechoslovak Communist Party relinquished
power and was replaced by a democratically elected government with President Vaclav Havel
and federal spokesman Alexander Dubcek. Soon after the political changes, Slovakia
experienced growing nationalism. At the federal level, influential political figures such as Vaclav
Klaus and Vladimir Mechar had different visions for the future development of the country.
Nearly 2.5 million Czechs signed a petition for a referendum on whether Czechoslovakia should
remain united. On January 1993 Czechoslovakia ceased to exist and formed two separate states Slovakia and the Czech Republic. In 1999, the Czech Republic, along with Hungary and Poland,
became NATO members, which caused Russia’s discontent. The Czech Republic became a
member of the EU in 2004.
Pro-Russian political parties
The Czech Communist Party (Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy, KSČM) is a far-left
leaning political party led by Vojtěch Filip. The party was established in 1989 and is the
successor of the Czechoslovak Communist Party founded in 1921. The party leadership refused
to exclude the word "communist" in its name, stressing its continuity with the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the party leadership criticized the mistakes of
Czechoslovakian Communist Party. Other Czech political parties are reluctant to keep a close
contact with the KSCM. In 2015 Filip participated in a Prague demonstration against Russian
sanctions and openly claimed that there is no Russian treat. In 2013 the party won 14.9 percent
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of the votes and finished third in the parliamentary elections (see Czech Republic Chamber of
Deputies Election Results data117).
The Czech Social-Democratic Party (Czech: Česká strana sociálně demokratická,
ČSSD) is a left-wing political party founded in 1989 that is led by Bohuslav Sobotka. The party
was banned during the German occupation in World War II and later by the Communists in
1948. By the recommendation of Milos Zeman the ČSSD was restored in 1989 and later became
the leading left-wing party in the country. In the period 1998-2006 year its representatives head
the government of the Czech Republic. In the elections of 2013 the party was first with 20.5
percent of the vote and 50 of 200 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (see Czech Republic
Chamber of Deputies Election Results data118). The party is critical of US foreign policy and
displays pro-Russian view, although the party leadership keeps a very low-profile on the
Crimean conflict and Russia’s involvement.
The Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (Czech: Akce nespokojených občanů, ANO) is a
centrist political party founded in 2012 and led by billionaire Andrej Babiš. In general, the party
does not adhere to any particular ideology, but uses public discontent following a series of
political scandals in the Czech Republic. Some argue, however, that the party is indeed opposed
to liberalism and democracy in general. Andrej Babiš is a former communist member turned
entrepreneur, who has surrounded himself with other former communist loyalists. Internally, the
party claims that it aims to relinquish corruption among the ranks of the police and prosecutor's
office that makes the party widely popular. Andrej Babiš is also positioning himself as a
successful and charismatic politician, who offers a different approach when compared to
traditional Czech politicians. Andrej Babiš’s appeal with the public is that he presents himself as
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a man of the people familiar with their interests and needs. In 2013 the party won 18.7 percent of
the votes and finished second in the parliamentary elections (see Czech Republic Chamber of
Deputies Election Results data119).
Because of the existence pro-Russian political support during the country’s EU accession
period since the Czech Communist Party and Czech Social-Democratic Party were founded in
1989 for the purpose of the analysis, this element is coded as 1 as of 1996 through 2004.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In the Czech Republic according to the PEW Research Center data120, the Muslim
population totaled around 4,000 that is less than 0.1 percent of the total population in 2010. By
the time of EU accession in 2004, the country’s Muslim population was 0.1 percent, which is
smaller than the average EU Muslim population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as
0 for the purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 200,000 Roma residing in the country as
of 2010 according to the European Commission data121. At time of accession, the Roma
population in the country made up 1.9 percent of the total population, which is less than the
average EU Roma population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose
of the analysis.
Conflict
There were no recorded wars that the Czech Republic participated in for the duration of
the EU’s existence according to COW’s data122, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is
coded as 0.
Boolean analysis for the Czech Republic
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9.7

Hungary
Hungary is country located in Central Europe whose capital is Budapest. Hungary

borders seven countries – Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Croatia, Serbia, Austria, and Slovenia.
Hungary’s terrain is made up mostly by plains with some mountains to the north. The total area
of Hungary is 35,912 square miles (or 93,011 square km) and a total population of 9,855,571 as
of 2015 that comprises a 1.9 percent share of the total EU population as of 2015. The political
system is parliamentary republic and Hungary is an EU member since May 1st of 2004. Hungary
has twenty-one European Parliament seats and held the revolving EU Council presidency once in
2011. Its official currency is Hungarian Forint (HUF) and is a member of the Schengen space
since December 21st of 2007123.
After the defeat of the Central Powers in the First World War, Austria and Hungary
declared independence. Mihai Karoyi became the president of the Hungarian republic, but the
new government failed to maintain the integrity of the country, which led to the fall of the
government in March 1919. This was the beginning of the six-month communist government,
which proclaimed the Hungarian Soviet Republic. The main pre-war and interwar objective of
the Hungarian governments was the return of its lost territories populated with ethnic Hungarians
to neighboring countries. With German and Italian aid in 1938 through 1941, Hungary managed
to recover about half of its lost territories. The price that Hungary paid for that, however, was
very high: the country entered the war and took on an active part in support of Germany.
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Participation in the war brought Hungary to defeat, loss of all recovered areas and three
additional villages given to Czechoslovakia and a huge number of military and civilian casualties
due to the deportation of over 450,000 Hungarian Jews to German death camps from April to
July 1944 and the subsequent Soviet occupation. In 1946 the monarchy was abolished and the
Republic of Hungary was declared. After the fall of Communism in 1989, Hungary became a
country with the lowest unemployment rate from all of its neighboring countries. It joined the
European Union in May 2004.
Pro-Russian political parties
Fidesz is a right-wing political party led by Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban. The
party was established in 1988. Fidesz, the current ruling party (see National Election Office
data124), is the biggest supporter of Russia in Hungary. After Viktor Orban’s coming to power,
Hungary pursues foreign policy that is independent from the European Community, particularly
with respect to Russia, with whom it cooperates closely in the fields of industry and energy as
well as supports politically. In July 2015 the party's leader Viktor Orban expressed that he wants
to create a less-liberal state in the EU, cultivate closer friendship with Russia, and plans to sue
the EU over the migrant quotas.
Jobbik is a far-right leaning political party led by Gabor Vona, who is the opposition
leader. The party was founded in 2003. Winner of one-fifth of the votes (11.56 percent of the
total mandates) in the most recent parliamentary elections in 2014125, Jobbik is avidly proRussian oriented. According to its leader, Russia is a guardian of European heritage, while the
EU is not. Bela Kovac, a member of Jobbik, actually openly supported the invasion of Crimea
and lobbies on behalf of Russian interests.
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Because of the existence pro-Russian political support during the country’s EU accession
period since Fidesz was founded in 1988 for the purpose of the analysis, this element is coded as
1 as of 1994 through 2004.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Hungary according to the PEW Research Center data126, the Muslim population totaled
around 25,000 that is 0.3 percent of the total population in 2010. By the time of EU accession in
2004, the country’s Muslim population was 0.2 percent, which is smaller than the average EU
Muslim population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the
analysis. There is an estimated 750,000 Roma residing in the country as of 2010 according to
the European Commission data127. At time of accession, the Roma population in the country
made up 7.49 percent of the total population, which is greater than the average EU Roma
population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
The Hungarian Uprising of 1956 was a revolutionary rebellion against the government of
the Hungarian People's Republic and its pro-Soviet policy, which lasted from October 23 to
November 10th, 1956. The uprising started as a peaceful student protest that was later joined by
thousands of citizens that passed through the center of Budapest on the way to the building of
Hungarian Parliament. The student delegation, who attempted to enter the building of the
national radio to broadcast their demands, was detained. When the majority of demonstrators still
standing outside requested that the students are released, the forces of state security inside the
building fired shots at the demonstrators. The news spread quickly, and with them the violence
and unrest in the capital. The uprising quickly spread throughout Hungary and the government
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capitulated. Thousands of people joined militias and began fighting with the forces of state
security. Pro-Soviet communists and police officers were executed or imprisoned, while
prisoners are armed and let out to fight along the demonstrators. Improvised militias seized
control of the municipalities of the ruling Workers Hungarian People's Party and put forward
their political demands. The new government officially disbanded the state security police,
proclaimed that Hungary wants to pull out from the Warsaw Pact, and promised to hold free
elections. In October fighting ended and peace resumed. However, after announcing willingness
to withdraw its Soviet troops from Hungary, the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union reversed its decision and prepared to suppress the Revolt. In the beginning of November
1956 a significant number of Soviet troops invaded Hungary. The Hungarian resistance persisted
until November 10th, but mass arrests and prosecutions continued throughout the following
months. In January 1957 the newly appointed Hungarian government by the USSR destroyed all
visible opposition and the uprising was crushed by the Soviet Red Army. These events
undoubtedly strengthened the political and military control of the USSR in Central Europe. Due
to the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 that occurred during EU’s existence according to
COW’s data128 for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 1.
Boolean analysis for Hungary
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9.8

Slovenia
Slovenia is a country in south-central Europe with capital Ljubljana. To the north

Slovenia borders Austria, to the west it borders Italy, to the northeast it borders Hungary, and to
the south and southeast it borders Croatia. Slovenia also has a 17 miles (43 km) coastline on the
Adriatic Sea between Croatia and Italy. The total area of Slovenia is 7,827 square miles (or
20,273 square km) and a total population of 2,062,874 that comprises a 0.4 percent share of the
total EU population as of 2015. The political system is parliamentary republic and Slovenia is an
EU member since May 1st of 2004. Slovakia holds eight European Parliament seats and has had
the revolving EU Council presidency once in 2008. Its official currency is the Euro and is a
Eurozone member since January 1st, 2007. Slovenia is also a member of the Schengen space
since December 21st, 2007129.
The State of Serbs, Slovenes, and Croats at the end of WWI and was the first incarnation
of Yugoslavia. In December 1918 the territory of Slovenia merged with the Kingdom of Serbs
that in 1929 became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During WWII Slovenia was occupied and split
between Hungary, Italy, Croatia, and Germany. After the end of WWII, Slovenia became a part
of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia. The contemporary Slovenian state emerged on
June 25th, 1991, after a ten-day war and disintegration from Yugoslavia. Although during its
transition period Slovenia went through a turbulent experience, its politicians managed to
successfully integrate the country with Western Europe and the country is now the richest
country of the former Yugoslav republics. It became a member of the European Union in 2004
and adopted the Euro at the beginning of 2007, which contributed to its substantial economic
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growth and stability. Today Slovenia is the richest of countries that transitioned from
government-owned to market economy in the 1990s.
Pro-Russian political parties
There is no substantial popular support for Pro-Russian political parties in Slovenia, so
for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 0.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Slovenia according to the PEW Research Center data130, the Muslim population totaled
around 49,000 that is 2.4 percent of the total population in 2010. By the time of its EU accession
in 2004, the country’s Muslim population was 1.5 percent, which is smaller than the average EU
Muslim population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the
analysis. There is an estimated 8,500 Roma residing in the country as of 2010 according to the
European Commission data131. At time of accession, the Roma population in the country made
up 0.41 percent of the total population, which is greater than the average EU Roma population of
2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
The Slovenian war for independence, also known as the Ten-day War, was an armed
conflict between the Slovenian Territorial Defense and the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) that
brought about the independence of Slovenia in 1991. Slovenia declared its independence
together with Croatia on June 25th, 1991. In the early hours of June 27th, the Yugoslav People's
Army troops were on the move and their antiaircraft regiment based in Croatia entered Slovenian
territory. Within a few hours an YPA column of armored vehicles and tanks seized control of
Slovenia’s airport Brnik. The Yugoslav Air Force placed propaganda leaflets over several
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regions in Slovenia with the messages calling for end of Slovenian’s resistance. The Slovenian
territorial defense attacked and took over the YPA’s troop positions at the Brnik airport.
Simultaneously, a heavy battle erupted in Tartsin where there were military casualties on both
sided and the YPA was forced to surrender. Slovenian forces also carried out successful attacks
on tank columns of the YPA. In the days that followed the local resistance, Slovenian forces
carried out multiple attacks against the YPA, gradually taking over all sites under YPA’s control.
The YPA was permitted to withdraw from Slovenia between July 4th and 6th and on July 7th
both sides signed the Brioni agreement that ended the war. Due to the 1991 conflict on Slovenian
territory that occurred during EU’s existence according to COW’s data132 for the purpose of the
analysis this element is coded as 1.
Boolean analysis for Slovenia

9.9

Malta
Malta is a one of the world’s most densely populated states. It is situated on an

archipelago of five islands in the center of the Mediterranean Sea with a capital Valletta. Malta is
located to north of Libya, east of Tunisia, and to the south of Italy. The total area of Malta is 121
square miles (or 315 square km) and a total population of 429,344 that comprises a 0.1 percent
share of the total EU population as of 2015. The political system is parliamentary republic and
Malta is an EU member since May 1st of 2004. Malta holds six European Parliament seats and
will assume the revolving EU Council presidency in 2017 for the first time. Its official currency
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is the Euro and is a Eurozone member since January 1st, 2008 and a member of the Schengen
space since December 21st of 2007133.
The Phoenicians were the first to discover the strategic importance of the archipelago that
comprises Malta during their colonization of the western Mediterranean. The area was
subsequently conquered by Rome, Byzantium, the Arab Caliphate, Aragon, the Normans, the
Order of Malta, France, and Britain, all of which were looking for the accessibility of ports in
order to control the Mediterranean. Even though the islands are geographically part of Africa and
are situated on the African continental plate, culturally and historically they are part of Europe.
Up until the 1960s, the Maltese economy was dedicated to the operation and maintenance of the
British fleet in the Mediterranean. Malta gained independence from Britain in 1964 and became
an EU member in 2004. Based on population and size, Malta is the smallest member state of the
EU.
Pro-Russian political parties
There is no substantial popular support for Pro-Russian political parties in Malta, so for
the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 0.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Malta according to the PEW Research Center data134, the Muslim population totaled
around 1,000 that is 0.3 percent of the total population in 2010. By the time of EU accession in
2004, the country’s Muslim population was 0.2 percent, which is smaller than the average EU
Muslim population of 2.18 percent in the EU up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose
of the analysis. There is no known numbers of Roma residing in the country as of 2010

133
134

http://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/malta_en
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/

183

according to the European Commission data135. At time of accession, the Roma population in the
country made up 0 percent of the total population, which is smelled than the average EU Roma
population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Malta participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data136, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis for Malta

9.10 Cyprus
Cyprus in an island located in the northern part of the Mediterranean Sea with a capital
Nicosia. Located south of Turkey is it also one of the smallest member states in the EU after
Luxembourg and Malta. Cyprus became a part of the EU with a special status of a divided
territory. The Turkish Cypriots are citizens of the EU who live on the territory that is not a part
of the EU, since it is not under Cypriot governmental control. The total area of Cyprus is 3,571
square miles (or 9,251 square km) and a total population of 847,008 as of 2015 that comprises a
0.2 percent share of the total EU population as of 2015. The political system is presidential
republic and Cyprus is an EU member since May 1st of 2004. Cyprus holds six European
Parliament seats and has held the revolving EU Council presidency once in 2012. Its official
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currency is the Euro and is a Eurozone member since January 1st, 2008. Cyprus is not a
Schengen space member.
Until 1960 Cyprus was a colony of Great Britain, but even after receiving is
independence, the island was still the home of two military bases under the jurisdiction of the
United Kingdom. In 1974, after a brief period of violence between Greeks and Turks, nearly a
third of the island was occupied by Turkish troops. Thousands of Greek Cypriots were forced to
flee overnight from their homes in the south, lose all their possessions and never to return to their
homes. The occupied territories were separated by the Green Line that was 180 kilometer long
and guarded by UN troops. This border runs through the capital Nicosia, the last divided capital
in the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The situation is Cyprus is still unresolved today.
Pro-Russian political parties
The Progressive Party of Working People (Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú,
AKEL) is a left-leaning party led by Andros Kyprianou. AKEL was established in 1926 as the
Communist Party of Cyprus. In regards to the conflict in Cyprus, AKEL supports independent
and demilitarized Cyprus with emphasis on appeasement with Turkish Cypriots. AKEL initially
backed UN’s Annan Plan in 2004, which entailed Cyprus would be a federation of two states, but
eventually reacted with a negative response. Since AKEL had significant support base, this
largely contributed to Greek Cypriots’ failure to ratify Annan’s plan in 2004 at the national
referendum. The reason for this response was the pro-Russian orientation of AKEL’s then-leader
Christofias. Christofias who became AKEL’s leader in 1988 managed not only to steer AKEL to
safety after the collapse of the USSR, but also to increase AKEL’s support base. At the same
time, his close ideological connections to Moscow lead him to closely coordinate AKEL’s
political positions with the Kremlin. Since the Turko-Cypriot war in 1974, when the island was
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split in two halves of Greek and Turkish influence, Russia’s position on the issue has been
always for appeasement with the Turkish side, since Russia perceives Turkey as a very valuable
trade partner. For Russia, the failure to solve the Cypriot issue would only drive Turkey away
from EU aspirations and closer to Russia’s sphere of influence. In 2013 Andros Kyprianou stated
that AKEL is considering leaving the Eurozone, but that requires careful planning. Today, AKEL
still maintains its popularity on the polls by finishing second in the parliamentary elections of
2016 with 25.67 percent of the mandate (see Ministry of the Interior of Cyprus data137).
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Cyprus according to the PEW Research Center data138, the Muslim population totaled
around 200,000 that is 22.7 percent of the total population in 2010. By the time of EU accession
in 2004, the country’s Muslim population was 0.3 percent, which is smaller than the average EU
Muslim population of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the
analysis. There is an estimated 1,250 Roma residing in the country as of 2010 according to the
European Commission data139. At time of accession, the Roma population in the country made
up 0.11 percent of the total population, which is less than the average EU Roma population of
2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
On November 1967, following an armed attack against Turkish Cypriot villages in the
southern part of the island that killed twenty-seven civilians, Turkey bombed some regions in the
Greek part of Cyprus and prepared a military intervention. Greece was forced to surrender. After
an international intervention, Greece agreed to recall the commander of the Greek Cypriot
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National Guard and reduce its military forces on the island. Taking advantage of the weakness of
the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots declared their independence on December 28th, 1967. In
May 1968 negotiations began between the two communities under the auspices of the UN
Secretary General, but very little progress was made. Before being able to negotiate a permanent
ceasefire, one third of the island fell under the control of the Turkish army. The division of the
island was marked by the UN buffer zone referred to as the "Green Line" stretching from east to
west through the island. The effect of this division was disastrous and in the process hundreds of
Cypriot Greeks and Turks were killed, wounded or disappeared, and two hundred-thousand
Greek and Turkish Cypriots were displaced or fled. In 1994 the EU affirmed its decision to add
Cyprus in the next enlargement. Even though the leaders of Northern Cyprus, the area controlled
by the ethnic-Turkish government, condemned this decision, the EU did not change its stance.
EU’s reasoning was that Northern Cyprus did not exhibit and promote pro-democratic values and
development, because the political system was under the control of the Turkish military, while
the part of the island controlled by the ethnic-Greek government demonstrated strong prodemocratic indicators and promoted democratic values. After a referendum, only the Greek part
of Cyprus joined the EU. In 2007, parts of the border were destroyed in the southern part of the
island. At the onset of negotiations for Turkey's accession to the EU, Brussels put the
precondition for the withdrawal of Turkey’s military forces from Cyprus, but the issues is yet to
be resolved. Due to the 1974 conflict on Cyprus’ territory that occurred during EU’s existence
according to COW’s data140 for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 1.
Boolean analysis for Cyprus
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9.11 Boolean analysis of Wave 5

Figure 9.11.1 Compilation of factors that impede EU accession speed in Wave 5

Figure 9.11.1 is a compilation of the additional factors that affect EU accession speed for
all ten states that joined the EU in Wave 5. Accession Wave 5 is rather incoherent and displays a
multitude of factors that impede EU accession speed. The grid’s highest concentration nodules
are found in the first and second rows. There are also altogether eight branches and two distinct
types of states that are observed in this wave – states with pro-Russian parties, which are present
in the majority of the grid for a total of 63.55 percent, and states with none of the factors that
make up 28.04 percent of the observations. From the states that have pro-Russian parties, the
biggest concentration in the category and in the grid overall is found on row 1 for states that only
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have strong popular support for pro-Russian parties at 30.84 percent, while 32.71 percent of the
cases were a part of armed conflict, only 18.69 percent of these also have Roma minorities, and
none of the cases had Muslim population that exceeded the EU average. With all this in mind, it
appears that the pro-Russian orientation of the states is a prominent feature in Wave 5, which can
be reasonably expected since the majority of the states accessed in this wave were former
Communist bloc members. Ultimately, the accession of Wave 5 was slower than previous
accession waves despite of the ten states’ positive pro-democratic and economic performance
(see Figure 9.11.2 below) during their application process due to the fact that they brought over
factors that impede accession speed, namely lingering pro-Russian sentiment. All of this
provides a valuable explanation for H4.
Next, I will compare Waves 2, 3, 4, and 5 for presence of additional factors that impeded
EU accession.

Figure 9.11.2 Comparison of factors that impede EU accession speeded in Wave 2 and
Wave 3 and Wave 4 and Wave 5
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In Figure 9.11.2 above, I examine the structures of additional factors that impede EU
accession speed for Waves 2, 3, 4, and 5 again by comparing the waves’ coherence. At a glance,
it is obvious that the states accessed in Wave 2 had a lot in common and were overall very
coherent as far as displaying a minimal number of factors that impede EU accession speed in
only one variety (one pathway). The states accessed in Wave 3 also had a lot in common, but
were overall a little less coherent, since they displayed two instead of one branch with higher
concentration towards the bottom rows. The states accessed in Wave 4 also had a lot in common,
but were overall a little less coherent than the previous waves, since they displayed two instead
of one branch with higher concentration towards the top rows. The states accessed in Wave 5 are
very incoherent in the variety of factors that they bring, since they displayed eight branches with
higher concentration towards the first and second rows. Never-the-less, a prominent feature in
Wave 5 is the presence of pro-Russian support, which include roughly two-thirds of the cases.
Most of the states in all waves other than Wave 5 had Roma populations that exceeded the Roma
population in the EU at the time of their accession. Overall, the comparison of the structures
shows that Wave 5 produced the most complicated structure of factors that impede EU
accession. From Figure 9.11.2 above it can be deduced that very few of the factors that impede
EU accession speed are present in either Waves 2 or 3. Also, a gradual increase in factors that
impede EU accession is observed between Wave 2, 3, 4 and 5 which is a more accurate
explanation of the waves’ sequential placement in time than the states’ pro-democratic
performance during their application period. This is indicative that speed of accession into the
EU of Wave 5 was slower than previous accession waves, despite of the states’ positive prodemocratic and economic performance during their application process due to the fact that they
brought over factors that impede accession speed, such as pro-Russian sentiments and conflict,
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which lends support for H4. Had there been no additional consideration outside of the prodemocratic developments of the states, then the application duration for the later waves, such as
Wave 5, should be proportionate to their pro-democratic development. This is not what we
observe here and the additional factors discussed above provide a valuable explanation as to why
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Malta, and
Cyprus were accessed at a slower speed (see Figure 9.11.3 below).

Average Values per Accession Wave

Average GDP per capita (ln) and EU Application Duration per Acccession Wave

Frozen

Wave 4

Wave 5

Pending

Wave 3

Wave 6

Wave 2

Wave 1

Waves of EU Accession
Average of GDP per capita (ln)

Average of application duration

Figure 9.11.3 Compilation of pro-democratic development and application duration by
wave compared to Wave 5
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10 WAVE 6: ACCESSION OF THE EAST-CENTRAL BALKANS
Chapter 10 consist of analysis of accession of the East-Central Balkan members and will
evaluate why the established member states were hesitant with EU expansion towards the
Balkans. The general perception is that they were eager to let the Southern and somewhat
guarded when letting Eastern European member states in, but were reluctant to let in the Balkan
member states. This analysis will include the accession of Wave 6 (adding Bulgarian and
Romania 2007) and Croatia (2013). After the historical and political overview review, I will
conduct the analysis of hypothesis five (H5). The question I will answer here is: Why was the
EU less keen to add the Balkan states of Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia to the EU?
In this chapter I suggest that earlier waves of accession of new member states exhibit
lower expectations of democratic and economic development and shorter timeframe of accession
into the EU in the following hypothesis:

Accession of the Central Balkans (H5): Despite of their positive pro-democratic and
economic performance accession of the Balkan states of Bulgaria, Romania (2004), and
Croatia (2013) in Wave 6 was slower than previous accession waves and with unequal
membership rights due to the fact that they brought over factors that impede accession
speed.

Bulgaria concluded its negotiations for joining the EU in June of 2004 and signed the
accession contract on April 25th of 2005. Romania completed its EU negotiations in December
2004 and also signed the accession contract on April 25th of 2005. Both countries became official
members, of the EU on January 1st of 2007, but were subjected to unequal membership terms
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because of the employment ban in established member states for Bulgarian and Romanian citizen
that was discussed in earlier chapters. The second phase of the Balkan expansion included
Croatia, who submitted its application for membership in the EU in 2003 and the European
Commission recommended that it be made an official applicant in 2004. Croatia became an EU
member on July 1st of 2013. The accession of all three states into the Eurozone, however, will
also require a longer period.

10.1 Bulgaria
Bulgaria is a located in the south-eastern Balkans with a capital Sofia. The country
borders Romania to the north, the Black Sea to the east, Serbia and Macedonia to the west, and
Turkey, and Greece to the south. The northern part of the country is mostly lowlands, as the
Danube flows into the Black sea and forms a natural border with Romania. In the south, the
terrain is mostly dominated by highlands and higher plains, with the Balkan Mountains passing
through the middle of the country. The total area of Bulgaria is 42,614 square miles (or 110,370
square km) and a total population of 7,202,198 as of 2015 that comprises a 1.4 percent share of
the total EU population as of 2015. The political system is parliamentary republic and Bulgaria is
an EU member since January 1st of 2007. Bulgaria holds seventeen European Parliament seats
and will take over the revolving EU Council presidency for the first time in 2018. Its official
currency is the Bulgarian lev (BGN) and is not a Eurozone or Schengen space member141.
In 1878, after almost a century of cultural and economic renaissance, unsuccessful
rebellions and diplomatic struggles, Bulgaria’s statehood was restored in the form of monarchy
and was freed from five centuries of Ottoman domination by the Russian Empire. However, its
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territory was not fully restored, so in an effort to regain these territories Bulgaria became
involved a series of wars with its neighbors and allied with Germany during the two world wars,
but a successful political or military resolution of the issue was never found. In result, Bulgaria
experienced a couple of significant refugee influxes, in particular after the Angora agreement
was signed in 1925 between Bulgaria and Turkey. After the signing of the agreement Bulgaria
officially gave up claims to its territories in Thrace, which remained in modern day Turkey. In
effect more than 250,000 displaced Bulgarian refugees traveled on foot from the territories to the
Bulgarian border. The same agreement was also signed between Greece and Bulgaria in 1927
and Bulgaria was also given monetary compensation for the displacement of the Bulgarian
population in Greek territory. Greece used the opportunity to chase away all of the voluntary
remaining Bulgarians out of their homes in Greece. In 1933 Adolph Hitler’s National Socialist
party came to power in Germany and this put the winners of WWI in a race for influence on the
Balkans. In the meantime, the political atmosphere in Bulgaria was characterized by political
instability and animosity. In 1934 there was a military coup in Bulgaria that led to the creation of
a military government, which abolished political participation and parliamentary functions and
the army was completely in charge. This military government created the foundation for the
authoritarian regime of King Boris III. During this period, the Bulgarian political community
was surprised that the Bulgarian government sought political contact with USSR, but were not
aware that that was done under pressure from Germany. In 1940, Bulgaria was “invited” by
Germany to join their pact with Italy and Japan and was given only two days for consideration.
This put Bulgaria in a very uncomfortable political position since it meant that Bulgaria may be
involved in yet another war on the Balkans if any of its neighbors decided not to join Germany
and Italy. With these considerations in mind, the Bulgarian King Boris III declined to be a part of
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the pact. However, he was pressured to reconsider and accepted after Hitler promised him the
return of Vardar Macedonia and Aegean Thrace that were taken away from Bulgaria shortly after
it supported Germany under similar circumstances in WWI. After Germany’s defeat in WWII,
the territories were lost and in 1946 the monarchy was replaced by a coup with a People's
Republic, a Soviet puppet state ruled by the Bulgarian Communist Party. The socialist system
existed until 1990, after which Bulgaria embarked on the road to liberal democracy and market
economy. In 2004 the country joined NATO in 2007 the European Union.
Pro-Russian political parties
Ataka is a political party led by Volen Siderov that uses right-wing populist rhetoric to
win the sympathy of voters and is politically oriented towards nationalism. Ataka is defined by
its leaders as the antipode of the party Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) that they
proclaim is an ethic party, which is unconstitutional, and separatist, since it is politically and
financially supported by Turkey. Nevertheless, according to the statement of Siderov, Ataka
provided political support for the 2009 coalition government of the Bulgarian Socialist party and
the MRF. Formally committed to pro-liberal democratic change in Bulgaria, the party currently
openly expresses pro-Russian sentiment, demanding full military neutrality of the country, nonparticipation in any military blocs, and exit from NATO. In the general elections in 2009, Ataka
finished fourth with 9.4 percent of the votes and 23 seats in parliament. In the 2013 elections the
results were slightly less favorable with 7.3 percent of the votes and 21 seats in parliament (see
Bulgarian Election Commission results142).
The Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) is the center-left social-democratic political party
in Bulgaria with Kornelia Ninova as chairman. It is the offspring of the Bulgarian Communist
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Party that later transformed into the BSP on April 3rd, 1990. BSP is also a member of the Party
of European Socialists (PES). As a successor of the Bulgarian Communist Party, BSP openly
supports pro-Russian political views. After 1989, the BSP participated in all elections in Bulgaria
and is represented in Parliament, has formed multiple governments and participated in various
coalitions with other political parties and movements sequentially from 37th to 43rd National
Assembly. The BSP has six representatives in the European Parliament since January 1, 2007. In
the general elections in 2009, BSP finished second with Coalition for Bulgaria with 17.7 percent
of the votes and 40 seats in parliament. In the 2013 elections, the Coalition for Bulgaria and the
BSP finished second with 26.6 percent of the votes and 84 seats in parliament (see Bulgarian
Election Commission results143) and in the 2017 elections the BSP (BSP for Bulgaria) finished
second again with 27.93 percent of the votes (see Bulgarian Election Commission results144). In
addition, the BSP supported the winning candidate Rumen Radev in the 2016 presidential
elections (see Bulgarian Election Commission results145), whose views are sympathetic to
Russia. During her visit to Moscow in June 2016, BSP’s leader Kornelia Ninova reportedly
received the Kremlin’s recommendation to support a candidate who is openly sympathetic to
Moscow and supports the removal of the western sanctions against Russia146. In Bulgaria, where
there is a significant popular support for democracy and EU membership, an influential political
figure such as a president who is pro-Kremlin oriented can provide the necessary leverage to
begin a slow process of reversing some of the processes of EU and transatlantic integration.
Because of the existence of the BSP since 1990, for the purpose of the analysis, this
element is coded as 1 for the duration of the entire EU application period from 1995 to 2007.
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Muslim and Roma minorities
In Bulgaria according to the PEW Research Center data147, the Muslim population totaled
around 1,002,000 that is 13.4 percent of the total population by 2010. By the time of EU
accession in 2007, the country’s Muslim population was 13.1 percent, which is larger than the
average EU Muslim population of 1.49 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the
purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 750,000 Roma residing in the country as of 2010
according to the European Commission data148. At time of accession, the Roma population in the
country made up 9.94 percent of the total population, which is less than the average EU Roma
population of 0.81 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Bulgaria participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data149, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis for Bulgaria

10.2 Romania
Romania is located in Southeastern Europe and its capital is Bucharest. In the southern
part of the country, the Danube River forms a delta into the Black sea, while the northern and
central regions of the country are dominated by the Carpathian Mountains. Romania borders
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Bulgaria to the south, Hungary to the west, Ukraine to the north, Serbia to the southwest, and
Moldova and Ukraine to the east. The total area of Romania is 92,043 square miles (or 238,391
square km) and a total population of 19,870,647 as of 2015 that comprises a 3.9 percent share of
the total EU population as of 2015. The political system is semi-presidential republic and
Romania is a member of the EU since January 1st, 2007. Romania holds thirty-two European
Parliament seats and will assume the rotating EU Council presidency for the first time in 2019.
Its official currency is the Romanian Leu (RON) and is not a member of the Euro zone or the
Schengen space150.
During the 16th century Romania fell under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, but
maintained some internal autonomy. In 1859 Alexandru Ioan Cuza became the ruler of the
Principality of Wallachia and Moldova and in 1861 he declared the independence of the State of
Romania. Romania entered into World War I in 1916 on the side of the Entente and became a
German protectorate after the Entente promised to meet Romania’s significant territorial and
economic conditions that included promises of territories in Hungary beyond Romania’s ethnic
line. In April of 1919 Romanian troops entered Hungarian territory and occupied Budapest.
During WWII, Romania supported Germany and in result three-hundred thousand Romanian
Jews were massacred. After WWII, Romania was dominated by the Romanian Communist Party
until 1989, then the Romanian dictator Nikolae Ceausescu was forcefully removed from power,
tried, and executed. Having previously joined the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank in 1972, Romania was one of the founders of the World Trade Organization. From
December 1989 Romania follows a policy of strengthening relations with the West. The country
joined the NATO on March 29th, 2004 and the European Union in January 1st of 2007. The
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current government declared its goal to also strengthen relations by helping other neighboring
countries.
Pro-Russian political parties
The Social Democratic Party (Romanian: Partidul Social Democrat, PSD) is a centerleft party in Romania led by Liviu Dragnea. It was founded in January 2001 by a merger of the
Party of Social Democracy in Romania and the Romanian Social Democratic Party. In the 2012
parliamentary elections the PSD appeared as a part of the Social Liberal Union (Romanian:
Uniunea Social Liberală, USL), a political union of Romania’s center-left and center-right
opposition parties that was established on 5 February 2011. The coalition won the parliamentary
elections December 9th, 2012 by a landslide with 58.6 percent of the vote and 273 seats in the
Chamber of Deputies and 122 seats for the Senate (see Romania's Central Electoral Bureau
results151). During the election campaign, the incumbent conservative president of Romania
Traian Basescu prepared the ground for the upcoming political conflict and tried to present his
opponents from the PSD in the worst possible light by suggesting that the leaders of the SocialLiberal Union are directly appointed by Moscow. Basescu urged voters to vote for those who
will keep their strategic partnership with the US and would not align the political course of
Romania with Moscow and Beijing. Basescu’s right–wing sympathizers were very supportive of
his stance152. Basescu’s party claimed that during the impeachment procedures for president
Basescu, the radio station Voice of Russia gave explicit guidance to the leaders of the Social
Liberal Union on how to destabilize the country and force the president to submit resignation.
This pro-Russian support was aimed at intensifying the political convergence of Romania with
Russia in order to sway Romania away from NATO and the US, slow down the reform of
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Romania’s corrupt justice system, and aid Romania’s participation in the South Stream gas
project funded by the Kremlin. In the end, Romania’s president Traian Basescu, appointed his
winning political rival from the PSD Victor Ponta as Prime Minister, hoping that the economic
crisis will quickly destroy support for the Social Liberal Union. Basescu’s allegations of proRussian connections of Ponta and the Social-Liberal Union obviated the importance of the region
for pro-Russian interests. Currently, the PSD is still the country’s leading political party
represented by 103 mandates in the lower chamber of the Romanian Parliament and 47 seats in
the Senate and ranks first in the local elections (see Romania's Central Electoral Bureau
results153).
Because of the existence of this party for the purpose of the analysis, this element is
coded as 1 as of 2001 and 2007 when the PSD was established and is coded as 0 from 1995 to
2000, when there were no pro-Russian political parties in existence in Romania.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Romania according to the PEW Research Center data154, the Muslim population
totaled around 73,000 that is 0.3 percent of the total population by 2010. By the time of its EU
accession in 2007, the country’s Muslim population was 0.20 percent, which is smaller than the
average EU Muslim population of 1.49 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the
purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 1,850,000 Roma residing in the country as of 2010
according to the European Commission data155. At time of accession, the Roma population in the
country made up 8.63 percent of the total population, which is more than the average EU Roma
population of 0.81 up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
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Conflict
The Romanian War, also referred to as the Romanian Revolution, took place between the
16th and 22nd of December, 1989 and is the armed resistance that took down the Communist
regime in Romania. Leader of the Romanian revolution was Ion Iliescu. The first protests against
the Romania’s communist dictatorship of Nicolae Ceausescu erupted in Timisoara. On
December 16th, a protest broke out as a reaction to the eviction of Hungarian pastor Laszlo
Tokes by the government. For a short time much of his parish collected around his home to
protect him from eviction. Subsequently many more joined the protest. Soon it became clear that
the crowd would not disperse and Timisoara’s Mayor Peter Motz claimed that he changed his
mind and will not evict Tokes. After the mayor refused to confirm this decision in a written
statement, the crowd became impatient and started singing anti-communist slogans.
Subsequently, the police security forces appeared at the scene. By the evening, the protest spread
and the original purpose shifted to anti-communist one. Some of the protesters tried to burn the
building that houses the local section of the Romanian Communist Party. On December 18th,
1989 Ceausescu went to Iran and on his return on December 20th, he gave a speech on live
television from a studio in the building of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist
Party. In his speech he described the events in Timisoara as interference and external aggression
of foreign powers in Romania. In the morning of December 21st Ceausescu spoke in front of the
approximately 110,000 people assembled in protest to condemn the riots in Timisoara. During
his speech, the fringes of the crowd suddenly started to move, frightened by what sounded
reportedly as weapons firing. The assembled crowd became terrified and started to disperse and
rumors spread that the police security forces shot at the crowd. This gave the reason for many
more people to join and the gathering turned into a protest demonstration. In the evening the
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government declared martial law and a banned gathering of groups larger than 5 people, but
nevertheless thousands gathered spontaneously in downtown Bucharest. Ceausescu tried to speak
to the crowd from the balcony of the building of the Central Committee of the Romanian
Communist Party, but his attempts are met with waves of discontent and anger. On December
22nd Ceausescu and his family attempted to flee, but they were arrested by local police at and
were taken to the military garrison of Targovishte and were held captive for several days. On
December 24 Ion Iliescu headed the newly-established Council of National Salvation Front and
signed a declaration to set up an extraordinary military tribunal to prosecute Ceausescu and his
wife. The process took place on December 25th and lasted for about two hours and ended with a
death penalty conviction for Ceausescu and his wife Elena. Their executions was carried out
immediately and were shown on live television in Romania and other countries. Romania is the
only former Eastern European socialist country where the regime was overthrown with violence
which resulted in the death of over one thousand people. Due to the 1989 conflict on Romanian
territory that occurred during EU’s existence according to COW’s data156 for the purpose of the
analysis this element is coded as 1.
Boolean analysis for Romania

10.3 Croatia
Croatia is a country in Southeast Europe with a capital Zagreb. It borders Hungary and
Slovenia to the north, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro to the east, and in the
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southwest it has a coastline with the Adriatic Sea. The total area of Croatia is 21,851 square
miles (or 56,594 square km) and a total population of 4,225,316 that comprises a 0.8 percent
share of the total EU population as of 2015. The political system is parliamentary republic and
Croatia is an EU member since July 1st, 2013. Croatia holds eleven European Parliament seats
and will assume the rotating EU Council presidency for the first time in the first half of 2020. Its
official currency is the Croatian Kuna (HRK) and is not a Eurozone or Schengen space
member157.
At the end of 1918, after World War I and the collapse of Austria-Hungary, Croatia
became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (CXC), while its territories of Istria,
Rijeka, and Zadar remained under Italian rule. The Kingdom of CXC was renamed in 1929 as
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The Independent State of Croatia that existed between 1941 and
1945 was founded in the beginning of World War II. After the end of WWII, Croatia became
part of socialist Yugoslavia. In 1991, one year after the first democratic elections, Croatia
declared its independence. In the same year, Croatia started a war with the Yugoslavian troops,
which ended in 1995. In 1992 Croatia became a UN member and in 2008 NATO sent a letter to
Croatia, inviting the country to begin formal negotiations to join the organization. On April 1st,
2009 the country became a member of NATO and on July 1, 2013 Croatia joined the EU.
Pro-Russian political parties
The Croatian Democratic Union (Croatian: Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) is a
center-right leaning political party led by Andrej Plenković. The party was founded in 1989. In
1990, the HDZ won absolute majority in the first multiparty elections in Croatia, which allowed
it to pass the new constitution that enabled the Croatian independence referendum. During the
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war in Bosnia and Herzegovina there were multiple political currents within the party, such as a
group who advocated end to aggressive policy in Bosnia and a group for whom the economic
recovery of Croatia was a top priority. The multitude of scandals that rocked the HDZ since 2009
had a substantial effect on Croatian society, since the HDZ is considered one of the founding
entities of the Croatian state and was the catalyst for gaining the Croatian independence from the
former Yugoslavia. In 2016 Ivo Sanader’s successor in office Tomislav Karamarko became a
part of scandal with geopolitical proportions when it was revealed that one of the donors of the
HDZ is a foundation backed by Russian capital of unknown origin158. The companies that
provided the capital were represented by Oksana Dvinskih, a Croatian citizen of Ukrainian origin
and a close friend's the Karamarko family. Her name also appeared as a part of a company that
put in a bid to participate in a lucrative nuclear energy project in Finland. The Finnish
authorities, however, rejected the company’s bid because of suspicion of Russian financial
support of Dvinskih’s Croatian company, since Finland interpreted this as a Russian attempt to
circumvent EU sanctions against Russia. Allegedly Oksana Dvinskih’s foundation New
Generation donated approximately 350,000 Euros to the HDZ. Through all this, the attitude of
the Croats towards Russia has not been as sensitive as it is in Bulgaria, Serbia, or the Baltic
states, for example and HDZ sympathizers see nothing wrong in maintaining positive trade
relations with Russia, since Croatia was never a part of Russian occupation. As a part of former
Yugoslavia, Croatia lived in a sheltered environment in a state that managed to maintain relative
neutrality during the Cold War. However, after the outbreak of this latest scandal, the electorate
is beginning to form a different perspective of the statement of Serbian Prime Minister
Aleksandar Vucic in 2016 who stated that if HDZ comes to power, Serbia and Croatia will enjoy
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better cooperation159. Vucic's party and HDZ are both in the right political spectrum, but after the
latest scandalous revelations it appears that both parties may be closely connected to Russia. In
2016 parliamentary elections the party headed the center-right HDZ Coalition that finished first
in the election with 36.27 percent of the vote and 59 out of 151 seats in parliament (see State
Election Committee of the Republic of Croatia website160).
Because of the existence of this party for the purpose of the analysis, this element is
coded as 1 as of 2012 and 2013 when the HDZ was established and is coded as 0 from 2003 to
2011, when there were no pro-Russian political parties in existence in Croatia.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Croatia according to the PEW Research Center data161, the Muslim population totaled
around 56,000 that is 1.3 percent of the total population by 2010. By the time of EU accession in
2013, the country’s Muslim population was 1.1 percent, which is smaller than the average EU
Muslim population of 1.49 percent in the EU up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose
of the analysis. There is an estimated 35,000 Roma residing in the country as of 2010 according
to the European Commission data162. At time of accession, the Roma population in the country
made up 0.79 percent of the total population, which is less than the average EU Roma population
of 0.81 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 0 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
The Croatian War of Independence (also known as the War of Srpska Krajina) is
violent armed conflict between Serbs and Croats that killed about 12,000 Croats and 9,000 Serbs
that began in 1991 and ended in 1995. The war in Croatia began with the breach of the
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Constitution of Yugoslavia by Croatia that unilaterally declared independence from Yugoslavia
in 1991. Initially, the war was fought between the forces of the Yugoslav People's Army, the
Croatian Serbs, and the Croatian police. The Yugoslav Federal Army forces attempted to
maintain Croatia as a part of the country. During the collapse of the country, a self-proclaimed
Serb state, the Republic of Serbian Krajina, was created. This was the beginning of the struggle
between the Croatian army and the army of the Krajina Serbs. In 1992, an agreement was signed
for a cease-fire, and was followed by the recognition of Croatia as a sovereign state. UN
peacekeeping troops were deployed in Croatia. In 1995, the Croatian army launched two major
military attacks, as a result of which a considerable part of the territory of the Republic of
Serbian Krajina came under Croatian control. The war ended with the signing of the Erdut and
Dayton Accords, according to which Eastern Slavonia was incorporated into Croatia in 1998.
The conflict was accompanied by mutual ethnic cleansing of the Serb and Croatian population.
As a result of the war Croatia gained its independence and the preservation of its territorial
integrity. During the fighting, many towns and villages were severely damaged or destroyed. A
large number of Croatian refugees were expelled from the territories controlled by the Serbs in
1991-92. At the same time, according to reports of the UN Commissariat for Refugees, by 1993
only in the territories under the control of Zagreb thousands of Serbs were expelled. Another
large flow of Serbian refugees numbering in the hundreds of thousands was recorded in 1995
after Operation Storm, a combined military effort between Bosnia and Herzegovina that aimed to
end the existence of the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Another estimated hundred thousand Serb
refugees after the war have returned to Croatia. At present, Serbia and Croatia relations are
improving, but are still complicated by the lawsuits filed in international courts against each
other. In 2015 the ICJ dismissed the genocide claims of both sides. The International Criminal
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Tribunal of Former Yugoslavia pronounced Milan Martić guilty of collaborating with Slobodan
Milošević and between 2008 and 2012 it also prosecuted a couple of Croatian generals, who
were subquery acquitted. An important pre-condition for opening negotiations with Croatia to
join was the surrender of Croatian General Ante Gotovina to the UN International Criminal
Tribunal at Hague for war crimes committed during the Yugoslav War. In 2011, Ante Gotovina
was convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal to 24 years in prison for war crimes and
crimes against humanity, but in 2012 he was acquitted in a re-trial and Croatia officially joined
the EU in 2013.
Due to the Croatian Independence War 1991-1995 and the Croatia-Krajina War of
1995 on Croatian territory that occurred during EU’s existence according to COW’s data163 for
the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 1.
Boolean analysis for Croatia
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10.4 Boolean analysis of Wave 6

Figure 10.4.1 Compilation of factors that impede EU accession speed in Wave 6

Figure 10.4.1 is a compilation of the additional factors that affect EU accession speed for
all three states that joined the EU in Wave 6. In the case of accession of states in Wave 6, over
70.28 percent had pro-Russian parties and Roma minorities that exceeded the EU average at the
time of their EU accession (see third tier nodules 1110 at 35.14 percent and 1011 at 35.14
percent). The presence of conflict in the states accessed in Wave 6 is observed in almost half of
the cases at 64.9 percent. The grid is limited to three branches in the second and third rows and
the highest concentration nodules that total 70.28 percent are found on the third row. Overall, the
wave is rather coherent, but possesses a high concentration of factors that impede EU accession
speed, which provides support for H5. Ultimately, this means that accession into the EU with
unequal membership rights for the Bulgaria, Romania (2004), and Croatia (2013) was slower
than previous accession waves despite of their positive pro-democratic and economic
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performance during their application process due to the fact that they brought over factors that
impede accession speed.
Next, I will compare Waves 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 for presence of additional factors that
impeded EU accession.

Figure 10.4.2 Comparison of factors that impede EU accession speeded in Wave 2, Wave
3, Wave 4, Wave 5, and Wave 6

In Figure 10.4.2 above, I examine the structures of additional factors that impede EU
accession speed for Waves 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 again by comparing the waves’ coherence. At a
glance, it is obvious that the states accessed in Wave 2 had a lot in common and were overall
very coherent as far as displaying a minimal number of factors in only one pathway that impede
EU accession speed. The states accessed in Wave 3 also had a lot in common, but were overall a
little less coherent, since they displayed two instead of one branch with higher concentration
towards the bottom rows. The states accessed in Wave 4 also had a lot in common, but were
overall a little less coherent than the previous waves, since they displayed two instead of one
branch with higher concentration towards the top rows. The states accessed in Wave 5 are very

209

incoherent in the variety of factors that they bring, since they displayed eight branches with
higher concentration towards the first and second row. Never-the-less, a prominent feature in
Wave 5 is the presence of pro-Russian parties, which include roughly two-thirds of the cases.
The states accessed in Wave 6 also had some common characteristic, namely the presence proRussian support and conflict and were overall more coherent than Wave 5, since they displayed
only three branches (instead of eight branches in Wave 5) with higher concentration towards the
top rows. Most of the states (besides the states accessed in Wave 5) had Roma populations that
exceeded the Roma population in the EU at the time of their accession, but Wave 6 appears to
have the highest Roma population thus far at 70.28 percent. Wave 6 also indicates the highest
conflict occurrence thus far at 64.9 percent. Overall, the comparison of the structures shows that
Wave 5 still produced the most complicated structure of factors that impede EU accession and
thus it appears that the states accessed in Wave 5 were very diverse other than the presence of
pro-Russian parties. Figure 10.4.2 above indicates a gradual increase in factors that impede EU
accession as the structures between Wave 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 get more top-heavy. This gradual
increase in factors between waves is a more accurate explanation of the waves’ sequential
placement in time than the states’ pro-democratic performance during their application period,
which lends support for H5. This is indicative that speed of accession into the EU of Wave 6 was
slower than previous accession waves despite of Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia’s positive prodemocratic and economic performance during their application process due to the fact that they
brought over factors that impede accession speed, such as pro-Russian sentiments and conflict.
Had there been no additional consideration outside of the pro-democratic developments of the
states, then the application duration for the later waves, such as Wave 6, should be proportionate
to their political and economic development and thus should have been accessed as fast as Wave
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3. This analysis is a viable explanation as to why the established member states were less keen to
add Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia to the EU, while the southern European states in Wave 3
were accessed faster at lower indicators of political and economic development (see Figure
10.4.3 below).

Average Values per Accession Wave

Average GDP per capita (ln) and EU Application Duration per Acccession Wave

Frozen

Wave 4

Wave 5

Pending

Wave 3

Wave 6

Wave 2

Wave 1

Waves of EU Accession
Average of GDP per capita (ln)

Average of application duration

Figure 10.4.3 Compilation of pro-democratic development and application duration by
wave compared to Wave 6
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11 PENDING MEMBERS: ACCESSION OF THE WESTERN BALKANS
Chapter 11 will consist of analysis of the pending accession of the Western Balkan
applicants and will evaluate the shift in membership expectations that are now preventing full
promised EU enlargement. Pending cases like Serbia and Turkey theoretically are on the path,
but no clear answers are given by the EU leadership when they will join. In addition, the EU
rhetorically also promised membership to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but there is no indication
when and if these promises will come true. This chapter will trace the pending membership
applications of Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey, and Serbia. After the historical and
political overview, I will conduct the analysis of hypothesis six (H6). The question I will answer
here is: Why is the EU reluctant to add the Balkan states of Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia,
Turkey, and Serbia to the EU?
In this chapter I suggest that earlier waves of accession of new member states exhibit
lower expectations of democratic and economic development and shorter timeframe of accession
into the EU in the following hypothesis:

Pending members from Western Balkans (H6): Despite the fact that the pro-democratic and
economic performance of the Pending members exceeds other successful applicants in the
past, the EU membership of Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey, and Serbia is still
uncertain due to the fact that they will bring over factors that impede EU accession speed.

11.1 Albania
Albania is a country in southern Europe with capital Tirana. It borders Kosovo to the
northeast, Montenegro to the north, Greece to the south, and Macedonia to the east. It has a
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coastline on the Ionian Sea to the southwest and the Adriatic Sea to the west. Its area is 11,264
square miles (or 29,176 square kilometers) and a total population of 2,902,000 as of 2010. The
political system is parliamentary republic and Albania submitted its formal EU application in
2009164.
The country was occupied by Italy during World War II. Resistance led by Enver Hoxha
and the newly established Communist Party gradually emerged. After defeating Italy, the
resistance fighters seized power. Initially Enver Hoxha maintained a good relationship with the
USSR and other countries of the Eastern bloc, but after Stalin's death he denied the reforms
introduced by Khrushchev and reoriented Albania to Mao Zedong’s ideology. Over time,
however, contacts with China weakened, especially after the Mao’s death. By 1990, five years
after the death of Hoxha, Albania was an extremely isolated communist state that maintained
minimal contact even with other communist countries. Despite the emerging multiparty
democracy, the country suffers substantial economic problems, raging organized crime, as well
as influx of Albanian refugees from Kosovo. In 1992 Albania held its first democratic elections
in after World War II. During the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999, Albania accepted
nearly half-million refugees who are ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. NATO formally invited
Albania to become members at the summit in Bucharest in April 2008. On April 1st of 2009
Albania officially joined NATO and in 2009 Albania formally applied for EU membership. Its
accession into the Union is still pending.
Pro-Russian political parties
There is no substantial popular support for Pro-Russian political parties in Albania, so for
the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 0.
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Muslim and Roma minorities
In Albania according to the PEW Research Center data165, the Muslim population totaled
around 2,601,000 that is 82.1percent of the total population by 2010. By the time of the country’s
official application into the EU in 2009, the country’s Muslim population was 82.10 percent,
which is larger than the average EU Muslim population of 1.64 percent in the EU up to that
point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 115,000 Roma
residing in Albania as of 2010 according to the European Commission data166. By the time of the
country’s official application into the EU in 2009, the Roma population in the country made up
3.59 percent of the total population, which exceeded the average EU Roma population of 1.39
percent up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Albania participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data167, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis for Albania
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11.2 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM)
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia occupies the northwestern part of the
historical region of Macedonia, parts of which are located in Bulgaria and Greece. To the east it
borders Bulgaria, to the south - Greece, to the north - Serbia and Kosovo, and to the west Albania. Its area is 9,927 square miles (or 25,713 square kilometers). Capital of the country is
Skopje, with a population of 2,062,000 as of 2010. The political system is parliamentary republic
and Albania submitted its formal EU application in 2004168.
On September 8th, 1991 the FYRM gained its independence from Yugoslavia after a
referendum and began a process for peaceful secession from the federation. On November 17th,
1991 the Assembly of the FYRM officially declared independence after a referendum on
September 8 of the same year. Bulgaria was the first country in the world to recognize the new
state on January 15th, 1992 under its constitutional name and persuaded Russia to do the same.
Robert Badinter, Chairman of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, called EU countries to do
the same in the same month. In 1993 FYRM became a member of the UN. Macedonia aspires to
join the European Union, but major obstacles to this are deteriorating relations with Greece,
because of the unresolved dispute over FYRM’s official name. Second issue is with Bulgaria,
since although the two countries have signed several declarations and memoranda of good
neighborly relations and in 1999 the linguistic dispute between Bulgaria and Macedonia was
resolved, some lingering questions about historical heritage remain. Conflicting reports emerge
about violations of the rights of the Bulgarians in FYRM and in turn FYRM insists on the
recognition of the Pirin territory in Bulgaria as belonging to the FYRM.
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Pro-Russian political parties
VMRO-DPMNE is a center-right leaning nationalist political party in FYRM led by
Nikola Gruevski. VMRO-DPMNE is one of the largest political organizations in the FYRM. The
party was officially registered on August 5th, 1990 as an ideological outlet of the political circles
of those who fought for independence of the FYRM from Yugoslavia and the victims of political
repression. However, a number of scandals, controversial political decisions, intervention and
infiltration of the secret police in the policy of the party led to a partial split in VMRO-DPMNE.
At the party’s congress in May 2003 in Ohrid, Ljubco Georgievski resigned as chairman of
VMRO-DPMNE and founded his own party VMRO People's Party and the new party chairman
Nikola Gruevski was elected. In 2006 VMRO-DPMNE won the elections and Nikola Gruevski
became Prime Minister of the FYRM. He remains in office until today with successive
governments. During his time in office, he has slowly realigned his political view form neoliberal to a style closer to Russia’s Putin. Nikola Gruevski lost a lot of support and patronage
with the departure of US president Bush Bush from the White House. In the mean-time Russia
began to establish itself as a world superpower and Putin’s leadership style centered on Christian
values and traditional gender roles, nationalism, and strong government appeal to Gruevski and
VMRO-DPMNE’s political stance. Not surprisingly, since the party has been in power,
Macedonia’s foreign policy is slowly realigning to Moscow. In the parliamentary elections in
2014, VMRO-DPMNE finished first with 42.97 percent and 61 out of 123 seats (see Republic of
Macedonia State Election Commission website169).
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Because of the existence of the VMRO-DPMNE since 1990, for the purpose of the
analysis, this element is coded as 1 for the duration of the entire EU application period from
2005 to 2016.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In the FYRM according to the PEW Research Center data170, the Muslim population
totaled around 713,000 that is 34.9 percent of the total population by 2010. By the time of the
country’s official application into the EU in 2004, the country’s Muslim population was 35.9
percent, which is larger than the average EU Muslim population of 1.64 percent in the EU up to
that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 197,000
Roma residing in the FYRM as of 2010 according to the European Commission data171. By the
time of the country’s official application into the EU in 2004, the Roma population in the
country made up 9.56 percent of the total population, which exceeded the average EU Roma
population of 1.39 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
The FYRM was significantly destabilized by the war in Kosovo in 1999 and the
subsequent fleeing of over 250,000 ethnic Albanians, which it was forced to accept. Albanian
nationalism intensified on both sides of the border in 2001, leading to military conflict in the area
between the security forces of the FYRM and the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA).
That same year the Ohrid Agreement was signed, which provided significant civil and political
rights of Macedonian Albanians. Soon after Albanian rebels disarmed with the help of NATO.
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Due to the 2001 Insurgency in the FYRM that occurred during EU’s existence according
to COW’s data172 for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 1.
Boolean analysis the FYRM

11.3 Montenegro
Montenegro is a country on the Balkan Peninsula. It borders Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina to the west, Serbia to the northeast, Albania to the south, and Kosovo to the east.
Montenegro has an outlet on the Adriatic Sea. The state and administrative capital is Podgorica,
while the historical capital of the country is Cetinje. Its area is 5,333 square miles (or 13,812
square kilometers) with a population of 622,000 as of 2010. The political system is parliamentary
republic and Montenegro submitted its formal EU application in 2008173.
In 1941 it was occupied by Italy and later by Germany. Montenegro has been a part of
Yugoslavia since 1945. Between 1945 and 1992 Montenegro was one of the republics included
in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After that, between 1992 and 2003, Montenegro
was a part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and from 2003 to 2006 it was a part of Serbia
and Montenegro. On May 21, 2006 in Montenegro held a referendum on independence from
Serbia and 55 percent of the participating voters voted for the republic's independence. On June
3rd, 2006 the Montenegrin parliament formally declared independence. On June 28, 2006

172
173

http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war/cow-war-list
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/montenegro/index_en.htm

218

Montenegro became a member of the UN. The EU council launched negotiation for
Montenegro’s accession application on June 2012.
Pro-Russian political parties
New Serb Democracy (Serbian: New Demokratiјa Srpska, NOVA) is right-wing
political organization in Montenegro led by Andrija Mandić. In was founded in 2009 with the
intention to unite all pro-Serbian organizations in the country, but eventually it included only the
Serbian People's Party and the People's Socialist Party of Montenegro. NOVA’s coalition (the
Democratic Front) participated in the parliamentary elections in 2016 and finished in second
place with 20.32 percent of the vote, or 18 out of 81 seats to the National Assembly (see
Montenegro’s National Election Commission website174). In 2015 pro-Russian protesters led by
NOVA took over the streets in the capital demanding the resignation of the democratically
elected prime minister of Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic. In 2016, there was a coup attempt
against Djukanovic led by Serbian nationalists and Russian citizens. Djukanovic claims that this
was orchestrated by Russia. Russia, who is strongly opposed to the country's NATO application,
denies official involvement in the destabilization of the country and the coup attempt175.
Because of the existence of the New Serb Democracy party since 2009, for the purpose of
the analysis, this element is coded as 1 for the duration of the entire EU application period from
2009 to 2016.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Montenegro according to the PEW Research Center data176, the Muslim population
totaled around 116,000 that is 18.5 percent of the total population by 2010. By the time of the
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country’s official application into the EU in 2008, the country’s Muslim population was 18.50
percent, which is larger than the average EU Muslim population of 1.64 percent up to that point,
so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 20,000 Roma residing in
Montenegro as of 2010 according to the European Commission data177. By the time of the
country’s official application into the EU in 2009, the Roma population in the country made up
3.17 percent of the total population, which exceeded the average EU Roma population of 1.39
percent up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
There were no recorded wars that Montenegro participated in for the duration of the EU’s
existence according to COW’s data178, so for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as
0.
Boolean analysis for Montenegro

11.4 Serbia
Eighty percent of Serbia's territory is located on the Balkan Peninsula, and twenty percent
is located in the Pannonian Plain. Serbia’s capital is Belgrade and borders Bulgaria and Romania
to the east, Hungary to the north, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Montenegro to the west,
and Macedonia to the south, and there is a disputed border with Albania through Kosovo. With
Kosovo, Serbia’s area is 54,905 square miles (or 88,361 square kilometers) and excluding
Kosovo its area is 48,140 square miles (or 77,474 square kilometers) with a population of
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9,059,000 as of 2010. The political system is parliamentary republic and Serbia submitted its
formal EU application in 2009179.
Serbia was a part of the First Yugoslavia formed after World War I in 1918 to include the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The state was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in
1929. The kingdom existed until April 1941, when much of its territory was divided between
Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Serbia then became a part of the Second Yugoslavia
formed immediately after World War II. Its foundations were laid in 1943 with the establishment
of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia. It was renamed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after
the end of the war in 1945 and then became the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in
1963. In this form Yugoslavia existed until 1992, when four out of the six republics that
comprised it, namely Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, became
independent. Serbia remained then a part of the Third Yugoslavia under the name Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which existed until 2003 and united the republics of Serbia
(including the autonomous regions of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Metohija) and Montenegro. In
2003, the FRY was transformed into a loose confederation including Serbia and Montenegro. On
June 3rd, 2006 the confederation disintegrated into the independent republics of modern-day
Serbia and Montenegro. Serbia submitted its EU application in 2009 and on January 21st, 2014,
the EU officially began membership talks with Serbia. The Serbian state aims to fulfill the
conditions of accession until 2018 and is expected to join Union in the next financial period that
starts in 2020.
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Pro-Russian political parties
The Serbian Radical Party (Srpska Radikalna Stranka, SRS) is right-wing national
conservative political party in Serbia led by Vojislav Šešelj. It was established in 1991 by the
unification of the two nationalist parties - the Serbian Chetnik Movement, chaired by Vojislav
Šešelj and the People's Radical Party, chaired by Tomislav Nikolich. The party’s main platform
revolves around nationalism, Euroscepticism and has distinct pro-Russian orientation. It claims
that Serbia should strive to restore its former greatness through affiliation with Russia instead of
the West. In the 2016 parliamentary elections the party finished third with 8.1 percent of the
votes and 22 mandates out of 250180.
Furthermore, the current prime minister of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić whose Serbian
Progressive Party won the 2016 parliamentary elections with 48.25 percent of the votes181
expressed an opinion in 2016 that if Croatia’s HDZ (a party that was involved in a recent scandal
with Russian funding) comes to power, Serbia and Croatia will enjoy better cooperation182. The
Serbian Progressive Party was established in 2008 by 21 former associates of the Serbian Radical
party. Vucic's party and HDZ are both in the right political spectrum, but after the latest
scandalous revelations of HDZ’s connections to financial support from the Kremlin, it appears
that both parties may be connected to Russia and support pro-Russian interests. This is a very
important and sensitive issue in the region, because Serbia is torn by geopolitical tensions and
has to make a choice of aligning with Russia or with the EU.
Finally, there are a few smaller pro-Russian parties that share the same nationalist,
Eurosceptic, pro-Russian sentiment and platform, but have a less of a popular appeal in the polls.
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One of them, the Russian Party (Ruska stranka) is a right-wing political party in Serbia led by
Ivan Isakovich that was founded in 2010. Another such party is the Serbo-Russian Movement
(Srpsko-ruski pokret), a right-wing political organization in Serbia led by Aleksandar Đurđev
that was founded in 2016.
Because of the existence of the Serbian Radical Party since 1991, for the purpose of the
analysis, this element is coded as 1 for the duration of the entire EU application period from
2009 to 2016.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Serbia according to the PEW Research Center data183, the Muslim population totaled
around 280,000 that is 3.7 percent of the total population by 2010. By the time of the country’s
official application into the EU in 2009, the country’s Muslim population was 3.7 percent, which
is larger than the average EU Muslim population of 1.64 percent in the EU up to that point, so it
is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 600,000 Roma residing in
Serbia as of 2010 according to the European Commission data184. By the time of the country’s
official application into the EU in 2009, the Roma population in the country made up 8.23
percent of the total population, which exceeded the average EU Roma population in the EU up to
that point of 1.39 percent, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
The Yugoslav Wars are generally defined as a series of ethnic conflict between Serbs on
one side, and Slovenes, Croats, Bosnians, and Albanians on the other. They are a series of wars
considered to be the bloodiest conflict in Europe since World War II that occurred between 1991
and 2001 on the territory of former Yugoslavia. These conflicts are associated with Yugoslavia’s
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dissolution and redistribution of territory, population, and resources between its former subjects,
which eventually led to the disappearance of the state of Yugoslavia from the political map of the
world. The Yugoslav wars were followed by a significant change in the political geography of
the Balkans and are divided in three periods. The first one was the conflicts related to the
breakup of Yugoslavia that includes the War in Croatia (1991-1995), the Ten-day war in
Slovenia (1991), and the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995). The second period
includes the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia populated by Albanians, including as the Kosovo
War (1996-1999), the conflict in the Presevo Valley (2000-2001), and the conflict in the
Republic of Macedonia (2001). The third period includes NATO military actions in former
Yugoslavia - the operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995) and the NATO air intervention
against Yugoslavia (1999).
There is an intense debate in the international community as to whether the Yugoslav
wars were a civil conflict or aggression. Bosnians and many Croatians claim that the war was
caused by Croatian and Serbian hostility based on Karadjordjevo agreement, while many Serbs
accept it as a civil war. Undoubtedly, the Yugoslav wars were caused by the political regime in
former Yugoslavia and the geopolitical interests and involvement of the Great Powers. The
catalyst for the wars was the ethnic and religious divisions in the former Yugoslav Federation.
When Slobodan Milošević came to power in 1989 in Serbia, he ignited nationalism across
Yugoslavia and stirred tensions with the communist leadership of the republics. These dynamics
eventually boiled over in armed confrontation, which lead to the disintegrating of Yugoslavia
into smaller republics and leaving the FRY that comprised of only Serbia and Montenegro. The
most severe confrontations took place in Bosnia and Croatia where the ethnic Serbs who lived
there refused to acknowledge the independence of the republics they inhabited from Yugoslavia.
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In Bosnia and Herzegovina following the massacre at Markale and Sreburnitca, NATO
became involved in the war in 1995 by initiating operation Deliberate Force against the
Republika Srpska army that threatened to attack areas designated as safe by the UN in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The war ended after the peace agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina was
signed in Paris on December 14th, 1995. The Kosovo war erupted in 1999 after clashes between
the Albanian guerillas and the FRY security forces. This short conflict was resolved with the
establishment of UN administration in Kosovo and the withdrawal of Serbian forces from the
region. On March 31st, 2003, as part of its common security and foreign policy, the EU
undertook peacekeeping operations in the troubled region, firstly in the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, and after that in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In both operations, forces led
by the EU substituted the NATO troops and the EU decided to establish an area of justice,
freedom, and security for all in the region by 2010.
Even though the FRY officially did not participate in the conflicts, it provided military
and logistic support for the Serbian forces fighting in Bosnia and Croatia. This prompted the
1992 imposition of UN sanctions against the FRY and as a result the country's economy
collapsed and the FRY became politically isolated by the international community. In 1990
multiparty democracy was introduced in Serbia, but Slobodan Milošević kept his strong hold
over the media and security forces. In 2000 after accusations of electoral fraud, Slobodan
Milošević was forced out of power and handed over to the ICTY. Some other high-ranking
political and military leaders of Serbia and Croatia were convicted for war crimes, while others
continue to litigate in the ICTY. Genocide, a crime against humanity, is the most serious war
crime in which they accused them. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established for identification and punishment of war crimes committed
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during the wars. By early 2008, 45 Serbs, 12 Croats and 4 Bosnians were sentenced for war
crimes by the ICTY in relation to the Yugoslav wars of the 90s185. ICTY report found that out of
the 104,732 victims (civilians and soldiers) 65 percent were Muslims, followed by Serbs (21.7
percent), Croats (8.5 percent) and a small number (4.8 percent) of other (mostly Albanians and
Roma)186.
Due to the War for Bosnian Independence of 1992, Bosnian-Serb Rebellion of 1992 1995, and the Insurgency in the Preševo Valley (1999–2001) conflicts that occurred during EU’s
existence according to COW’s data187 for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 1.
Boolean analysis of Serbia

11.5 Turkey
The Republic of Turkey with capital Ankara is a country whose territory is almost
entirely located in Asia (97 percent) and the remaining 3 percent is in the Balkan Peninsula in
southeastern Europe. However, more than 20 percent of its population lives on the Balkans. In
the east it borders Georgia, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, to the south it borders Syria and Iraq,
and to the west it borders the Aegean Sea, Bulgaria, and Greece. Turkey’s geographical location
between Europe and Asia makes it a country of particular geostrategic importance. Turkey’s area
it is 302,534 square miles (or 783,562 square kilometers) with a population of 72,310,000 as of
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2010. The political system is parliamentary republic and Turkey submitted its formal EU
application in 1987188.
Until 1922 the territory of the modern state was the center of the Ottoman Empire.
Between 1923 and 1938 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk implemented fundamental changes in Turkish
society, such as introducing a legal system of European type, separating Islam from the state, and
giving women the right to vote. After Ataturk’s death on November 10th, 1938 power passed
into the hands of his fellow İsmet İnönü. During that period, Turkey's foreign policy became proGerman, and after the Second World War it became pro-Western, but Turkey maintained
neutrality during World War II. In 1945, Turkey became an official UN member. The period of
1946 and 1950 was an era of strengthening of Turkey’s democratic institutions. In result, in 1948
the country received economic assistance under the Marshall Plan and in 1952 Turkey joined
NATO. Turkey’s senior army leadership carried out three military coups in 1960, 1971, and
1980 that continued the economic reforms. In 1974 Turkey invaded Cyprus and in 1979, the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus declared independence, but this was condemned by the UN
and is currently only recognized by Turkey. In 2013, anti-government protests broke out
followed by a corruption scandal. In July 2016 a new military coup attempt took place, but that
was quickly put out by the government and President Tayyip Erdoğan returned to power.
The country implemented a number of pro-democratic reforms and is a member of
NATO since February 18th of 1952. After much deliberation, the European Parliament came to a
consensus to begin negotiations with the country in October 2005. However, the issue of
Turkey's accession into the EU is highly controversial. For one, some member states consider
that Turkey’s accession into the EU is inappropriate since 97 percent of its territory lies in Asia.
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There is speculation that the long delay in membership negotiations is due to the fact that the
majority of Turkey’s population is primarily Muslim and most Europeans do not want a Muslim
state added to the predominantly Christian Europe. Another major problem that delays the state’s
EU accession is the issue of the reunification of Cyprus. However, after the formation of a proEuropean government in the Turkish part of Cyprus, there is a hope that the unification of the
country as a part of the EU may become a reality soon. Then there is the ongoing issue with the
Kurd minority in Turkey and the ongoing allegations of human rights violations against Kurds
perpetrated by the Turkish government. The final and most current issue that prevents Turkey’s
membership in the EU is the crackdown on suspected political rivals following the 2016 coup
attempt against President Tayyip Erdoğan. Currently, there is an outgoing purge within Turkish
civil society and military personnel in response to the latest military coup that has been strongly
condemned by the international community, so the EP called for a halt to Turkey’s EU
membership application in 2016.
Pro-Russian political parties
There is no substantial popular support for Pro-Russian political parties in Turkey, so for
the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 0.
Muslim and Roma minorities
In Turkey according to the PEW Research Center data189, the Muslim population totaled
around 74,660,000 that is 98.6 percent of the total population by 2010. By the time of the
country’s official application into the EU in 1987, the country’s Muslim population was 98.6
percent, which is larger than the average EU Muslim population of 2.18 percent in the EU up to
that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis. There is an estimated 2,750,000
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Roma residing in Turkey as of 2010 according to the European Commission data190. By the time
of the country’s official application into the EU in 1987, the Roma population in the country
made up 3.75 percent of the total population, which exceeded the average EU Roma population
of 2.18 percent up to that point, so it is coded as 1 for the purpose of the analysis.
Conflict
Turkey has been involved in a few conflicts on its territory since 1952. The most notable
ones according to the COW191 data are the Turko-Cypriot War in 1974, the First Turkish Kurds
War of (1984-1986) and the Second Turkish Kurds War of (1991-1999).
The Turkish occupation of Cyprus started on July 20th, 1974, when Turkish armed forces
landed in northern Cyprus. This occurred five days after the coup organized by the military
regime in Greece was carried out by the Cypriot army. In this coup the Cypriot President
Archbishop Makarios III of Cyprus was removed from power and replaced by Nikos Sampson.
The goal of the coup was to annex Cyprus to Greece and to announce the Greek Republic of
Cyprus. Turkey invaded the island in July when the Turkish army occupied 3 percent of the
territory and again in August 1974 when the army occupied 40 percent of the territory. Hundreds
of thousands Greek Cypriots become refugees and there were many civilian deaths. The ceasefire
line known as the Green Line separated the two communities on the island in 1974 and allowed
the resettlement of the remaining Turkish Cypriots to the Turkish side. On February 13th, 1975,
in response to widespread condemnation by the international community (Resolution 367 of the
Security Council of the United Nations), Turkey declared the occupied Cypriot territory a
Turkish Federal State. This new state was condemned by the UN and is currently only
recognized by Turkey. The UN Security Council challenged the legitimacy of the actions of
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Turkey because as a result of the invasion of Turkey the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Cyprus was compromised, which resulted in separatism within Cyprus and the establishment of a
separate political entity in the north. The conflict continues to affect Turkey's relations with
Cyprus, Greece, and the European Union since after a referendum on the island, only the
southern portion of Cyprus joined the EU.
Kurds are the largest minority in Turkey that comprises around one fifth of the population
of the country. The Turkish government has long attempted to hide the Kurds’ existence on its
territory, even to the extent of officially banning the word “Kurd” and the Kurdish language in
Turkey. Multiple massacres and various other human rights abuses against the Kurdish
population on Turkish territory have been inflicted by the Turkish government since the 1980s.
These actions were condemned by the European Court of Human Rights and the international
community at large. The Kurds responded in a variety of ways ranging from peaceful protest, to
attacks on soft targets and army bases, to open armed conflict. During the First Turkish Kurds
War (1984-1986) and the Second Turkish Kurds War (1991-1999), many Kurds were killed or
expelled from their settlements and their villages were destroyed. In other cases, food embargos
were imposed on the villages and the villagers were imprisoned, tortured, expelled or killed. In
the beginning of the confrontation, the Kurds demanded a separate Kurdish state and later
demanded self-determination, but none of these demands have ever been addressed by the
Turkish government. In the mean-time, political parties representing the interests of Kurds are
banned in Turkey, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is considered a terrorist organization
by the Turkish government. After a brief ceasefire from 2013 to 2015, the conflict between PKK
and the Turkish government was renewed because of the alleged role of Turkey in the war in
Syria.
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Due to these conflicts that occurred during EU’s existence according to COW’s data192
for the purpose of the analysis this element is coded as 1.
Boolean analysis of Turkey

11.6 Boolean analysis of Pending members

Figure 11.6.1 Compilation of factors that impede EU accession speed in Pending

Figure 11.6.1 above is a compilation of the additional factors that affect EU accession
speed for all 5 states still pending accession into the EU. Unlike in previous accession waves, the
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5 Pending member states have various timeframe of application wait time, so the percentage of
the total is calculated by first establishing that the respective applicant’s weight in the structure is
equal. Thus, each state is given a total of 20 percent and the respective coding within each
applicant is a weighted average, so each separate coding within a state represents its respective
proportion of the factors that impede EU accession within the 20 percent. In the case of
accession the Pending members, 100 percent of the applicants have Muslim and Roma minorities
that exceeded the EU average at the time they submit their EU accession application. The
presence of conflict in the Pending members is present in 60 percent of the observations and
support for pro-Russian parties at 57.78 percent overall. The grid is limited to four branches in
the second and third rows and the highest concentration nodules are found on the fourth row at
40 percent. Thus, the Pending members display a significant number of observations that have all
four of the factors that impede EU accession speed. Overall, the wave is rather coherent, but
displays a high concentration of factors that impede EU accession speed, which provides a
valuable explanation for H6. Ultimately, this means that the EU membership of Albania,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey, and Serbia is still uncertain despite the fact that their prodemocratic and economic performance exceeds other successful applicants in the past due to the
fact that they brought over factors that impede accession speed.
Next, I will compare Waves 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and Pending members for presence of additional
factors that impeded EU accession.
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Figure 11.6.2 Comparison of factors that impede EU accession speeded in Wave 2, Wave
3, Wave 4, Wave 5, Wave 6, and Pending

In Figure 11.6.2 above, I examine the structures of additional factors that impede EU
accession speed for Waves 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and Pending members again by comparing the waves’
coherence. At a glance, it is obvious that the states accessed in Wave 2 had a lot in common and
were overall very coherent as far as displaying a minimal number of factors that impede EU
accession speed in only one branch. The states accessed in Wave 3 also had a lot in common, but
were overall a little less coherent, since they displayed two instead of one branch with higher
concentration towards the bottom rows. The states accessed in Wave 4 also had a lot in common,
but were overall a little less coherent than the preceding ones, since they displayed two instead of
one branch with higher concentration towards the top rows. The states accessed in Wave 5 are
very incoherent in the variety of factors that they bring, since they displayed eight branches with
higher concentration towards the first and second rows. Never-the-less, a prominent feature in
Wave 5 is the presence of pro-Russian parties, which is present in roughly two-thirds of the

233

cases. The states accessed in Wave 6 also had some common characteristic, namely the proRussian parties and conflict and were overall more coherent than Wave 5, since they displayed
only three branches (instead of eight branches in Wave 5) with higher concentration towards the
top rows. The Pending members also had some common characteristic, namely the Muslim and
Roma minorities at a lot higher rates than any other wave so far at 100 percent and the second
highest rate of conflict at 60 percent. The highest conflict rate so far can be found in Wave 6 at
64.9 percent. Also the Pending member states display overall more coherent characteristics than
Wave 5, since they displayed only four branches (instead of eight branches in Wave 5) with
higher concentration towards the top rows. Overall, most of the states (besides the states
accessed in Wave 5) had Roma populations that exceeded the Roma population in the EU at the
time of their accession. The comparison of the structures shows that Wave 5 still produced the
most complicated structure of factors that impede EU accession and thus it appears that the states
accessed in Wave 5 were very diverse in their distribution of indicators other than the underlying
significant presence of pro-Russian parties at 63.55 percent. Figure 11.6.2 above indicates a
progressive increase in factors that impede EU accession, since the structures starting with Wave
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and ending with Pending members become gradually more top-heavy. This
progressive increase in factors between waves is a more accurate explanation of the waves’
sequential placement in time than the states’ pro-democratic performance during their
application period, which lends support for H6. This is indicative that speed of accession into the
EU of the Pending members would be slower than previous accession waves despite of Albania,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey, and Serbia’s positive pro-democratic and economic
performance during their application process due to the fact that they will bring in factors that
impede accession speed. Had there been no additional consideration outside of the pro-
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democratic developments of the states, then the application duration for the later waves, such as
the Pending members, should be proportionate to their political and economic development and
thus should have been accessed as fast as Wave 3 (see Figure 11.6.3 below).

Average Values per Accession Wave

Average GDP per capita (ln) and EU Application Duration per Acccession Wave

Frozen

Wave 4

Wave 5

Pending

Wave 3

Wave 6

Wave 2

Wave 1

Waves of EU Accession
Average of GDP per capita (ln)

Average of application duration

Figure 11.6.3 Compilation of pro-democratic development and application duration by
wave compared to Pending members
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12 DURATIONAL MODEL OF PROXIMITY TO RUSSIA
Based on the preceding analysis it appears that a major factor that shaped the accession
timeframe of Eastern Europe was the disproportionate political influence of Russia in the region.
In this chapter I will present the durational analysis of states’ proximity to Russia, since I believe
that statistically significant relationship between accession duration and distance to Russia is a
testament of the importance of Russian political influence. The questions examined here are:
Can proximity to Russia, a country with significant natural resources, but widely perceived as
unstable democracy at best, affect the speed of accession of new members into the EU? Does
proximity to Russia matters to the EU?
12.1 Hypotheses Concerning the Motivation for Accession into the EU
From the preceding analysis, performance of the economy, democratic values, and
proximity to Russia can be expected to influence the motivations of established member states to
approve accession of new members into the EU. Consequently, I suggest that geographical
proximity to Russia increases the timeframe of accession, while party competition (since it is
generally expected to indicate the democratic mechanism of elections) and economic health
decrease the timeframe of accession into the EU in the following hypotheses:

Proximity to Russia (H7): The likelihood of an applicant accession into the EU decreases
over time the closer a state is to Russia.

Economic Health (H8): The likelihood of an applicant accession into the EU increases
over time for wealthier states.
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Party competition (H9): The likelihood of an applicant accession into the EU increases
over time for states with higher party competition.

12.2 An Event History Analysis Model (EHA) of Proximity to Russia
Previous studies in the field utilize various analytical methods, ranging from game theory
to case studies that rarely account for time in the accession period. In this part of my analysis, I
utilize the event history model because it allows to measure how much time has elapsed before
an event occurs. This event is often referred to as “failure” or a “hazard”, and in this particular
case the “failure” is accession into the EU. The goal is to model the hazard rate as a function of
the baseline hazard (CENSOR0) during the application period (APPLICATIONi,t) while
accounting for distance from Russia, economic health, and an indicator of democracy. The
hazard rate APPLICATIONi,t is the probability that country i is accessed into the EU during the
application process t. CENSOR variable indicates whether a country was accessed into the EU at
the end of the application period, so if CENSOR is set to “1” the country was accessed and if
CENSOR is equal to “0”, it was not.
12.2.1 Data
I utilize a complete longitudinal datasets of wealth and democracy indicators that are
available for the period of 1952 through 2014 for all European applicants respectively from the
Polity IV and World Bank datasets. Included in the dataset are all approved, current, and denied
applicants – a total of 37 countries available on the EU legislation website. The first year in the
dataset is 1952 when six members formed the EU. Since the process of EU accession is still
ongoing, I limited the observations until the most recent available year, 2014, for the longest
application time of 26 years for Turkey. These data are recorded in a traditional format with each
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row in the dataset denoting the unique values for the 3 independent variables, noting that the
variables for wealth and party competition are time-varying covariates.
Distance from Russia i,t measures the geographical proximity to Russia of country i when
it was accepted in the EU during the application process t. The distance is measured in miles
from Moscow to the capital of each of the member states, since I presume that capitals are the
primary influence in economic and political values. GDP Per Capita i,t indicates the economic
health of the country i in current US dollars when it was accepted into the EU during the
application process t. GDP per capita and distance from Russia values were converted to their
logarithm equivalents. Party Competition i,t represents the party competition in country i when it
was accepted into the EU during the application process t.
12.2.2 Analysis of the Model of Accession into the EU
The first step in analyzing the accession into the EU is to define the hazard rate. The
hazard rate is the probability that a country will be accessed into the EU at time t during the
process of EU application, so the hazard rate is the unobserved rate at which accession occurs. If
accession has not occurred by cut-off time the data was collected (in this case 2014), that
observation is “censored’, so the censoring variable indicates whether or not a process is still
ongoing. If the country is not accessed by the end of the active application period indicated by
the variable CENSOR, then its corresponding value in the time series of CENSOR for the
country is set at 0. If accessed, the corresponding value in the time series of the country is set at
1. The time series for the variable of APPLICATION i,t for the six founding members of the EU
(Italy, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) is fixed at 1 in 1952.
APPLICATION i,t for each of the time series for the remaining countries varies from 1 to 26 (26
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being the longest application period), indicating the number of years a country was an active
applicant in the process.

Table 12.1 Impact on Contextual Factors on Time until Accession into the EU – Weibull
Model
Independent Variables
Distance from Russia
GDP Per Capita i,t

p-values

Standard
Errors

0.377

0.017

0.154

0.227

0.000

0.081

Hazard Ratios
i,t

Party Competition i,t
3.763
0.006
1.813
Observations
37
2
Probability > χ
0.000
Log-likelihood χ2
31.81
ρ
1.949
Note: All significance tests are one-tailed because directionality of relationship

After extensive model testing, I narrow down the relationships of interest and present in
Table 12.1 above. The failure rates (ρ) increase over time, so a Weibull model is appropriate.
The pertinent hazard ratios generated by the Weibull analysis are recorded in Table 12.1, column
1. According to the results, H7 cannot be supported because a country further from Russia is
62.32 percent less likely to be accessed into the EU over time. Therefore, close proximity of a
country to Russia in fact increases the likelihood of accession into the EU during the application
process. Figure 12.2.1 below shows that the predicted hazard curve is raising more steeply over
time among countries that are closer to Russia.
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Figure 12.2.1 Hazard Function for Proximity to Russia in logarithm (miles)

A wealthy (GDP Per Capita i,t) applicant is 77.3 percent less likely to be accessed into the
EU over time, so H8 cannot be supported. This result indicates that economic health in fact
decreases the likelihood of accession into the EU during the application process. Figure 12.2.2
below confirms that the predicted hazard curve is rising more steeply among countries with
lower GDP Per Capita over time.
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Figure 12.2.2 Hazard Function for GDP Per Capita in logarithm

And finally, a country with high party competition (Party Competition i,t) quadruples its
chances to be accessed into the EU over time, so H9 receives significant support. Figure 12.2.3
below confirms that the predicted hazard curve is rising steadily among countries with higher
Party Competition over time, which indicates that countries that are more democratic are more
likely to be accessed into the EU over time.
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Overall, although the relationship between distance from Moscow and accession time is
in direction opposite than I expected, still these results are evidence of the strategic importance
and geopolitical interests of established member states towards Russia, so proximity to Russia is
important to the EU. In addition, these findings partially confirm the conventional wisdom that
pro-democratic attitudes in candidates determine the EU application timeframe, since the prodemocracy connection appears to hold only for party competition. The inverse relationship with
wealth may be proof of unwillingness of wealthier states to expand East because they are
hesitant and can realistically expect negative impact on their economies following the accession
of the poorer Eastern European members. This sentiment is largely echoed in the less-dominant
strains in the literature outlined in previous paragraphs that links unwillingness of established
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member states to progress without amending the rules of accession to protect their interests.
Indeed, some of the most advanced economies in Europe demonstrated exactly that by
suspending or terminating their applications – Norway declined accession through a national
referendum in 1992, Switzerland application was frozen in 1992 due to negative public opinion,
and Iceland’s application has been frozen since 2009 due to a pending referendum for resuming
of negotiations with EU.

Distance from Russia and EU Application Duration per Acccession Wave

Average Values per Accession Wave
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Figure 12.2.4 Distance from Moscow and EU Application Duration

In relation to the overall purpose of this project, undoubtedly, the positive relationship
between accession time and proximity to Moscow in part is also a testament of Moscow’s
geographical closeness to Europe itself. Furthermore, as mentioned before, proximity to Russia,
a major gas exporter and a questionable democracy at best, is of strategic importance to the
West. Nevertheless, once the accession time-frame is examined in relation to proximity to
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Moscow by wave (Figure 12.2.4 above), something rather unusual becomes apparent.
Geographically the former Soviet Satellites from Eastern Europe (Waves 5 and Wave 6) are very
close to Moscow. However, it is evident that their proximity does not correspond to faster
accession time-frame for the waves they were a part of. This is an undeniable confirmation that
the accession of selected waves, such as Waves 5 and 6, was slowed down for reasons that are
specific to their geographical location. After all, Eastern Europe’s is adjacent to other regions in
Central and Southern Europe that were accessed rather seamlessly. Thus, the duration model
analysis lends support to the idea that the timeframe of accession of Eastern Europe is negatively
affected by additional factors. In the case of Eastern Europe’s geographical location, proximity
to Russia is also related to its lingering political influence in the region that slows down and even
threatens the region’s European integration. Furthermore, the region’s unique ethnic makeup as
well as the increased incidence of conflict are also factors that were identified as factors of
concern for established member states who approve the accession applications. Therefore, these
factors slow down the accession time-frame and, ultimately, are perceived as problematic by the
established EU member states.
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13 CONCLUSIONS
The preceding analysis of EU accession of new member states provides credible evidence
that supports the idea that earlier accession waves were accessed relatively faster, often at lower
economic and democratic development. I contend that this is due to the fact that these states
brought in fewer additional factors that slow down EU accession, namely pro-Russian parties
with wide public support and political clout, Muslim and Roma minorities in the applicant
member states that exceed the average levels in the EU prior to the states’ accession, and armed
conflict within the region involving the state during EU’s existence. My findings support this
claim and contradict the conventional wisdom according to which we should see a reverse
relationship between GDP (current US dollars) and Polity average per wave and accession speed.
In other words, the higher the GDP (current US dollars) and Polity averages for the entire
application period per wave, the faster the accession. Instead, what I observed is that longer
accession time of the later Waves 5, Wave 6, and Pending applicants are not proportionate to
their pro-democratic development, while earlier accession waves are accessed at lower prodemocratic levels with a much shorter timeframe. The Boolean analysis of the waves indicates
that each subsequent wave gradually shows more and more of the factors that slow down EU
accession as the structures progressively become more top heavy, while the characters of the
states in each wave remain relatively coherent. Exception is Wave 5 that displayed a wide range
of combinations of factors that impede accession speed. The underlying characteristic of Wave 5,
however, is strong support for pro-Russian parties, so it appears that the states in Wave 5 were
lumped together at accession primarily based on the fact that they showed strong political
affiliation with Russia. Overall, the gradual increase in factors in the waves is a more accurate
predictor of the waves’ application length than the states’ pro-democratic performance during
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their application period, a notion supported by some of the literature discussed in earlier
chapters. The most telling reason as to why these factors were important to established member
states can be demonstrated by comparing Waves 3 and 5. Both waves came out of dictatorial
regimes with significant structural and political issues. Nevertheless, the states accessed in Wave
3 show very consistent characteristics with less additional factors that do not indicate proRussian support or conflict with neighboring countries, while Wave 5 shows significant support
for pro-Russian parties and presence of conflict. However, Wave 5 displays higher prodemocratic development and significantly longer accession time than Wave 3. Similar dynamics
can be seen when comparing Waves 6 and 2, where the two waves show only marginal
difference in pro-democratic development, but the accession times of the two waves is
disproportionately short for Wave 2 and very long for Wave 6. However, Wave 6 shows 83.79
percent support for pro-Russian parties, while Wave 2 shows none. Based on these observations,
I believe that the underlying concerns of established member states when accessing Eastern
Europe is Russia’s increased political influence and presence in the region. Although armed
conflict is increasingly present in Waves 5, 6, and Pending, based on the preceding analysis it
always appears to be related to conflict of interest between the West on one side and Russia on
the other. Thus, armed conflict in Eastern Europe and the Balkans is related in one way or
another to Russia’s involvement in the region, so I believe it is a function of Russia’s increased
political influence and presence in the region. The increased presence of Muslim and Roma
minorities in the Balkans also slows down accession speed but only marginally, since these also
exist in established member states, although in smaller concentration. In a sense, the EU policy
of expansion East appears to overlap with NATO’s presence and expansion in the region that is
motivated by the established states’ goal to moderate and push Russian influence out of Eastern
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Europe. A testament to that is, as mentioned in the beginning, the fact that the requirements for
NATO and EU membership are virtually the same, with the exception of that European territory
is not a prerequisite for a NATO membership.
Overall, the preceding literature analysis suggests that the EU is expanding offers to
Eastern Europe to join because established member states want to speed up and protect the
Western-oriented democratic development of the poorer Eastern bloc, resolve conflict within the
region, curb migration from and through Eastern Europe, and win the economic and political
fight with Russia for influence over Eastern Europe. The preceding literature analysis confirmed
that even though democratization alone is a strong motive for EU expansion towards Eastern
Europe, this is not possible without effective institutions. From the preceding analysis, it appears
that EU institutions at this time cannot successfully affect the quality of democracy in Eastern
Europe because they lack real power. Therefore, they are not entirely sufficient on their own to
maintain a democratic sub-continent, which in turn cannot support the expansion of the EU to the
East. In addition to these structural limitations, according to the literature, although a consistent
normative framework is structurally embedded into the EU, it does not manifest in even
Europeanization of new member states and it is not the standard for behavior across the EU. The
EU has set itself up as a model for governance guided by binding European norms, but although
procedurally productive, the EU does not have coherent policies. This inconsistency undermines
the normative foundation of the organization because it gives incentives to members to
implement legislation they do not intend to enforce. These tendencies cast a shadow over claims
that the EU is guided by concepts such as “the rule of law” and “equality” and give credence to
doubts that political decisions in the organization can be arbitrary or self-serving and cater to
political interests of powerful established member states. That can explain why the time-table of
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accession of some European states was accelerated, while it is limited or delayed for others with
similar political, economic, and cultural background. Ultimately, EU expansion East is guided in
part by the economic and in part by political interests of key actors, such as established member
states and not mass driven because if mass opinion was taken into account, the process of
integration would have stopped short of accessing the Balkans, a region still perceived as notEuropean-enough in the Western psyche.
Finally, the preceding literature review also links shorter accession timeframes to
increase in democratic and economic values. Ultimately, although in this analysis I could not
fully support the suggested directionality of this relationship, this insight is very useful because it
identifies some of the major forces that drive EU integration. In broad terms, better economic
and democratic performance can speed up new member accession if the state is perceived as a
potential new market and political ally. Conversely, a poor economic or democratic performance
can be a viable reason for delay or refusal of the application if the state is expected to drag down
developed market economies or support undemocratic attitudes or institutions. While both
scenarios are very well supported by the literature, I maintain that this conventional perception
underplays EU’s advantage of geo-political proximity to Russia. The reason for that is because
EU leadership promotes expansion towards Eastern Europe, regardless of the lack of popular
support for it in many established member states and the overall slower speed of economic
development in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, current political events in Ukraine have clarified
EU’s resolution to promote pro-democratic values and moderate Russian involvement in the
region. All of these developments indicate that the EU has tangible incentives that motivate the
expansion eastwards in the Balkans, closer to Russia, regardless of the various normative,
economic, and structural obstacles.
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In all of this, the rise of right wing ideology in Europe has been very helpful to reestablishing Russia’s influence in Eastern Europe. The right-wing phenomenon in Eastern
Europe is occurring at a time when the EU is experiencing simultaneous political and economic
crises, which puts the EU in a rather unfavorable and vulnerable position. All can be interpreted
as the fruit of Russia’s new geopolitical strategy to re-establish itself as a world superpower in
the Putin era, since Putin’s political ambitions involve a distinctive path to modernization backed
by powerful natural resources that impact the world’s energy market. All of these have also
strongly impacted Russian political life, strengthening Putin’s political position during a time of
negative impact of the global financial crisis and sanctions from the West. However, it is
Russia’s distinctive new approach to politics that includes Euroscepticism and post-communist
neo-conservatism that attracted the attention of many anti-establishment parties within Western
Europe. In Western Europe, the right wing parties who openly express their dislike of
multiculturalism and liberal ideals have found a new unexpected ally in the face of Russia. Now
that parties such as the ENF, the anti-EU EFDD and the far-left GUE-NGL have enough of
political presence within European Parliament, their influence will only grow with the support
and funding from the EP that they are entitled to. However, in Eastern European countries who
share close historical and cultural ties with Russia, the right wing leaning political elites are even
more receptive and openly sympathetic to Russia, since they enjoy even wider popular support
that far predates right-wing support for Russia in Western Europe. Not surprisingly, during the
analysis of the pro-Russian parties in Eastern Europe, the repetitive theme was how sensitive the
issue of NATO and EU membership is in the region, as support for NATO and EU membership
is used repeatedly in power struggles between political opponents and can make or break a
political career. It also appears that parties who currently tend to win on the polls in Eastern
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Europe and in the Balkans in particular are on some level friendly to Moscow, but the same is
not true to such a strong extend in Western Europe. This lends further support to the idea I
expressed earlier, that the EU policy of expansion East appears to overlap with NATO’s
presence and expansion in the region that is motivated by established states goal to moderate and
push Russian influence out of Eastern Europe.
Ultimately, the inability of Europe to promote a consistent and clear process of EU
emancipation for the economically and structurally weaker Eastern European and Balkan
societies radically limits the chances of Russia to find its post-socialist identity and success in the
way of modern liberal democratic development and necessitates the help from NATO. Not
surprisingly as of late, there has been an open power showdown between NATO and Russia in
Eastern Europe. The timing for this could not be any more telling of the ongoing tensions
between Russia and NATO in the region. Thus, EU’s expansion East emerges as a more strategic
approach of established member states that aims to push out Russian influence out of the region
where EU policies failed. Because of the reluctance to form an effective and decisive policy
toward Moscow, in part due to political calculations of established member states, Europe is
moving towards inevitable long-term political instability within the EU and slow, painful, and
uneven EU expansion East at best. This instability will perpetuate chronic economic and security
dilemmas on the continent and on the Balkans and can sabotage EU’s self-envisioned image of a
unified and powerful European community.
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APPENDIX
Duration Analysis Dependent Variable
Application Period (APPLICATION). Variable is calculated as the number of years the state has
had an active application into the EU.
Duration Analysis Indicators Used To Measure Independent Variables
Accession into the EU (CENSOR). CENSOR variable indicates whether the country i was
accessed into the EU at the end of the application period t, so if CENSOR is equal to 1 the
country was accessed and if CENSOR is equal to zero, it was not. Accession for each applicant
is recorded by creating a dummy variable for acceptance into the E.U from data obtained from
the E.U. Legislation web page
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/2004_and_2007_enlar
Gement/index_en.htm
Economic Health (GDP_PERCAPITA). Data for GDP per capita (current US$) is collected from
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries?display=default for all
potential, accepted, and declined applicants. The raw values are then converted to the logarithm
values.
Party Competition (PARCOMP). Variable is recorded on an ordinal scale and measures the
extent to which alternatives to political leadership and policy is available in a given country, so
“Not Applicable” = 0, “Repressed” = 1, “Suppressed” = 2, “Factional” = 3, “Transitional” = 4,
and “Competitive” = 5. Note that the gradation in numbering corresponds to the gradation in
party competition from very none at the lowest end to competitive at the highest end of the
number-scale. Data on party competition characteristic of all courtiers in the European Union is
recorded from the Polity IV website - http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html .
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Distance from Russia. Variable measures the geographical proximity to Russia of applicants. The
distance is measured in miles from Moscow to the capital of each of the member states from
Google maps. The raw values ae then converted to the logarithm values.
Countries. Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom

